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A study of Hiram W. Johnson's public speaking technique and of his speech composition : as manifested in five of his speeches on United States foreign policy

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A
STUDY OF
HIRAM W. JOHNSON'S
PUBLIC SPEAKING TECHNIQUE
AND OF
HIS SPEECH COMPOSITION
AS MANIFESTED IN FIVE OF HIS SPEECHES ON
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

By
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In the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century Hiram W. Johnson was one of the most important men in American public life. He attained his eminence through the power of the spoken word; as a master wielder of that power he is a deserving subject for a study to which this thesis claims to be only the plodding and inept introduction.

The point of view from which the present paper was written is that expressed by Herbert Wichelns in "The Literary Criticism of Oratory." "The critic," Wichelns writes, "speaks of the orator as a public man whose function it is to exert his influence by speech," and "criticism...holds its business to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator's method of imparting his ideas to his hearers."

Johnson's career as an orator passed, in point of time, at least, through three distinct phases. In the first, he is but a practicing lawyer, his oratory confined to the courtroom. In the second, he is a reformer, riding a wave of progressive government in California. In the third, he is an arch-conservative, his voice the greatest obstacle to a mature participation by the United States in international affairs.

This thesis does not pretend to be an exhaustive study of Johnson's methods for three reasons: 1. Its

is restricted to the third of the developmental stages listed above; 2. The speeches selected for analysis are restricted to the topic of U. S. foreign policy; 3. All but one of the speeches were made in the Senate, with its unique speech situation.

It was felt that with the study thus qualified, it could not be adequately evaluated, nor could its conclusions be justified, without the inclusion of the speeches themselves in the thesis. This reasoning accounts for the fact that seventy-five percent of this thesis--the appendix--was written by Johnson.

For its form, and to a certain extent its method of treatment, the thesis used as models the chapters of History and Criticism of American Public Address (edited by W. Norwood Brigance). As a check-list against oversights, omissions, and errors of emphasis, the author used "A Standard for Critical Analysis," issued by the Department of Speech of the University of Iowa. For errors of expression, evaluation, and judgment the author himself must take the blame.

Hiram Warren Johnson was born in Sacramento, California, September 2, 1866. Graduated from Sacramento High School when seventeen years old, then spent a year in his father's law office. Entered the University of California in 1884, left two years later to marry. Passed state bar examinations and practiced law with father and brother till 1901. Moved to San Francisco in 1902 and practiced law there till 1910. Elected governor of California in 1910; reelected in 1914, one of only three men in the state's history to be so honored. While governor, reformed the state banking system, established initiative, referendum, recall, workmen's compensation law, blue-sky law, women's suffrage in state elections; broke the hold of the Southern Pacific Railroad on state politics. Candidate for Vice-President of the United States in 1912 on Bull Moose ticket. Elected U. S. Senator in 1916, reelected for five terms. Unsuccessfully sought Republican nominations for President of the U. S. in 1920 and 1924. While Senator, he led the "isolationist" attacks on the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, the World Court, armament limitations programs, support of Great Britain against Hitler; sponsored in the Senate the legislation authorizing the Boulder Dam project. Died Aug. 6, 1945.

PART I: The Man in Action

Hiram W. Johnson was born into a world where war was still pretty much a matter of national choice. He never got over that accident. At the time of his death 78 years later two earthshaking wars had failed to alter his conviction that the world had not changed. He devoted his 27 years in the United States Senate to expounding the doctrine that the United States could live aloof from the world. He played a leading role in keeping the United States out of the League of Nations, and he probably hastened thereby Woodrow Wilson's death. He made our membership in the World Court meaningless. "The Hoover moratorium, the London Naval Conference, the New Deal,

perhaps even the League of Nations,

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would not have happened, but for downright Johnsonian obstinacy."¹

This paper is an attempt to determine the source of Johnson's personal influence on American foreign policy through an analysis of his oratorical methods and effectiveness.

Before looking at Johnson himself, it might be well to review the circumstances in which his philosophy was born and flourished.

The First World War dramatically emphasized America's productive capacity, her military strength, her financial power, and her moral prestige. Whatever her pre-war influence had been, the Armistice found her undeniably the greatest and most powerful nation in the world. The great debate of post-war America centered on the use of that power. Wilson was the chief spokesman for the "internationalist" group who held that concomitant with America's authority was the responsibility of using that authority to achieve the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Opposed to this concept were the "isolationists" who, led by Senators Lodge, Borah, and Johnson, preached a kind of international rugged

¹T. C. Wallen, "Johnson: Symbol of Extreme Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX, 13, col. 2 (March 23, 1935). This statement is based on Wallen's belief that if Johnson had given Hughes his full support in 1916, Wilson would never have been President.

individualism, arguing that the United States 3
need concern itself with foreign nations only to the
extent necessary to steer clear of their disputes, that
throwing in our fortune with the fortunes of the rest of
the world means "throwing our fortunes to the rest of the
world, that the rest of the world may do with our donation
as it sees fit."¹

Through the next two decades these opposing philosophies contended for the support of Americans with the isolationists usually victorious. Not until 1937, when the growing threat of Hitlerism in Europe and the persuasiveness of Franklin D. Roosevelt combined to stir Americans out of their indifference and/or their opposition to the internationalist attitude, did isolationism lose its grip on U. S. foreign policy.

From Armistice Day to Pearl Harbor Hiram Johnson was one of the most vociferous and successful exponents of isolationism. He condemned the World Court, the League of Nations, the Hoover moratorium on war debts, the London Treaty for Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, the military conscription law of 1940--anything and everything which he could portray as either a step toward war or a sacrifice of our sovereignty or prestige. He was a consistent foe of all plans which called for U. S. participation in the affairs of other nations, such as

¹Johnson, 1919 speech

membership in the League of Nations would have 4
entailed. He had no particular program of his own,
other than for the United States to stay behind our
"...God-given vantage of 3000 miles of protecting
waters...",¹ but he was savage and unrelenting in his
attacks upon the plans of others. He was the great nega-
tive speaker of the debate. "Few Federal statutes carry
his name. He is more noted for what he has stopped."²
"...he appears in warmest light when he is 'agin' some-
body or something,"³ and so effective was his opposition
that "...since 1917, when he entered the Senate, Hiram
Johnson has waved his arms, tossed his grey head,
thundered his passionate opinions in such a way as to
abort most of the things he has been against."⁴

PERSONALITY---

To his task Johnson brought a personality universally
noted for its independence, its obstinacy, its vigor, its
ambition, and its hard conviction of the righteousness of
his cause. He was of medium height and stoutly built,
but never giving the impression of flabbiness. A round
head with a squarish face, thin lips firmly set in a

¹Johnson, 1923 speech.

²T. C. Wallen, op. cit., p. 13, col. 2.

³A. F. C., "Backstage in Washington: Senator Johnson and
the President," Outlook, CLX, 10 (January 6, 1932).

⁴Time, XXVII, 15, col. 3 (February 24, 1936).

straight line, and direct, angry eyes, was surmounted by straight grey hair, parted in the middle and combed straight out to each side. "To match the grey of his eyes one would have to break a piece of steel and examine the surface; only the steel would not be alive with a cold fire. When Hiram Johnson is pleased to be genial there are few more winning men alive; and when he is pleased to be cantankerous, he steps out of competition."¹

The most unflattering portrait of Johnson this writer found was written by C. W. Gilbert, a journalist, who pictures Johnson as an egomaniac seeking only the cheers of the mob.

Revolution has a fierce attraction for him. I do not believe he [wanted revolution.] But he wanted his chance, that outburst of popular resentment which would bring him to the front; with the excitement, the sense of power that would come from the response of the nation when his angry voice translated into words its elemental passion. Turbulent popular feeling is breath in Johnson's nostrils...²

Johnson's political life, Gilbert continues, was a blank until in 1910 he successfully prosecuted the Abe Ruef gang which had controlled San Francisco politics. The resultant "...angry popular feeling...woke something in him, something that he did not know existed

¹Wallen, op. cit., p. 35, col. 2.

²The Mirrors of Washington, 184.

before--his instinct for the expression of public passion; his love of the platform with yelling multitudes in front of him."¹

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The essential thing with him is popular passion, not a political philosophy. He has no political philosophy. He has no real convictions. He does not reason or think deeply. His mentality is slight. He is the voice of many; instinctively he gives tongue to what the many feel; that is all.²

In contrast to Wallen's statement of Johnson's geniality, Gilbert thought him "...cold, hard, and selfish...He has no magnetism in personal contact. He walks toward you as if he were about to strike a blow...His smile is wry...He is not interested in people...He is habitually pessimistic."³

This appraisal of Johnson as motivated primarily by "popular passion" is not corroborated by other writers or borne out by Johnson's political activities subsequent to 1921. Though Johnson supported Roosevelt in 1932, he was not famed as one of the prophets of the New Deal. He fathered none of the social legislation of the thirties, and the "public passion" of that day was directed to such domestic issues as labor unionization. In the late thirties and until the United States declared war on Japan, Johnson steadfastly clung to his

¹Gilbert, op. cit., 186.

²Ibid, p. 188.

³Ibid, pp. 189-90.

isolationist doctrine, though the weight of popular opinion was against him.

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A more realistic viewpoint is that Johnson was dominated more by his own emotions than by popular prejudice, and probably more by his emotions than by his intellect. He was unreservedly ambitious. "In his soul is an insatiable thirst for power and mastery. He cannot conceal it; it is evident to the casual acquaintance."¹ Johnson readily admitted that his ambition extended to the White House. He wrote to C. K. McClatchy, a California publisher, "As I have said to you often, I would like to be President. I think any American in political life who pretends otherwise is wholly hypocritical..."²

Johnson's obstinacy combined with his ambition to cost him the Presidency in 1923 and probably in 1924. He sought and lost the Republican nomination in 1920, was offered the Vice-Presidential nomination but refused, declining to play "second fiddle" to a party hack. Harding's death in 1923 elevated Coolidge to the White House, and though Johnson again campaigned for the nomination in 1924, he lost to Coolidge. Owens explained the

¹John W. Owens, "Hiram Johnson at Large Again," New Republic, XXVI, 378 (May 25, 1921).

²Quoted in the Literary Digest, LXXVIII, 11.

defeat as "...the simple story of a man of
personal rectitude and large talent for public affairs
who has been thrown back on his haunches...for no other
reason than that he was narrowly and unintelligently
selfish...,"¹ and defines Johnson's selfishness as "a
form that usually causes the man afflicted with it to be
described as a short sport."²

Johnson, in short, was not above the petty malice
and resentment so common to all men. As a matter of fact,
it is probable that the very traits which gave rise to his
shortcomings were also sources of much of his strength.
Thus, his unyielding belief that his way was the right
way fostered both his obstinacy and his independence.
His ambition nourished both his selfishness and his per-
sistence in advocating his philosophy. His vigor lent
color and power to his attacks on others, even though it
helped to perpetuate unfounded grudges. The blunt,
forthright fury of his orations denied them finesse and
subtlety, but convinced his audiences of his sincerity.

PLATFORM MANNER---

All these characteristics helped to shape his
speeches, and all impressed his hearers. Of them perhaps

¹John W. Owens, "The Tragic Hiram," American Mercury, I,
60 (January 1924).

²Ibid.

the most commanding was his aggressive manner.

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Johnson is bursting with energy and vitality; he is always under high pressure; he is dominant, masterful, impatient of restraint, demandful for what he believes to be right; "a born leader" as the old phrase has it. He is pugnacious, always a fighter, and incapable of using moral suasion...¹

(It is a curious fact that twenty-six years ago Lowry, asking people what kind of man Johnson was, would receive the reply, "He certainly is a fighter." Johnson's style did not change, nor did his hearers' impressions. When the present writer was gathering the material for this thesis, he asked those people who could recall hearing Johnson what the Senator's platform manner was. The reply invariably started with, "Well, he was very forceful.")

His pugnacity was fundamental in his approach to all problems. "A sort of passive attitude never got me anywhere," he wrote, "and my natural inclination is to fight."²

One of the fortunate consequences of this pugnacity was that it convinced his auditors of his sincerity. That Johnson was sincere, not even Gilbert questioned. And because he believed so passionately in the things he said, he transmitted that belief to his audience.

¹Edward G. Lowry, Washington Close-ups, 51.

²McClatchy letter, op. cit., p. 11.

"He...is a remarkably effective platform speaker, not because he is smooth and polished, but, on the contrary, because his audience can not fail to be convinced that he means every word he says."¹ "To hear him speak is to believe in his fundamental honesty and in the sincerity with which he takes his stand and advocates his belief...Even his enemies admit that he is a man of great power and force of character."²

Is it any wonder that when this "bold, forthright, questing man"³ mounted the speaker's platform and directed his magnificent vitality and belligerent attention to the League of Nations that the people of America responded with "even stronger emotions than Mr. Wilson could stir?"⁴

Johnson's platform manner was fully in keeping with his personality.

He stands there, flat-founded on the platform, square-shouldered, short-necked, deep-chested, and slightly rotund--very much like a boxer ready for the bout...Johnson gesticulates very little, but when he does, "Every little movement has a meaning all its own." Sometimes he shoves a thought out with a closed left fist; then with a clenched right fist; now with both hands he shoves it into place--where he means it to stay...Then he hammers the thing down, as on an anvil; fashioning it; first,

¹"Hiram Johnson's American-made Radicalism," Literary Digest, LXV, 51 (April 3, 1920). Quoted from an editorial by Bruce Bliven in the New York Globe.

²O. G. Villard, "Hiram W. Johnson," Nation, CX, 748 (June 5, 1930).

³Lowry, op. cit., 50.

one fist, then the other, and finally both, as if tamping the roadbed solid for the coming of the freight.¹

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His gestures are not Delsartian; in fact, they have been described by students of oratory as negative gestures. They consist merely of a doubling up of the fist and a short-arm pounding of the air, first with one hand and then with the other. His one other gesture is a waving of the hand, palm outward, to silence applause which he apparently wishes to still so that the continuity of his thought and the full effect of the point he is making shall not be lost...²

He moved as he talked, with broad, blunt movements, devoid of subtlety and delicate nuance. "Senator Johnson is not a polished orator. He has few of the mannerisms or stage tricks of the stump speaker."³

The whole-bodiedness of his gestures reinforced the concept of Johnson as a fighting man, so eager to strike the target of his vehemence that decorum and finesse became stumbling-blocks to his progress. C. C. Brainerd, Washington correspondent of the Brooklyn (N. Y.) Eagle, compares Johnson and Idaho's Senator Borah thus:

There is a good deal of dignity in Borah's bearing, but not so with Hiram Johnson. His manner is too aggressive, his voice too rasping, his gestures too

¹"Hiram Johnson, Political Revivalist," Review of Reviews, XLVI, 309, col. 1 (Sept. 1912); quoted from an article by Edmund Norton in LaFollettes (date not specified).

²Alexander C. Joy, "Senator Johnson's Campaign," Review of Reviews, LXI, 605 (June 1920).

³Ibid., 604.

swift and vigorous to convey any suggestion of Senatorial dignity. For Borah's deliberate solemnity Johnson substitutes speed and a punch.¹

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VOICE---

Johnson's voice was not famed for a bell-like tone; indeed, it is usually described as rasping in quality and monotonous in pitch. Subtlety in the use of his voice was as foreign to Johnson as was subtlety of phrase or of gesture. His impulse was to shout, to roar down his opposition, to conquer his audience with main strength. His faith in himself and in the causes he espoused, his predilection for direct and unceasing attack when the battle was joined, led him to blow down his opponents rather than to sing an artful tune for them to chorus. Johnson would have vetoed the horse before the walls of Troy and built instead a battering ram.

One of the most vivid accounts of Johnson's voice is found in an unsigned article in Review of Reviews.

"It was in June, at Chicago, that Johnson first secured widespread recognition for his fighting voice. Those who attended that convention can never forget that voice. They agree that, in the words of an

¹Quoted in "Borah and Johnson, Disturbers of the Senatorial Peace," Literary Digest, LXII, 52 (August 23, 1919).

The first notes of his voice keyed up your nerves to a fighting pitch. We can't imagine anyone's listening to Johnson for five minutes without wanting to fight--either to fight with him or to fight against him. His voice sounds just as an east wind feels. It grates and snarls and pierces, and puts you all on edge. The whole man goes with the voice. Every posture and gesture is one of intensity. His hands are nearly always clenched. His jaw, a good strong fighting jaw, is set. His muscles are tense. He talks rapidly and with no gradations of volume or tone, without any embellishment of rhetoric, without any appearance of self-consciousness. He gives you the impression of a man carried away entirely on the flood of his own feelings."²

Elbert F. Baldwin, in a review of Johnson's political future during the 1920 Presidential campaign, wrote

He has that indefinable thing called charm. If, in his case, we try to define the elements in it, we shall probably think first of all, of his voice, not in its sometimes rasping platform tones, but in the gentleness and persuasiveness of its conversational quality...On the stage he is tempestuous. As he thunders, his deep-chested tones bespeak a constitution of iron and steel. Moved to the highest pitch of emotion, he fairly snaps at his enemies, as Roosevelt did.³

Contrasted with these essentially favorable judgments is the statement of a Washington journalist that Johnson "...has no magnetism in personal contact...His voice is

¹Not further identified.

²"Hiram Johnson, Political Revivalist," Review of Reviews, XLVI, 309 (Sept. 1912).

³"Hiram Johnson: His Assets and Liabilities," Outlook, CXXIV, 696 (April 21, 1920).

unpleasant...with its hard angry tone, its mechanical rise and fall, it has the ring of a hundred guillotines in operation."¹

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It is clear from these accounts, friendly and unfriendly--with due allowance for the political and journalistic considerations which prompted their publication--that Johnson had a tremendous fund of vitality, and that this vitality was a fundamental surging influence in his speaking. Some of his hearers were attracted by it, some were repelled, but none was indifferent. No one could listen to him "without wanting to fight--either to fight with him or to fight against him." None of his audiences left him lukewarm, indifferent, or unimpressed. And this was due, apparently, not so much to what he said, or to the words in which he said it, but to the sheer overwhelming force of the man, to the flood of passion which moved him. We may infer that it was the whole personality rather than any specific oratorical skill which underlay his success.

AUDIENCE RESPONSE--

Successful he undeniably was. There are obvious difficulties and dangers involved in appraising the audience response to a speech made by a politician to a group of politicians. To say that Johnson's 1919

¹C. W. Gilbert, The Mirrors of Washington, 189-90.

Treaty influenced the vote on the ratification of that treaty would be sailing dangerously close to the rocks of the "post hoc" fallacy. Indeed, the Senatorial vote on a given question is determined by so many factors other than the merits of the question itself that rarely, if ever, is any Senator's vote directly traceable to another Senator's oratorical persuasiveness. On the other hand, legislators realize that their speeches reach a larger, and perhaps more important audience than that immediately facing them; and their speeches are probably designed as much for their impact on the public at large as for the purpose of influencing the Congressional temper. Finally, each Congressman addresses his own constituents, and must in deference to them shape his utterances so as not to jeopardize his political future. The last situation is further complicated by the fact that the politician in legislative office must choose from among the things he wants to say those which will please his constituents, and may be forced by his constituents to advocate measures of which he personally does not approve. Johnson, then, had three audiences: the Senate and the Nation, both of which he attempted to lead, and the voters of California, whom he wished to lead, but was at the same time required to follow.

audiences and shaped his arguments accordingly.

Such appeals as the following were addressed primarily to Senators' ears.

You gentlemen from the South would resent the suggestion that the race problem of yours should be decided by nations bound to the race affected by secret treaties. (1919)

Why is it necessary now, in the heat of a political campaign and in the dog days in the city of Washington, to ratify this treaty...? Today the Chief Executive has in his hands... appointments to various offices... He will not send them even to the Senate for fear we might be delayed... (1930)

The cry is rampant throughout the land today to destroy the Senate as a part of the treaty-making power... By this reservation the Senate is deprived practically of the right to say aught concerning what is a treaty. (1935)

It would be useless for me to say to any of my colleagues that they are ruining their country... they ought not to take their country into any path at the end of which is ruin, and ruin is at the end of this vote which is about to be cast tonight. (1941)

For his constituents in California Johnson had such words as these:

It is absolutely clear that questions like immigration, those arising from the alien land law of California and similar matters, will be within the jurisdiction of the league... Californians, therefore, if they are interested in Japanese immigration, if they believe in the California land law... can not support the present league of nations. (1919)

I see in the not so distant future this great territory from which I come, the empire of the world, with its ships going to the four corners of the earth... In the desire to protect that commerce, in the endeavor to aid that territory which I love and from which I come, wherein I

was born...I struggle here... (1930)

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Finally, Johnson's realization that his audience was not restricted to the Senators who faced him and the Californians who voted for him is demonstrated in the following excerpts.

Are ye ready, Americans, to pledge your sons and your sons' sons to maintain and preserve for all time the present governments of the little nations ...in Europe and the present governments and boundaries of the British and Japanese Empires? (1919)

Americans, if they are jealous of their right to determine who shall come to our shores and under what circumstances, and who insist Americans must alone decide their domestic problems dealing with other nationals, can not support the present league of nations. (1919)

I should like to present this question to just the common people of America, and I would do it with the absolute confidence that they would again agree that we should never join with a European organization... (1935)

His success with all three audiences is demonstrated by three facts. First, in the Senate between 1919 and 1939 only one major step in our foreign policy was taken over Johnson's determined opposition. Second, the nation in general rejected the League of Nations and the World Court, and up to the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster, was skeptical of the extent to which we should support Great Britain against Hitler--in 1941 U. S. citizens were still lulled to apathy by Johnson's, "God gave us two great oceans that put us here upon this hemisphere...

Why go abroad?"¹ Third, Johnson, elected 18 to the Senate in 1916, was reelected every subsequent term, and still represented his state at the time of his death. He was elected in 1934 despite the fact that he bolted party lines to support Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 against Herbert Hoover, a fellow Californian. In 1940 he won the Senatorial nomination, tantamount to election, on all three of the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive tickets, though California was predominantly Democratic in registration and by that time Johnson was a bitter foe of Roosevelt's foreign policy and of the President's third term candidacy, and had previously helped to defeat in the Senate Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court.

Thus, the relative permanency of isolationist sentiment in American attitudes testifies to the effectiveness of Johnson and his colleagues. Even the mutual hardships and sacrifices of the Second World War have failed to overcome American indifference to foreign affairs.²

¹1935 speech.

²The following is typical. "I am an American, working in the British zone of Germany...with persons of English and continental nationality who are so tired...of conditions which the American public...can never understand...I feel embarrassed when I read in the papers of the delays on action on the British loan--and the apathetic attitude toward the world food situation...Today, the apparent callousness of my people is making it difficult for me to work..." Dorothy T. Pearse, letter to the Editor, Time, XLVIII, 6 (July 1, 1946).

Johnson's skill in holding an audience. "For instance, at the Chicago convention of 1912 he was the only Progressive who made a hostile majority give him its attention and listen to his address without interruption... No candidate is such a powerful campaigner... He is not so magnetic as was Theodore Roosevelt, but when you have once been under his spell, the spell remains. Last week after hearing one of Mr. Johnson's speeches, an auditor remarked, 'I'm not a Johnson man, but he is the greatest orator I ever heard. Why, he pulled me right out of my seat!'"¹

Oswald Garrison Villard rated Johnson in 1920 as "vastly more effective than William J. Bryan, with almost as much punch and vigor in his utterances as Roosevelt had. One cannot...hear him speak without being affected by him, whether one believes him or not."²

Johnson's influence on the public mind during the debate on the Versailles Treaty was not exerted solely through his speeches in the Senate. When President Wilson toured the nation in 1919, seeking to arouse popular sentiment for the League of Nations, "Johnson and other Senators...were out speaking to immense audiences and eliciting even stronger emotions than Mr. Wilson could

¹E. F. Baldwin, "Hiram Johnson: His Assets and Liabilities," Outlook, CXXIV, 696 (April 21, 1920).

²"Hiram W. Johnson," Nation, CX, 749 (June 5, 1920).

stir...Senator Johnson was having such 20
success on his tour that friends of the League declared
he was running away with the Republican Presidential
nomination."¹ A year later, during the 1920 Presidential
campaign, Johnson's influence apparently was so great
that he established the Republican Party's policy on the
League. "...Harding, in his Des Moines speech, had said
as much as he could for the League without displeasing
Senator Johnson."²

Johnson's influence--the vigor and strength of the
response of his audience--was much more apparent in the
early 1920's than it was later, although, as shown above,
it did not actually start to decline until after 1935.
There were several reasons for this. In the first place,
Harding's signature of our peace treaties with Germany
and her allies in 1921 obviated further discussion of the
Treaty of Versailles and shoved the League of Nations issue
into the background. The efforts of the world to achieve
peace were thereafter concentrated in the various disarmament
proposals, which, being essentially negative
approaches to the problem, failed to inspire the popular
interest which the League debates aroused.

¹D. F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 698.

²Ruhl F. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace, 196.
Quoted from a letter from A. Lawrence Lowell, then President of Harvard University, to Paul D. Cravath, Oct. 17, 1920.

Republican Presidential nomination in 1924 kept him in the public eye despite the relative stability of our foreign policy at that time, whereas his only active campaigning on a national scale thereafter was a series of speeches supporting Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and a group of addresses made under the dubious auspices of the America First Committee in the late thirties. His campaigning on his own behalf was restricted to getting himself reelected to the Senate.

Thirdly, the economic boom of the twenties concentrated public attention on domestic prosperity. People were anxious to forget the war and ignore its consequences. The 1926 debates on U. S. adherence to the World Court never had the flavor of the 1919 debates on the League of Nations; people weren't interested any longer; the issue had lost its vitality. The economic depression of the thirties had the same effect; misery at home was more compelling than plans for an international Utopia.

The 1935 debate on the World Court was Johnson's last effective expression of isolationism. Though he strove to the very last--the 1941 speech included in this study was made exactly a month before Pearl Harbor--to impress the virtues of isolation upon the nation, he was a man with a lost cause. The Pearl Harbor disaster made isolationism an academic question overnight. Johnson didn't just lose the support of his audience; he lost the audience itself.

PART II: Speech Analysis and Critique

Of the five speeches selected for this study four were made in the Senate. The fifth was made at a testimonial dinner for Johnson following his return from a tour of Europe in 1923. This speech was extracted from the New York Times, which printed the text in full. The authenticity of this text must rest on the reliability of Times reporting. The four Senate speeches were extracted from the Congressional Record. Two of them (1930, 1935) were interrupted by other Senators for questions and discussion. One (1941) was interrupted by the Presiding Officer of the Senate to notify Johnson that his time had expired. The remaining speech (1919) was uninterrupted by Johnson's specific request, but newspaper comment, including quotations from the speech, plus the notation in the Congressional Record following Johnson's conclusion, "Applause on the floor and in the galleries," confirm the fact that it was delivered. There is little, if any, reason to believe that any portion of the Senate speeches was inserted in the Congressional Record as an "Extension of Remarks."

In all of these speeches Johnson upholds the negative of the question under discussion. In 1919 he denounces the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles. In 1923 he opposes U. S. participation in European

affairs in general and the World Court in

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particular. In 1930 he would have the Treaty of London voted down. In 1935 he attacks the World Court again. In 1941 he resists the repeal of certain sections of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

REFUTATION---

Johnson might be expected, as a staunch supporter of the negative in these debates, to devote considerable time and effort to a refutation of the affirmative arguments, but such an expectation is not realized. Though he is unrelenting in his attacks on the plans of the internationalists, he seldom attacks the reasoning upon which those plans are based. In 1919 he uses only three paragraphs in citing and refuting arguments supporting the League.¹ Apparently Johnson worked under some kind of rule of three, for in none of these speeches does he refer to more than three opposing arguments.² His method in the three speeches on the League and the World Court is to

¹p. 77, "We have been told by the President...;" p. 98 ff., "Of late, the advocates of the League..." and following paragraph. (In this and all subsequent footnotes referring to Johnson's speeches, the page numbers cited are those of the appendix to this thesis.)

²1923: p. 128, "However well intended...;" p. 134, "Moral weight! Our internationalists...;" p. 138, "Our internationalists iterate...;" 1930: p. 149, "I do not speak...;" 1935: p. 206, "Why do we enter it...;" p. 230, "One of the arguments...;" p. 233, "Now, in order to ease us...;" 1941: p. 257, "What do you say to it?..."

show that the methods of the internationalists 24
will not achieve their goals. Although this generality
is a valid starting point for refutation, Johnson supports
it only by impugning the motives and methods of the
European nations, and predicting various dire results for
America, so that his argument is more emotional than
logical. In 1919, for example, he refers to the argument
of the League supporters that "we must throw in our for-
tunes with the rest of the world...We have become a part
of world politics." His answer is that "throwing in our
fortunes with the fortunes of the rest of the world
means...throwing our fortunes to the rest of the world,
that [it] may do with our donation as it sees fit."¹ He
sweeps aside the argument that we could, as a member of
the League, exert our moral weight by asserting that, on
the contrary, our moral weight would be dissipated by
submitting it "for ultimate expression to those who have
no moral sense."²

The 1935 speech contains a good example of the avidity
with which Johnson seized on an opportunity to cloak his
refutation in abuse of European nations. He refers to the
arguments of proponents of the World Court that the United
States should not share in the benefits of peace without
paying a portion of the expense--the so-called "sponger"

¹1919, p. 78.

²1923, p. 135.

argument. Without attempting to dispute the argument itself, Johnson seizes upon the word "sponger" and applies it with similar aspersions to the governments of Europe.¹ To the uncritical or unobservant listener this might appear to be turning the tables, whereas it is in reality ignoring the question. The same fallacy underlies the whole of the 1941 speech; it is perfectly summed up in Johnson's own words, "I care not for Great Britain or 'Bundles for Britain,' I care not for Germany and Hitler's crimes."² Johnson's attack on the affirmative argument that we should have the freedom of the seas is as pointless in the face of the larger question of England's survival as is the argument itself.³

His most effective refutation occurs in the early part of the 1935 speech. "Why," he asks, "do we enter [the World Court?] ... [We are told] we must go in to preserve the world's peace...What peace do you mean?"⁴ And he promptly cites a list of international conflicts which the League of Nations had not and apparently could not resolve.⁵

Another instance of logical refutation is found in

¹1935, p. 230 ff.

²p. 257.

³p. 257 ff.

⁴p. 208.

⁵p. 206 ff.

1930, where Johnson attacks a disjunctive syllogism by 26 demonstrating that the alternatives are not exhaustive and by denying their mutual exclusiveness.¹

In 1923 he scores the notion that America could solve Europe's problems when generations of Europeans had failed to do so. His answer to the internationalist belief "that it is not our troops that are wanted. It is our views" is to cite a list of historic personalities from Julius Caesar to Mussolini whose views failed to bring peace to Europe. "It follows apparently that all it needs is two new representatives of the American State Department [who] would accomplish a task that a thousand geniuses from Alexander the Great to Lloyd George have attempted in vain."²

CONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENT: LOGICAL PROOF--

The great bulk of Johnson's speeches is devoted to constructive negative argument. As might be expected from the foregoing discussion, the constructive argument is based primarily on emotional rather than logical grounds. Yet, though the main contentions of his speeches are phrased and developed with emphasis on their ethical and pathetic appeals, Johnson does use logical devices in his subsidiary and supporting propositions.

His favorite logical method appears to be argument

¹p. 149 ff.

²p. 138 f.

from specific instances. This method appears in his refutation as the citation of negative instances.¹ Perhaps his most cogent use of the method is his development in the 1930 speech of the thesis that our merchant marine must be large enough to carry our sea-going commerce, and our navy must be large enough to protect the merchant marine. He supports both statements with copious illustrations from the past.² The chain of reasoning of which these premises are a part is the only logical argument in the entire speech, and is carefully and strongly developed up to the final link--that the treaty navy is inadequate--when he merely asserts "that under this treaty no such navy is accorded to us,"³ and leaves the subject never to return.

In contrast to the careful elaboration and comparative weight of the commerce-protection argument, Johnson's use of specific instances leads to hasty generalization when he predicts the failure of the 1930 treaty because the Washington Treaty of 1922 did not accomplish its goals.⁴ He even goes to the extreme of asserting that "the Washington conference ought to be the guide for all

¹In the 1923 and the 1935 speeches.

²P. 164 ff.

³P. 169.

⁴P. 152 ff.

of our people respecting every other conference,"¹ thus perpetuating his fallacy!

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In 1935 he cites the case of the Austro-German customs union decision to prove that the World Court judges decide the cases brought before them "not according to law, not according to judicial concepts... [but according to] the politics of the situation..."²

In the 1919 and 1935 speeches Johnson elaborates his historical material into the Holy Alliance analogy.³ His use of the analogy is particularly effective in 1919, when he demonstrates the similarity between the League of Nations and the Holy Alliance even in the phraseology of the respective covenants. He varies the analogy in 1935 by quoting John Adams and Emerson regarding U. S. participation in the agreement.

These few manifestations of the logical method are all of importance to be found in these speeches. There are no examples of syllogistic reasoning, except for the unfinished chain in the 1930 speech. The rest of the speech material is given over to the emotional modes of proof.

¹p. 151.

²p. 224 f.

³1919: p. 79 ff.; 1935: p. 238 ff.

Johnson based his opposition to our participation in European affairs on two main arguments, one of which is essentially ethical in nature and is supported by a series of ethical sub-arguments. The main argument is summarized in a single sentence in 1923: "If we become a part of what is happening abroad, we would be the dupe or the prey of one faction or the other."¹

To the support of this thesis he brought all the vituperative power at his command. Membership in the League of Nations or the World Court, ratification of the London Naval Treaty, did not represent to him a constructive effort by America toward peace and good will, but submission to the rapacity of international gangsters; and he did not hesitate to say so.

To his disparagement of the European governments and Japan Johnson applied a well-stocked vocabulary of derogatory nouns and adjectives. Nowhere in these speeches can there be found, except as sarcasm or irony, a complimentary description of a foreign government or personality.

In 1919, for example, we find such descriptives as these: "the four bankrupt nations with which we have allied ourselves;"² "the shrewd nationalist of Europe;"³

¹p. 133.

²p. 84.

³p. 90.

its seething millions of discontented peoples;"¹ "the autocracy of the Orient;"² "a league of armed nations in a gigantic war trust;"³ "cynical Old World Diplomacy."⁴

The 1923 speech, a monument of ethical argument, is filled with such terms as deceit, hypocrisy, suspicion, hatred, distrust, perfidious Albion, the maelstrom of Europe--and all are used to characterize European governments and their attitudes. Of England he warns, "No sentiment rules its foreign office, and none interferes with its political alliances."⁵

Of France: "She seeks by the strong arm what she asserts is her just due."⁶

Germany "dreams of a future day of reckoning."⁷

"The strong man of Italy...pursues his nationalistic way."⁸

With such strokes does Johnson paint a picture of a gang of thieves and exploiters across the sea waiting

¹p. 90.

²p. 110.

³p. 114.

⁴p. 117.

⁵p. 129.

⁶p. 130.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

for a hapless United States to fall into
their unscrupulous hands.

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The situation involved in the 1930 debate did not give him the opportunity or the justification for attacking the motives of other nations, but in 1935 he takes up the cudgels again. He blames the delay in U. S. adherence to the World Court on "Europe's scheming diplomats."¹ "A Court where the controlling interests represent dictatorship, absolutism, tyranny"² cannot protect peoples' interests, he argues. Membership in the Court, he cries, would compel us "to sit with spongers, with welchers, and with repudiators of treaties."³

He exploits the ethical appeal of the Holy Alliance analogy by demonstrating that the Holy Alliance was used by the "infamous Metternich"⁴ for political purposes; and he declares that the League of Nations would be ruled in "the same sinister spirit."⁵

To his deprecation of foreign governments he added derogation of the League of Nations and the World Court as such. "The circumstances surrounding [the League's] creation are anything but reassuring...The covenant...

¹P. 205.

²P. 211.

³P. 231.

⁴1919: p. 86.

⁵Ibid., p. 86.

often ambiguous and obscure, born in
secrecy, binds us in the sordid, cunning, secret,
and crafty designs of European and Asiatic governments."¹
"This league of nations...was meant to obtain peace only
insofar as peace maintained forever inviolate [the mem-
bers'] territories and their subject peoples; and it was
meant that this kind of peace should be obtained by the
exercise of the power and the force of the United
States."²

Johnson sums up his objections to the League in a
full paragraph of denunciation in 1919.³ He warns in
1935 that "if they get us over there at Geneva into the
Court, our protests will be treated as so much waste
paper and our remonstrances will be mingled with the
air."⁴

He denounces the internationalists in America as
fiercely as he does "the chancellories of Europe, with
their secret diplomacy, their selfishness and cupidity,
and their hideous schemes of exploitation and
conquest."⁵

He complains bitterly that "we who would protect

¹1919: p. 74.

²Ibid., p. 91.

³p. 114 f.

⁴1935: P. 248.

⁵1923: p. 129.

and preserve our own Nation...are

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designated as 'little,' 'selfish,' and 'provincial' Americans."¹ In 1919 and 1930 he condemns the U. S. government for its official propaganda on behalf of the League of Nations and the London Treaty respectively.² In 1923 he concentrates on foreign, and particularly British, propaganda.³ In 1935 he warns against "the highly paid propagandists and all their dupes."⁴

Thus Johnson pilloried his opponents, doubting their wisdom, questioning their sincerity, denying their honesty, proclaiming their perfidy. As might be expected, he relied heavily on ethical proof in establishing his own fitness as a speaker. He adopted the pose of the novice, the earnest stumbler. His speeches abound in such phrases as "my feeble warning,"⁵ "in my humble fashion,"⁶ "the Republican Party, of which I am a very humble member,"⁷ "my very marked limitations,"⁸ and so on.

He repeatedly disavows any political motives in

¹1919: p. 71 f.

²1919: p. 72 f.; 1930: p. 155 f.

³p. 125 f.

⁴p. 219.

⁵1923: p. 125.

⁶Ibid., p. 133.

⁷1930: p. 144.

⁸1935: p. 203.

his attitude toward foreign policy---"I am

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one of those who believe politics should be limited to the coast line of the nation"¹--and imputes the same objectivity (except in the 1930 speech, when he directly accuses the Republican Party of presenting the London Treaty as a campaign issue) to his audience.²

One of his favorite devices is perfectly exhibited in the peroration to the 1919 speech. "The issue is America. And I am an American."³ Variations of this theme occur in all the speeches except that of 1930.⁴

PATNETIC PROOF---

If Johnson was persistent and vigorous in picturing other nations as greedy profiteers, he was equally persistent and vigorous in predicting the dire effects on America of our association with them. For his second principal objection to U. S. participation in foreign affairs is that such involvement can only lead to foreign exploitation of America and its resources without any

¹1923: p. 121. See also 1919: p. 67; 1935: p. 236 f.; 1941: p. 255.

²There is no reason to doubt his sincerity on this point.

³p. 112.

⁴1919: p. 74; 1923: p. 133; 1935: p. 252; 1941: p. 257.

corresponding benefits.

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The argument is presented in two parts: first, that U. S. participation in Europe is desired by European governments solely that they may take advantage of our military strength and our financial resources; and second, that cooperation in international agreements deprives us of our sovereignty over inherently domestic questions.

The first part is developed in the three speeches on the League and the Court, the second in the 1930 speech as well as the other three. Johnson is not content to characterize European statesmen and governments as scheming and selfish; he repeatedly warns that their schemes call for the expenditure of American money and the spilling of American blood.

"The sole reason," he says early in the 1919 speech, "...why the United States should become the world's guarantor...is that by doing so the possibility of future wars will be minimized..."

But this argument in its last analysis means that United States power and treasure and blood will do for England, France, Italy, and Japan what otherwise they would be compelled to do for themselves...The one going solvent concern nationally is about to enter into partnership with certain national bankrupts. We give of our assets, both moral and material, and assume a part of

Europe's grasping for our "treasure and blood" runs as a kind of refrain throughout the rest of the speech.² Johnson takes up in 1923 where he left off in 1919. "If we become a part of what is happening abroad, we would be the dupe or prey of the one faction or the other"³ not only summarizes his distrust of the European nations, but it also forecasts their looting of American resources. "It is not American wisdom that France and Britain want," he reiterates, "If we accept the invitation to help France and Britain enforce the Treaty of Versailles, let us at least realize that the importunity of the invitation is due to the size of our muscles and not the quality of our brains...Our presence in Europe is desired simply and solely because of our sword, and because of our purse..."⁴

Twelve years later when the question of adherence to

¹P. 75.

²P. 78, "Throwing in our fortune..." p. 83, "The league of nations comes to us..." p. 90 ff., "And this league of nations is written..." and following three paragraphs; p. 98 f., "The great fundamental question..." p. 111 f., "We give by the peace treaty Shantung..."

³P. 133.

⁴P. 139 f.

the World Court was again before the

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Senate, Johnson repeated his warnings of the twenties.¹ He didn't hesitate to personalize this argument. "I do not want any son of mine or any grandson sent over to China in a war between China and Japan,"² he says, and asks the parents of American children if they are ready to make that sacrifice.³

All this argument is distortion of the facts. Johnson must have known that the League had no authority to commandeer troops from its members nor did membership in the League constitute membership in a military alliance. He specifically points out in 1935 that the League's decisions are to be enforced by sanctions,⁴ and, incidentally, raises a great hue and cry about their cruelty. Since this argument is not based upon a reasoned analysis of the facts, but upon an appeal to the individual American's personal sense of safety and security, it represents a deliberate (and skillful) use of the pathetic mode of proof.

The second of the pathetic appeals Johnson makes is

¹1935: p. 212, "If Europeans do know...;" p. 231, "Take our country into...;" p. 207, "They will unite among themselves..."

²1935: p. 230.

³1919: p. 91 f.

⁴p. 228 f.

founded on the threat made to our

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sovereignty by an internationalist policy. The threat is pictured as vitiating two traditional cornerstones of United States foreign policy, the open-door in the Orient, and the Monroe Doctrine; and as subjecting questions of domestic policy to settlement by other nations.

The threat of the League of Nations to the Monroe Doctrine is described at length in 1919.¹ That the London Treaty navy would be inadequate to maintain the open-door policy is argued in 1930.² Yet, in neither case, does Johnson attempt to prove that these policies accomplish a positive good in the world or that specific evils would attend their passing. Rather, he would preserve them because they are American.³ The appeal is to tradition, not to reason.

In discussing the alleged interference of the League in domestic legislation, Johnson stoops to appeal blatantly to racial prejudice.⁴ His defense of the California alien land law is a direct bid for the support of the anti-Japanese element in that state. He reaches the extreme of

¹p. 92 ff.

²p. 181 ff.

³1919: p. 92, "The Monroe Doctrine being peculiarly a doctrine of our own...;" p. 92, "This traditional policy of the Republic;" p. 95, "This great American policy;" 1930: p. 194, "the open-door policy of John Hay, which we followed so long in the past..."

⁴1919: p. 103 ff.

demagoguery when he justifies his

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position by comparing it with the "white-supremacy" philosophy of the South,¹ an obvious "argumentum ad populum."

Johnson does not forget that he has three audiences.² Besides the above appeals to sectional prejudices, he warns his colleagues that the Senate's powers will wane if the United States joins the League of Nations or the World Court, and, in fact, he often complains that treaties are negotiated in defiance of the Senate's Constitutional right of advice and consent. The League covenant is "presented to us," he grumbles, "with a cynical indifference to our right of knowledge."³ He makes the same complaint about the treaty Wilson concluded with the French.⁴ Again, he denounces the exclusion of the Senate from treaty negotiations in 1930.⁵ In 1935 he threatens the Senate with the loss of one of its most cherished prerogatives. "The cry is rampant throughout the land to destroy the Senate as a part of the treaty-making power...By this reservation the Senate is deprived practically of the right to say aught concerning what is a

¹1919: p. 105.

²See p. 14 ff.

³1919: p. 68.

⁴Ibid., p. 113.

⁵p. 178 f.

So Johnson impressed upon Senators the urgent need of voting against the World Court.

One other of his arguments deserves mention. "Every race on earth is part of our citizenship...By going into Europe, we have little chance of settling Europe's racial hatreds, and we may transfer them to our own land."² This notion, reiterated in 1935,³ apparently is intended to create fear of inter-racial strife in America. Yet, Johnson must have known that the overwhelming majority of immigrants were loyal to their new home, and he does not go beyond his mere assertion to show that our membership in the Court would stir up racial strife which would otherwise be non-existent.

COUNTER-PROPOSITIONS--

That Johnson's use of argument was effective is proven by his record in the Senate. But the question inevitably arises: What, if these were the policies he condemned, were the policies of which he approved?

In 1923 he defined his position as follows:

We may have a foreign policy if we choose and that foreign policy may speak in tones which will cause

¹P. 246 f.

²1923: 141 f.

³P. 243 f.

all the world to pause.

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For one I would have a definite foreign policy for our nation, but a policy of our own...If the Administration for a moment in power believes a foreign country jeopardizes peace, there is no reason why we should not say so. It is only the timid and the fearful who ask others to unite with them in order to exercise their moral weight...The sure way in which we might dissipate our moral weight is to make it subject to the decision of those upon whom we wish to exercise moral suasion, or to submit it for ultimate expression to those who have no moral sense. Free, independent, unfettered by league or association, court, or conference, America can speak and the world will heed.¹

This is but a paraphrase of his 1919 definition of the isolationist philosophy.

...We can, whenever we think it in consonance with humanity, go wherever we will and do whatever duty demands. Our position has been, and ought to be, the commanding one in all the world. And it is unnecessary, in order that we preserve this position and maintain ourselves, in order that we may succor the weak or rescue humanity, to tie ourselves irrevocably to the bankrupt nations of the earth or to enter into a confederation for the protection of their boundaries and the preservation of their territories.²

The 1930 speech makes clear his advocacy of a large merchant marine and a large navy, and his reluctance to compromise in our demands for the sake of more cordial relations with others.³ "I demand my right to have my country do just as it pleases,"⁴ he says in 1935, over-looking for the moment that this same right,

¹p. 133 ff.

²p. 77.

³See the "cruiser" argument, p. 170 ff.

⁴p. 232.

exercised by European nations, had been 42
denounced by him as reprehensible. And in 1941, when
the country's right to do as it pleased was attended by
the risk of war, he executes an about-face and offers what
is virtually an argument for peace at any price.

The picture thus drawn is that of a self-centered,
domineering man, more conscious of his rights than of his
responsibilities, and willing to sacrifice even his so-
called rights for the sake of his security.¹ His method
of achieving security was to run away from those
situations in which it was threatened. The advent of
World War II demonstrated the inadequacy of his stand.

SOURCE OF IDEAS AND EARLY TRAINING--

The source of Johnson's philosophy is difficult to
find, in view of the scanty literature available. No
biography of Johnson has yet been published, to this
writer's knowledge; and information about his schooling,
his speech training, if any, and his education in
political science is difficult to find--if it exists.

It is apparent, however, that Johnson grew up in an
atmosphere of speech making. His father, Grove L.
Johnson, "was very successful as a criminal lawyer and
during his practice lost only two cases. He defended

¹In January, 1942, a month after the U. S. had declared
war on Germany and Japan, Johnson voted against sending
American troops overseas to fight.

seventeen persons accused of murder and

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saved all but one from hanging. He won the Hurtado case, when the Supreme Court of California, upon the strength of his argument, changed the rule of testimony in murder cases where temporary insanity was the defense."¹

Too much weight should not be given this evaluation of Grove L. Johnson's legal prowess, since his position as attorney for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company gave him tremendous political influence; and it is possible, especially in the Hurtado case, that something other than legal considerations entered into the decisions of the courts. A tantalizing hint of his authority is given by an unidentified "native historian" who said of him, "The long continuance in the Legislature of this adroit and malevolent man is one of the heaviest burdens carried by California today."² (Date not specified.)

Be that as it may, Hiram Johnson undoubtedly learned much of his persuasive technique from his father. Speaking ability apparently ran in the family. "The eldest son, Albert M., ranked as one of the most brilliant and promising attorneys of the state and as one of the most eloquent orators in the west."³

¹W. L. Willis, History of Sacramento County, 500.

²Quoted by Ray Tucker, Sons of the Wild Jackass, 116.

³Willis, op. cit., 501.

writer was able to determine only that he pitched on the baseball team, that he was selected as editor of the school paper,² and that his aggressive disposition in his first year on the campus led the students to say that "a freshman is boss of the whole university."³

His oratorical ability probably matured during the years of his law practice. "In San Francisco he...made a reputation as a great 'trial lawyer,' almost invincible before a jury...His speech to the jury in the Abe Ruef case has rarely been rivalled in California."⁴

From the meager evidence available we may infer that Johnson learned much of his speaking technique in the family circle, that he evidenced an aggressive and commanding personality while still in school, and that his practical experience in the courtroom gave him the opportunity to select, practice, and perfect those devices he deemed desirable and effective. Certain it is that by the time he entered political life his talent was full-blown.

¹At the University of California at Berkeley.

²But never served, since he quit the university to be married the year his term in office started.

³Willis, op. cit., 836.

⁴E. French Strother, "Hiram W. Johnson, The Man," The California Weekly, Feb. 25, 1910, 220, col. 2.

One of the most brilliant manifestations of that talent is Johnson's use of the language. His rhetorical style is vigorous, colorful, sometimes repetitious, often sarcastic; it achieves in at least one instance real beauty.¹ His use of adjectives and nouns as a part of his ethical argument has already been discussed. With sentences he could be equally effective. In 1919 he uses five sentences to sum up the aims, the atmosphere, and the results of the Paris Peace Conference.

The great British Empire is there represented not alone by the ablest and most brilliant officials of the home government, but by the most astute and talented statesmen of England, all for Britain, and all with an eye single to Britain's power and greatness. For France, her grand old premier and her most famous citizens stand there ever alive to France's interest, demanding France's rights, and fighting for France's aggrandizement. Italy, from her various parties, has sent her best, skilled and learned in statecraft, Italians all, for Italy and Italy's future. Japan's cunning and illustrious sons fight Japan's battle for Japan's expansion and Japan's increase in power and wealth.²

These sentences are expanded to paragraphs in the 1923 speech³ and are supplemented by one of Johnson's rare flashes of humor. "The Balkan states, pawns of the

¹"...the bondage of every suffering people in anguish begging for freedom..." 1919: p. 117.

²p. 73 f.

³p. 129 f.

great powers, retain their unlimited capacity for involving their greater neighbors, and with but one or two exceptions, still cling to the good old Balkan method of changing Ministers by assassinating Ministers."¹

In 1923 also, he makes a vicious attack on the American inferiority complex in the presence of foreigners. "We cannot blame some of our English brethren if they are rather contemptuous in their estimate of American character. They see only two classes of Americans--fawning little brothers of the rich, who speak only in cringing aspects, and those who wish to bask in the sunlight of a titled presence and who jostle one another in a frantic effort for presentation at Court."²

Though the 1919 and 1923 speeches are obviously more carefully prepared and are therefore more concise, the other speeches occasionally exhibit the same graphic strokes which mark the composition of the first two.³

Johnson's use of vivid language was more a matter of word choice than a use of figures of speech. The 1923

¹p. 130.

²p. 126.

³1930: p. 156, "They have paid from...;" p. 183, "In doing this we have...;" 1935: p. 231 f., the paragraph starting with "Talk to me...;" 1941: p. 257, "Take these things..."

speech, for example, contains only about a 47
dozen figures of speech in over six thousand words. None
of these is particularly unusual or startling in its
construction.¹ The proportion and quality of figures of
speech in the other speeches is the same.

The direct question is a favorite device in his
Senate speeches. It is particularly effective in the 1935
speech, where each question provides the cue for another
negative instance in refutation of the internationalist
argument that we should enter the World Court to preserve
peace.²

Johnson's most effective use of quotations is his
exposition of the contrast between Wilson's ideals and the
reality of European practice.³ Again, he provides the
Holy Alliance analogy with much of its strength by quoting
corresponding sections of the respective covenants govern-
ing the Holy Alliance and the League of Nations.⁴ On the
other hand, his quotation of Adams' and Emerson's comments
on the Holy Alliance are ineffective because the argument

¹ Samples: "those who wish to bask in the sunlight of a
titled presence;" "the chords of human sympathy and
brotherly love are played on by masterly alien hands;"
"feuds which have written the bloody pages of European
history;" the metaphor in the paragraph starting, "The
latest effort....," p. 135; "...the issue of the League
was as dead as slavery."

²p. 206 ff.

³1919: p. 109 f.

⁴1919: p. 80 ff.

is so obviously an appeal to great names.

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The quoted material in the 1930 speech serves neither to advance Johnson's argument, to corroborate it, to illustrate it, or to prove it. It does have the effect, of course, of extending the length of the speech.

ORGANIZATION AND ARRANGEMENT--

Johnson's telling use of language was offset by poor organization. The speeches proceed in a narrative rather than a logical manner. There are no pauses for perspective, no reviews of things past, no forecasts of things to come. Even the reader of the speeches encounters difficulty in outlining them, because the arguments are so intricately interwoven and because Johnson gives no indication of his evaluation of their relative importance.

Though three of the speeches of this group took over two hours to deliver and a fourth over an hour, only the 1919 and 1935 speeches have concluding summaries and none has an internal summary. Thus, Johnson ignores from the beginning the most useful tool for guiding the audience as to the direction, extent, and weight of the arguments introduced. The lack of internal summaries and the infrequent use of transitional statements obscure the outline of his argument and make it especially difficult to separate the main contentions from each other and from their subsidiary, supporting contentions; this lack

of the speeches.

More serious yet is the slipshod arrangement of his arguments. There is no such thing as an orderly progression of ideas in either the 1919 or the 1930 speeches. Instead, a kind of "scatter" method is used--no argument is completed before another is introduced; no idea is so important that it can not be interrupted for consideration of another. The result is a game of leap-frog, with the various contentions hurdling one another right up to the conclusion.

The 1930 speech is perhaps the most flagrant offender in this regard. Four times Johnson, after commending to describe the need to protect our commerce with a large navy, is sidetracked on to another argument. He makes his first approach to the argument with the statement that "...it is upon those different subjects that I first desire to speak...to business in this Nation...for wars have their roots in trade rivalry always."¹ Four paragraphs later he leaves the subject of trade rivalry to refute the argument that "it is this treaty or chaos."

He returns to the subject upon which he "first desires to speak" with a brand new introduction.

"Mr. President, let me turn a bit to the commerce of

¹p. 148.

this Nation...¹ but gets no farther; for

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now he must expose the errors on which the treaty navy is predicated.

Three paragraphs later he tries again. "Now, Mr. President," he says, "let us look for a moment at the situation that confronts us concerning our ships and our commerce..."² This is a fairly successful beginning; before he is again diverted Johnson manages to establish the necessity for a large merchant marine and a navy adequate to protect it. At the very moment, however, when he could clinch his argument by demonstrating that the treaty navy would be inadequate, he takes up instead the matter of cruisers.³

The cruiser provisions of the treaty having been disposed of, he returns to our commerce with his first reference to the open-door policy,⁴ which "has proved, we felt, beneficial to our commerce..." Four sentences later he goes back to the cruisers (and before he actually gets to them, he scores the gullibility of the American people).

Finally, into this helter-skelter arrangement--or disarrangement--he interjects at intervals his protests against the invocation of the cloture rule and his pride

¹P. 158.

²P. 161.

³P. 169.

⁴P. 181.

Though the 1919 speech was certainly more carefully prepared than that of 1930, it exhibits the same fault. For example, in the twelfth paragraph Johnson answers one of the President's arguments in favor of our participation in the League and asserts that no good reason has been advanced by League proponents for our joining it, but not until he has devoted thirty-one intervening paragraphs to the exposition of the Holy Alliance analogy and to the argument that the League would nullify the Monroe Doctrine does he actually cite an argument of supporters of the League and offer a rebuttal.²

Again, he says, "The circumstances surrounding [the League's] creation are anything but reassuring," and offers an illustration: "The sordid bargaining, selfish interest, and secret diplomacy which produced the league of nations is best illustrated in the decision of the peace conference relating to China and Japan."³ But the original statement and the illustration are separated by thousands of words and dozens of minutes!

A comparison of the actual outline with a logical outline of the 1919 speech vividly illustrates both the repetitious nature of Johnson's arrangement and its

¹PP 144, 156, 158, 195.

²P. 98 ff.

³P. 100.

to the status of major contentions.

A logical outline might look something like this:

THESIS: The League should be rejected.

I The circumstances surrounding its creation are anything but reassuring.

- A. The peace conference was the scene of secret plotting and plunder.
 - 1. All the victorious nations except the United States enlarged their territories at the expense of the vanquished.
 - 2. Japan, in the Shantung case, violated the rights of an ally.
 - 3. Japan, France, England, and Italy concluded a secret treaty among themselves.
 - 4. Wilson negotiated a secret treaty with the French.
- B. Acceptance of the League in the United States has been hysterical and sentimental.
 - 1. The war psychology created a wave of sentiment for the League.
 - 2. Proponents of the League have financed and fostered a tremendous propaganda in its support.

II No good argument has yet been advanced for our entry into the League.

- A. The argument that we have to throw in our fortunes with the rest of the world is fallacious.
- B. The argument that no harm will come of entering the League is fallacious.
- C. The argument that "half a loaf is better than none" is fallacious.

III There are compelling reasons for our refusal to enter the League.

- A. Past organizations to prevent war have failed.
- B. Article 10 of the League covenant requires the League to guarantee the territorial integrity of all of its members.
 - 1. This provision would lead to exploitation of U. S. power and blood by other nations.
 - 2. It denies any future freedom to today's subject peoples.
- C. The League deprives the United States of sovereignty over inherently domestic questions, such as
 - 1. Immigration.

- 2. The Monroe Doctrine.
- 3. The California alien land law.
- D. The League further separates rulers from the people whom they rule.

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IV The United States can play her part in the world without joining the League.

Actually, the speech outline is essentially that given below.

THESIS: The League should be rejected.

I The circumstances surrounding its creation are anything but reassuring.

- A. Acceptance of the League in the United States has been hysterical and sentimental.
 - 1. The war psychology created a wave of sentiment for the League.
 - 2. Proponents of the League have conducted a tremendous propaganda campaign in its support.

- B. The peace conference was the scene of secret plotting and plunder.

II The League of Nations puts the burden of protecting Allied gains on the United States.

- A. The assumption of such a burden is unnecessary and unwise.
 - 1. We can play our world part without the compulsion of secret treaties.

III Past organizations to prevent war have failed.

IV Article 10 of the League covenant is the most outrageous thing ever attempted on America.

- A. It compels us to guarantee the territorial limits of other nations.
- B. It further requires us to suppress revolutions in other countries.

V The League covenant scraps the Monroe Doctrine.

- A. The British interpretation supports this view.
- B. The voting strength of the British insures that their interpretation would be adopted.

VI Arguments in support of the League are "curious."

- A. The argument that no harm will come of accepting the League is fallacious.

- B. The argument that "half a loaf is better than none" is fallacious.
- VII The sordid bargaining, etc., which produced the League is illustrated in the case of China and Japan.
- VIII The covenant gives the League jurisdiction over Japanese immigration into the United States and over the California land law.
 - A. The wording of various articles, particularly article 15, supports this view.
 - B. In any case, "a dispute likely to lead to a rupture" would come before the League.
- IX The League of Nations is tainted with duplicity and wrong.
 - A. The Shantung decision is an example.
 - B. Wilson's treaty with France is another.
- X The League may rule without Congressional or popular control.

Orderliness is the logician's tool. Johnson might very well have felt that since his arguments did not emphasize logic, his speeches need not emphasize orderly arrangement. (It is, of course, extremely doubtful that he would deny their logic.) In a sense, the reiterations and re-development of his arguments throughout the speech served, as an internal summary would, to recall to the audience the progress of the reasoning; on the other hand, the reiteration served to confuse and conceal the proper inter-relationship of his arguments where an internal summary would have clarified it.

Strangely enough, the 1935 address, despite its length, does not contain any "leap-frogging." The 1923

speech shows one obvious, deliberate

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instance when Johnson "pause s a moment to warn against the foreign propaganda...poisoning the public mind."¹

The introductions to all five speeches are in some form of reference to the occasion. The 1941 introduction,² with its recollection of Congress on the eve of the First World War, adroitly sets the stage for Johnson's subsequent assertion that the Senate will vote the U. S. into war if it repeals the Neutrality Act.³ The 1930 speech starts as if it were the resumption of an interrupted conversation, a not unnatural condition during spirited debate, perhaps, and an indication that this speech was more nearly impromptu than the others.

The conclusions of the 1919 and 1930 speeches contain recapitulations of the preceding arguments, and to the summary in 1919 is added the "I am an American" peroration.⁴ The 1930 conclusion trails off after the summary into a querulous, petulant complaint of personal inconvenience.⁵ In 1923, though Johnson manages to insert a plea for isolation, he confines the entire

¹P. 125.

²P. 253.

³P. 254.

⁴P. 118.

⁵P. 201.

conclusion to a single sentence.¹

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In general, we can judge both the introductions and the conclusions as pedestrian efforts, apt but uninspired.

HISTORICAL COMPARISON---

Of the five speeches used in this study the earliest two are the best, but in substance they are not markedly different from the other three. Johnson's arguments did not change with a changing world, nor did the language with which he expressed them. Many portions of his 1935 speech are so similar to what he had said fifteen years previously that they suggest that he used his own speeches of the twenties as source material.

The following arguments, major and minor, occur in the speeches dealing with the League of Nations and the World Court:

Participation in European affairs would stir up national prejudices among European immigrants in the United States--1923, 1935

We are being duped by propaganda--1919, 1923, 1935

European nations want our troops and our money--1919, 1923, 1935

Europe is a hotbed of greed, distrust, etc.--1919, 1923, 1935

Holy Alliance analogy--1919, 1935

The World Court cannot preserve peace--1923, 1935

Joining the League or the Court will 57
deprive us of our sovereignty---1919, 1923, 1935

Not only these generalities are similarly expressed in the three speeches, but even phrases and sentences with nearly identical wording occur.

...the resolutions so generously...adopted by Friday morning clubs and Tuesday evening associations... (1923)

...the Tuesday Evening Club of Kankakee, or the Friday Morning Club of Kokomo... (1930)

In the language of a famous editor of the West, "All this is partly true." (1919)
(The letter is quoted at length in 1935, and the editor is identified.)

...in the presence of a foreign title or a great alien personage some of our people are afflicted with an inferiority complex... (1923)
Some of our people have an inferiority complex in dealing with foreign nations... (1935)

No man ought to consider a subject of this sort from any political standpoint. (1930)
I cannot forgive the man who decides this nation's future solely by the present apparent necessity of partisan politics. (1923)
...I want to insist that no man who is a member of this body...shall be deterred from speaking...by any fear of personal consequences or political expediency... (1919)

We have been picking our pockets to poison our minds. (1919)
The foreign propaganda now poisoning the public mind... (1923)

The 1941 speech exhibits the feebleness of old age, the dim glow of what had once been a roaring fire. It is unique in two respects. It is addressed to the Senate, not to any other audience. And it is a plea. Contrast it with the earlier speeches with their defiant, ringing denunciations of the proposals being debated,

their contemptuous disregard of the

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opinions of others, their scorn of foreign governments.

Johnson, weakened by illness and exhausted by his years, clung to the last to his analysis of America's role in the world of international diplomacy. He ignored the threat of Hitlerism, denied the demonstrated community of interests and ideals between the United States and England, overlooked our moral obligation to preserve democracy in the world. The lessons of history, on which he had relied so often to support his doctrines, apparently never convinced him that no nation can secure itself in a vacuum.

Practically all of the available material on Johnson is confined to articles in periodicals, and most of these are commentaries on Johnson's role in contemporary politics. Several include biographical material, and nearly all contain some comment on Johnson's personality, his philosophy, and/or his historical influence. The chapters by Gilbert, Lowry, and Tucker are the best, and together with Strother's article, about the only sources which are concerned primarily with Johnson himself, rather than with Johnson's place in current affairs. For the most part, the picture of Johnson must be pieced together with a shred of information here and a shred there; there is, as yet, no biography of Johnson, and there is no work which attempts to review and evaluate with the detachment of historical perspective Johnson's contribution to and influence upon the course of world events.

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APPENDIX

Mr. President, I am constrained to ask, in the first instance, the courtesy of my colleagues that I may not be interrupted during the course of the remarks that I shall address to the league of nations, because I wish, if I can, to maintain their continuity; and because, too, with interruptions my remarks might reach interminable length.

I have been unable to discuss within any reasonable limits all of the questions that are presented by this league. I have been unable in what I shall present today to take up such important propositions as the amendment relating to withdrawal, which constitutes no amendment at all, or the system relating to mandatories or various other provisions of this document; and I have been unable, too, to present at all the interrelated matters of the league and the treaty. I have attempted to discuss the outstanding, plain propositions which seem to me to present a case upon which any of us who are opposed to this document may with absolute confidence go to our people and go to all the people of the United States; and in speaking upon this instrument I want to insist that no man who is a member of this body, upon whom in the final analysis rests the obligation to decide the future destiny of his country

¹United States Congress, Congressional Record, LVIII, 501-509.

shall be deterred from speaking in frank and in open 67
fashion by any fear of personal consequences or political
consequences, by any threat from any person, no matter
who that person may be; but that Senators of the United
States, conscious that upon them rests this great and
this solemn duty, shall speak in absolute fearlessness and
with the utmost frankness and characterize the acts and
the facts that are pertinent to the issue just exactly as
their judgments and their consciences may require. This
is a time for plain speaking. The man who blinks the
facts now does a distinct disservice to his country.

Mr. President, the covenant of the league of nations
transcends in importance perhaps any document which has
ever been presented to this country. It not only violently
wrenches the Nation from its traditional policy, deals with
its economic resources, embarks it upon a precarious and a
perilous departure, but commandeers, apparently, for all
time its blood and its bone. For every sentence of such a
momentous document there should be sound reason, and for
every clause, rational and logical explanation and demon-
stration. Indeed, the President himself, after the com-
pletion in secrecy of the document, cabled in triumph its
adoption with the statement that there was "good and suf-
ficient reason for every portion of it." And yet to this
day neither the President has shown us reasons for a single
article or clause, nor has any one of the Americans pre-
sumably interested in its composition disclosed to the

American people anything at all in respect to this docu- 68
ment. We are compelled, therefore, from the words of
the instrument itself, often ambiguous and obscure, to
determine what this document, born in secrecy, denied
exposition, and presented to us with a cynical indiffer-
ence to our right of knowledge, may mean, and what some
of its particular provisions portend to the Republic.

The circumstances surrounding its creation are any-
thing but reassuring. It was to be the apotheosis of
idealism; it was to represent the triumph of right, the
overpowering direction of the conscience of mankind; it
was to sound the knell for all time of selfish national
ambition and aggression, of the tyranny of the strong
over the weak; it was to realize the hopes, and the as-
pirations, and the prayers of peoples; it would throttle
forever the cunning, greed, and avarice of diplomacy, and
curb the grasping selfishness of power. The phrases in
which its virtues were sung were almost as high-sounding
and alluring and enticing as the phrases of a century ago,
in which the world was to enter upon a new era under the
Quadruple and the Holy Alliance. And long before we saw
a line of this secret document, a tremendous propaganda,
financed with hundreds of thousands of dollars, obtained
from clubs and organizations enthusiastic indorsements.
Our people were taught to chant "promote peace and prevent
war." The formula "promote peace and prevent war" swept
over all the land, and its necessary corollary, before
there was any league of nations at all, was the

indorsement of the fantastic thing which feared the 69
light in its creation and has denied to those most affected
by it the slightest knowledge of the circumstances, events,
and details of its composition. I received, just as
other Senators did, innumerable resolutions before any
one of us had the slightest conception of what the league
of nations was; the resolutions, in like tenor, have con-
tinued from that time to the present. Before publication
of it various trainloads of distinguished gentlemen were
going about the country holding meetings and conventions
in different localities advocating an undisclosed docu-
ment dealing with the future of the Republic.

Of course, when the document ultimately was given
publicity, those who had in advance so hysterically and
enthusiastically embraced it continued their advocacy.
And while most of them grudgingly admitted what the Presi-
dent denied, that it required amendment, nevertheless,
whether it had been amended or not, whether the most
treasured policies of the Republic had been touched or
destroyed, would not have altered the hectic hysteria of
the league of nations men. That they have created a tre-
mendous sentiment in this country by the repetition of
their formula, "Promote peace and prevent war," is perhaps
so. They rush upon the platform and demand of their
auditors, "Don't you want to prevent war?" and there is
immediate unanimity in the response, "Of course we want to
prevent war." Thereupon the advocates say, "Inasmuch as

you are against war and desire to prevent it, you 70
must favor the league of nations." And the ordinary man,
accepting the statement, subscribes to the resolutions
to "promote peace and prevent war."¹ There is another
group, too, among them some very excellent people, who
have hysterically embraced this document. They are
those who conscientiously abhor war and are in general
opposed to it. They found themselves during the last
two years suppressed and repressed by espionage bills and
by the mass consciousness aroused in the Nation in favor
of the war. To voice their sentiments then meant jail,
and they were compelled either by a regard for the wishes
of their fellows or by personal fear to suppress ex-
pression of what had been their lifelong thought. With
the league of nations and its formula, "Promote peace and
prevent war," these people found once more the possibility
of expression, and the two years of suppression under the
law but made them perhaps more earnest and more vociferous
in their newly acquired right to speak upon one subject.
There are many other circumstances which contributed to
the first hysteria and perhaps to the present sentiment in
favor of this league. The awful tragedy of the world, the
sorrow, the grief, and the anguish of those whose dear ones
had made the supreme sacrifice, the fearful waste and wel-
ter, of necessity turned the thoughts of all men and of
all women to a prevention of another world tragedy and

¹This device is repeated in 1930, p. 133 f.

cataclysm. Those of us who have spent a part of our 71
lives in humanitarian endeavor were resolved after the
experience of this great conflict to take, as far as hu-
man agency could, some forward step to preclude another.
To all of these people--and I number myself among them--
the idea of a league or confederation or union of the
nations of the earth in behalf of the right, for the pro-
tection of the weak against the strong, to preclude the
successful culmination of national cunning and cupidity,
and to prevent future conflicts of God's creatures
possessed a charm and an allurements, a hope and an in-
spiration, which we would have gone far to realize and
consummate. The various phases of our disillusionment I
will not dwell upon. Each milestone of the peace confer-
ence successively marks them. The beautiful phrases of al-
truism and idealism are found, as often has been the case
in the last few years, but mere words. They were never
translated into deeds. And, ultimately, with the presenta-
tion of the covenant came the shattering of all our fond
hopes.

Of all the singular and astonishing intellectual dis-
tortions induced by the advocacy of the league of nations,
not the least remarkable is the reproach to patriotism and
the denunciation of those who think first of our Republic.
It is rare, indeed, that any speech is made in favor of
the league which does not bitterly condemn Americans who
think of their own country first. We who would protect

and preserve our own Nation, who loyally and patriot- 72
ically would hesitate to involve its sons and its future
generations in perpetual and continuous warfare, are des-
ignated as "little," "selfish," and "provincial" Americans,
even as men without international human sympathy and
bereft of world vision. For the first time in our history
the jealous guarding of our own, the love of our traditions
and our institutions, the passion for our land and our
liberty, have become grievous sins. We are told that our
past affords no precedents; that our history contains no
lessons; that all of those who have passed before, whose
names we revere, spoke but empty words, and that their
counsels give no guide. This strange, psychological
phenomenon, apparently accompanying war, is an unnatural
distortion of human intelligence which time alone will
heal. May it be cured before the injury it threatens is
done to the Nation.

There is yet another contributing cause to the present
hysteria. We have learned in the last two years a new
thing in our national life--national propaganda. We have
been picking our pockets to poison our minds. Millions
upon millions of dollars we have spent from the Public
Treasury, and from taxes wrung from an overburdened people,
to publish, not only in America but throughout the world,
panegyrics upon those in power. The propaganda has been
devoted, not as you would imagine it would be devoted in
a country boasting of its democracy, for dissemination of

the truth, but the propaganda, paid for by the people 73 themselves, has been devoted to deceiving the people and to glorifying those who by a people's grace have been raised to high position. The heavy hand of a war-time Government has been held upon the press until in the East the liberty of the press has passed into history; upon the people themselves the clutch has been maintained so that only that which the administration desired spoken should be expressed. National propaganda, for the first time in our history suppressing current events, has manufactured public opinion, and that opinion has been made but the echo of what the national propaganda has decreed. This deadening and perverting mind process has had its evil effects and has been one of the powerful agencies for preventing people from knowing the facts or the possibilities of the league of nations.

I wish that I could adequately picture the situation at Paris in the peace conference. The great British Empire is there represented not alone by the ablest and most brilliant officials of the home Government, but by the most astute and talented statesmen of England, all for Britain, and all with an eye single to Britain's power and greatness. For France, her grand old premier and her most famous citizens stand there ever alive to France's interest, demanding France's rights, and fighting for France's aggrandizement. Italy, from her various parties, has sent her best, skilled and learned in statecraft, Italians all, for Italy and

Italy's future. Japan's cunning and illustrious sons fight Japan's battle for Japan's expansion and Japan's increase in territory and wealth. Every small nation on earth and every one that hopes to be a small nation have sent of their very best and very highest, each intent upon his own nation, its progress and its happiness, its future and its prosperity. There is just one nation unrepresented, perhaps included in a nebulous vision of internationalism, but not otherwise, and that is the United States of America. The position originally assumed by our country of idealism and altruism struck a responsive chord in the generous hearts of Americans, but, unfortunately, we have seen our idealism abandoned, our altruism forgotten. We have observed with astonishment and indignation our country inextricably bound in the sordid, cunning, secret, and crafty designs of European and Asiatic governments. We would wish, if we could not stem the tide of greed and avarice, selfishness and sordidness, and stop the secret plotting and plunder, at least, to be no part of it; to be ourselves again, with our ideals, untarnished, to be just Americans.

We fought a righteous war and won. With our might and our treasure we determined to destroy a ruthless militarism, and it is done. In the peace we would make it impossible for this monster ever again to threaten the world.

The victory for the United States means neither territory nor reparations. It should mean the triumph of our

loud-trumpeted ideals for civilization, for the rights of small nations, for self-determination, for democracy. It means for England, France, Italy, and Japan huge territories, vast numbers of people, immense national gain. The burden must be borne of protecting and safeguarding these enormous allied gains. The question is, and the league of nations squarely presents it, Who shall bear the burden? Shall the burden rest upon the gainers, those who made a mock of self-determination, of the rights of weak people, of all our high-sounding idealism, or shall the burden at the command of one who was party to the mockery, be thrust upon the only non-profitting Nation, the United States? The sole reason, whispered in fear or ominously hissed to create fear in the rest of us, why the United States should become the world's guarantor and underwrite the rape of China and the partition of hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory and the transfer of millions of human beings to England, France, Italy, and Japan, is that by doing so the possibility of future wars will be minimized, and there may be a greater sense of security in the possession by England, France, Italy, and Japan of their newly acquired peoples and territories.

But this argument in its last analysis means that United States power and treasure and blood will do for England, France, Italy, and Japan what otherwise they would be compelled to do for themselves. It means not the

end of discontent or the cessation of war, for

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peoples held in cruel subjection like the Koreans or Chinese will ever be striving for their liberty and the self-determination for which we talked so much and did so little. It means that the great democracy of the world--our country--must not only continue a party to the denial of these peoples' rights whenever they are asserted, but to our diplomatic denial we will add denial economically and by force of arms, too.

On the 11th day of November, America, as no nation on earth ever had been before, was respected, revered, and beloved. After six months of meddling and muddling in European and Asiatic controversies and contests over territory, the end of the peace conference finds Italy detesting us, France secretly despising us, England using us, and Japan bluffing us. They are all willing and anxious that we should have our league of nations, and willing and anxious because of the same spirit which has ruled them in the peace conference. The one going solvent concern nationally is about to enter into partnership with certain national bankrupts. We give of our assets, both moral and material, and assume a part of their liabilities. We do not need them as partners. They require us. They yield to us nothing; they can yield to us nothing. We give to them everything. We can protect our borders for centuries to come, just as we have in the century past. The Lord has given us our geographical isolation, and the Lord has

denied just that thing to the different races of

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Europe. And, while our internationalists in behalf of the league of nations prate of the fact that we can not remain longer isolated, they forget that the geography of the situation remains immutable. Isolation otherwise, except to refrain from European entanglements or to indulge in European controversies and wars, has never existed, and, of course, never will exist. But when distinguished gentlemen say that we can no longer remain in a position of splendid isolation and play our own part in the world, they forget all the events of the past century. We are in constant touch with all the world. We can, whenever we think it in consonance with humanity, go wherever we will and do whatever duty demands. Our position has been, and ought to be, the commanding one in all the world. And it is unnecessary, in order that we may preserve this position and maintain ourselves, in order that we may succor the weak or rescue humanity, to tie ourselves irrevocably to the bankrupt nations of the earth or to enter into a confederation for the protection of their boundaries and the preservation of their territories.

We have been told by the President that we must now by this league of nations make the supreme sacrifice and throw in our fortunes with the rest of the world. Why? The very query evokes from league enthusiasts immediate and angry retort, and, while they will not enlighten us,

they hint darkly at our motives and deny even our good faith. Occasionally we hear that we have at last entered upon a world career, that we have become a part of world politics, and that we can not now either withdraw from the course into which the war drew us or desert the world which so needs us. In the language of a famous editor of the West, "All this is partly true,"¹ but it by no means establishes that we must surrender our cherished position or our loved ideals by becoming a party to the sordid quarrels and the diplomatic duplicity of Europe and Asia. The United States will play her proud part in the world in the future as she has done in the past--a part prouder because based upon American principles and American ideals. It did not require secret treaties and stealthy bartering of unwilling peoples to make our Nation play her part in the war; it does not require the guaranty of secret treaties and bargaining and bartering of unwilling peoples to have the Nation play its world part after the war. Throwing in our fortune with fortunes of the rest of the world means, with our altruistic brethren, throwing our fortunes to the rest of the world, that the rest of the world may do with our donation as it sees fit. Gladly will we do what duty commands and humanity and civilization may require, but that duty can be better done, our obligations to humanity

¹See the letter quoted in 1935, p.220. The editor was Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle.

and civilization better fulfilled, in the high position of the world's greatest democracy than in the subordinate position of the least consequential of a quintuple alliance, or as one of many bound irrevocably to the guaranty of the many's power and territories.

Organizations to prevent war are as old as civilization. I wish that every American would take the time to read the history of the many attempts which have been made, but one of which in reality reached a riper stage than mere negotiation. I will not, therefore, deal with the earlier attempts to prevent by unity of action future wars, but, because this present covenant bears such a sinister resemblance to the one definite project succeeding the Napoleonic world wars, I turn at once to the Quadruple and the Holy Alliance.¹ The world in 1814-15 was quite as weary of war as the world today. There were then some altruistic and idealistic statesmen, possibly, just as, possibly, there are some today. And there were very, very many statesmen who saw alone the aggrandizement of their own nations, just as today there are very, very many such statesmen. It was May 30, 1814, that the Treaty of Paris was signed and the boundaries of the various nations settled. It was then "the big four"--Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England--who remade the map of Europe, just as now it is another "big four"

¹See also 1935, p. 238 ff.

engaged in that task.

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The original Treaty of Paris was incomplete, so the Congress of Vienna was called, where it was hoped that international authority might be established by which questions perilous to the world's peace could be decided. The time was quite as propitious as the present. On November 20, 1815, "the big four" completed their Quadruple Alliance. By article 6 of this alliance it was provided that in order "to consolidate the intimate relations which unite the four sovereigns for the world's happiness" it was necessary to hold periodic meetings either of monarchs or of ministers to concert measures "for the repose and prosperity of the peoples." The four great powers then were to constitute an international court for the settlement of all questions which threatened the existing order as fixed by the treaties concluded at Vienna and Paris. On September 28, 1815, Alexander I, the Czar of Russia, who was as prolific in idealistic speeches and nebulous altruistic generalities as some of our modern statesmen, proclaimed the Holy Alliance, and asked the other powers to join. Nearly every State in Europe became a member of this Holy Alliance. Great Britain indorsed it by a letter from the regent. The Holy Alliance agreed--

To take for their sole guide the precepts of that holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections. The monarchs engage to regard themselves toward their subjects

and armies as fathers of families, and to lead them in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated and protect general peace and justice.

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The sole principle of force, it was agreed, should be that of doing each other reciprocal service. Indeed, the language of the Holy Alliance, and even of the proclamations and speeches preceding it, are quite as ethereal and celestial as the language which has been applied to the league of nations. At Aix-la-Chapelle, November 15, 1818, the "big five"---France having now been admitted---agreed that---

Neither in their mutual relations nor in those which bind them to their interests ever to depart from the principle of intimate union which has hitherto presided over all their common relations and interest--a union rendered more strong and indissoluble by the bond of Christian fraternity which the sovereigns have formed among themselves. And that this union, which is the more real and durable, inasmuch as it depends on no separate interest or temporary combination, can only have for its object the maintenance of general peace founded on a religious respect for engagements contained in the treaties and for the whole of the rights resulting therefrom.

The protocol provided as well for particular meetings of the sovereigns themselves, or their ministers or plenipotentiaries, to treat of their own interests and interests of other States or Europe. Observe now our League of Nations. Its preamble is--

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war--

and so forth---

and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealing

of organized peoples with one another.

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A preamble of like character with that of the Quadruple Alliance, not as lofty in purpose or of such broad Christianity as the Holy Alliance, but with the same underlying principle in reference to existing treaties.

There was no such provision in any of the engagements of the European countries in the Quadruple or Holy Alliance, or in the subsequent congresses, at Troppan, 1820; Lalbach, 1821; or Verona, 1822, as that specifically set forth in article 10 of the present covenant. And, inasmuch as article 10 is perhaps the most astonishing thing ever attempted to be fastened upon a world, and certainly the most outrageous ever attempted upon America, I quote it:

Article 10. Territorial integrity: The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. In any case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

A century ago we had the Quadruple Alliance, and subsequently one made with France in addition, for the maintenance of existing treaties and the preservation of the peace of the world. Today we have a league composed substantially of five nations pledged to the maintenance of existing treaties, and in addition pledged to the preservation as against external aggression of the

territorial integrity and existing political independence of its members. The league of nations comes to us after its principal members have been gorged with territory, with their boundaries and their limits increased beyond the wildest dreams, and with other immense tracts of the world's surface yet to be distributed among them. After these extraordinary accessions of territory, when each of the four nations possesses land far greater than ever before, the one going solvent national concern on earth undertakes by article 10 to guarantee forever these extraordinary territorial limits. It is answered by the advocates of the league that we guarantee these boundaries only against external aggression. But this was the very question that arose in the Quadruple Alliance a century ago. Castlereagh, England's representative, then recognized the possibilities of the future, and as the historian, Phillips, remarks--

It was but a short step from interfering with the external relations of a state to interfering with those of its internal relations which might be supposed to exercise an external effect; and from the first the British Government had realized the danger to national liberties involved in any such claim.

Great Britain's attitude then was justified by subsequent events. It seems unspeakable that America, with the story before it of what was undertaken a century ago, under a provision merely guaranteeing treaties, should now enter into engagements by which she puts her mighty power in the hands of foreign diplomats whose spirit has not

changed by the passing of a century for the maintenance for all time of their territories. It is obvious why the British statesmanship just subsequent to the Napoleonic wars and the British statesmanship of today are quite at variance. Today, with the tremendous accessions of lands by England, she can very well insist upon the guaranty of boundaries.

A hundred years ago the guaranty rested most onerously upon England, the guaranty not alone to preserve boundaries fixed by treaties, but what was read into the particular provision then--to destroy internal revolution which might have an external effect. Today the guaranty, infinitely stronger than in the treaties succeeding the Napoleonic wars, rests upon the United States, and that guaranty once given by our Nation must in the good faith upon which we pride ourselves be carried out to the limit. Now, what happened in the guaranty of preservation of existing treaties made just after the Napoleonic wars, the sort of guaranty immeasurably strengthened to which we bind ourselves? Metternich feared revolution just as the four bankrupt nations with which we have allied ourselves fear it, and he evolved from the engagement of the Allies to respect existing treaties his famous doctrine of intervention. England saw herself thus trapped, and the possibility of having her soldiers sent into every country in Europe, and perhaps abroad, to quell internal disturbances, and would not ultimately subscribe to the doctrine

emunciated and agreed to by other nations. That 85
doctrine, which became the law of the alliance, was that
internal revolution might constitute or result in external
injury or aggression, and therefore was not only the
bounden duty of the members to quell every internal dis-
turbance and destroy every possible revolution. Under
Metternich's leadership, the Congress of Troppau was held.
England and France declined to engage in Metternich's
enterprises. Revolution had broken out in south Italy.
The people were striving for freedom. They forced their
king to proclaim a constitution and asked a liberal
government. Under the terms of the Quadruple Alliance
for the protection of treaties an Austrian expedition in-
vaded Naples, defeated the people, and put back upon the
throne with absolute power the recalcitrant sovereign
Ferdinand. In Piedmont in 1821 the story was repeated,
and revolution was ended in Italy and freedom for the mo-
ment died. In 1822 Ferdinand VII of Spain, the most
worthless of rulers, was expelled by his people, who
adopted a constitution and endeavored to have a govern-
ment founded upon liberty. The great powers under the
formula and definition of Metternich sent a hundred
thousand French troops into Spain, who whipped the ill-
disciplined people and restored the dissolute monarch.
And all this was done under a clause not a tithe as strong
as that under which we are asked to bind ourselves in the

After the powers had restored absolutism in Spain and again set up worthless Ferdinand upon the throne, they deemed it advisable to restore to Spain her American colonies, which had successfully revolted. England protested strongly against this course, but under the league of nations, as it then existed to preserve existing treaties, the great powers made ready to give back to Spain by force of arms the American colonies of Spain, which had revolted and become free. And then they were stopped, and stopped forever by an American message, the Monroe Doctrine. It was America, an American President, who ended for all time the infamous Metternich doctrine, which had grown out of the nineteenth century league of nations designed to "promote peace and prevent war," and to guarantee existing treaties. Now, today this American doctrine having played its important role is delivered into the custody of the same sinister spirit which it exorcised from the world a century ago.

In the construction of article 10 it will require neither astute lawyer nor cunning diplomat to apply external aggression to any form of internal revolution, which it was feared might be communicated to neighboring States. It was exactly upon this theory that internal revolution was held by Metternich and his associates to be within the jurisdiction of the Quadruple Alliance of a century ago under its obligation to preserve treaties.

At the conference of Troppau, in 1820, the

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assembled powers solemnly declared:

The powers have exercised an incontestable right in commonly concerting measures of safety against the States in which an overturn of the government effected by revolt can only be considered as a dangerous example which must have for a result an attitude hostile against all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exercise of this right of necessity becomes still more urgent when those in that situation sought to communicate to neighboring States the evil in which they themselves were plunged and to propagate revolt and confusion among them. There is in this attitude and this conduct an evident rupture of the pact which guarantees to all the governments of Europe besides the inviolability of their territory the enjoyment of peaceful relations which exclude all reciprocal encroachment on their rights.

How often of late have we heard language conveying the same thought from those who are advocating the league of nations. If any people with a perfect case for freedom should rebel, the advocates of the league of nations would enthusiastically rush in, because this is exactly the design of the league of nations. Tomorrow it may be Ireland, aided in small part from the outside, demanding that of which we have made a mockery--self-determination. Under our guaranty we must prevent it. And parenthetically, Mr. President, I may remark that Ireland, it seems to me, is in the position of a litigant with a perfect case who can get no hearing. In a year hence stricken and cruelly despoiled Korea, or possibly even passive, humble, robbed, and weak China. And, whether it would be the one or the other subject peoples rebelling, the purpose of the league of nations, under article 10, is to use the great

wealth, power, and blood of the great democracy of the 88
earth to retain revolting peoples, without regard to the
righteousness of their cause, within the governments
and the powers from which they would be free. I wish that
there were time to insert in full the various pronuncia-
mentos of the allies in the last century, when, under the
pretense of preserving peace with the sword, they destroyed
freedom. If their various proclamations were recited today,
and no indication given of the time of their issuance and
the specific matters to which they relate, they would
readily be ascribed to modern utterances of the advocates
of the league of nations, and would be taken as a part of
the discussions at Paris. At Laibach, in 1821, the
proclamation of the allied monarchs said of themselves:

In the future, as in the past, they will always have
the purpose of preserving the independence and rights
of each State as they are recognized and defined by
existing treaties.

It was under this clause that the incipient revolu-
tions in Italy against discredited and disreputable monarchs,
all internal and domestic in character, were cruelly des-
troyed by the force of the great powers.

In the light of historical precedent and with the
solemn determination faithfully to observe every inter-
national obligation we may assume, read and analyze this
remarkable document. It goes far beyond that which the
world, with the exception of one power, in the last
century construed as requiring the guarantee of nations to

preserve inviolate against any attack, external

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or internal, territorial limits and existing govern-

ments. In its preamble the league of nations provides:

The high contracting parties, in order to promote international cooperation, to achieve international peace and security...by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this covenant.

And then, in article 10, the members of the league for themselves "undertake to respect," and, far beyond undertaking to respect, they agree to "preserve," as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. And if this were not enough to involve us in any dispute or controversy, external or internal, which might affect the territorial integrity and existing political independence of members of the league, article 10 takes cognizance not only of any such external aggression but specifically takes cognizance, too, of any threat or danger of such aggression. It does not need precedent or the construction put upon the maintenance of existing treaties by the Quadruple Alliance to enable us to understand that "danger" of such aggression may be any kind of revolution, rebellion, internal or external controversy, or any difficulty of any character. It is unthinkable that any American wrote article 10. It is unthinkable that any American can subscribe to article 10. Those who penned this provision knew exactly what they meant and

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exactly what they intended. With scrupulous care the provision was designed to preserve for all time existing governments and the territorial integrity of existing governments. How best could this guaranty, in the light of world events and in the kaleidoscopic changes of the past few years, be accomplished? The shrewd nationalist of Europe or the able diplomat of the Orient, taking unto his country the immense new territories acquired by the peace, at once would realize that the only substantial guaranty in the world of the stability of his country and of the preservation of its enormous gains in territory and people, would be the great, free, giant democracy, the United States. And this league of nations is written around the one central idea that the great democracy of the United States shall guarantee, maintain, and preserve the British Empire's boundaries, with its seething millions of discontented peoples; the increased territories of France; the vastly extended boundaries of Italy, throbbing with revolution; and the rape of China by Japan.

American fathers and American mothers want peace, and they want a league of nations which will give them peace. Ask any American mother in Kansas or Illinois or California if she is for peace. She will say "Yes" with all her heart. Ask her if she is willing that her son and her grandsons shall go to the Balkans, to China, to Korea, to Siberia, to Arabia, to the Dalmatian coast, to Poland to

compel peace. She will answer just as promptly "No."¹ 91

This league of nations, with the men who really wrote it, was meant to obtain peace only insofar as peace maintained forever inviolate their territories and their subject peoples; and it was meant that this kind of peace should be obtained by the exercise of the power and the force of the United States.

How can any men of liberal views agree to article 10? When I speak of men of liberal views I mean those whose hearts throb in unison with humanity; those who believe governments are obligated first to men and women and children. The section freezes the world into immutability. It arrogates to those of us who are here today a knowledge superior to that of all those who shall come hereafter. It makes the present generation decide the fate of all future generations. It takes no heed of new world events, of ever-changing advances and progress. It assumes today to be the end, and that the men of today may write the history of tomorrow. It assumes to put the world in a strait-jacket, wherein there can be no movement for betterment or progress or humanity. But beyond and above all this, the maintenance of the static condition can be accomplished by the blood of just one nation, and that is ours. Are ye ready, Americans, to pledge your sons and your sons' sons to

¹This appeal is repeated in 1941, last paragraph

maintain and preserve for all time the present

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governments of the little nations we are setting up in Europe and the present governments and boundaries of the British and the Japanese Empires?

When the President returned from Europe with the original draft of the league of nations, a study of the draft disclosed that the Monroe doctrine had been deliberately scrapped. A very ominous statement was first made by the President that the covenant would not be amended, and all of those who cheerfully had accepted the covenant before ever they had seen it united in a universal cry that amendment was unnecessary. They all agreed, of course, that the Monroe doctrine was not mentioned, but they said it was unnecessary to mention the Monroe doctrine, because the covenant extended the doctrine to the world, as well as to the American Hemisphere. The fact is they gave little heed to the Monroe doctrine and cared less about it. The country, however, soon gave unmistakable evidence that it was unwilling to abandon this traditional policy of the Republic. At first the endeavor was made to soothe the people with bland, urbane, and specious arguments about the extension of the Monroe doctrine to the world, but this was so obviously specious and so plainly in violation of the very essence of the doctrine that the explanation failed to satisfy. The Monroe doctrine being peculiarly a doctrine of our own, designed and adapted for our self-defense and preservation, could not in the

very nature of things be applicable to the world, 93
and a league of nations which took it from its proper
sphere of necessity destroyed it. The advocates of the
league of nations knowing this fact, and being unable to
convince our people that a world-wide application, with-
out mention of the doctrine or reservation concerning
it, preserved it, finally concluded to amend the coven-
ant in some sort of fashion to overcome the widespread
American objection. And what an amendment was presented:

Article 21. Nothing in this covenant shall be
deemed to affect the validity of international
engagements such as treaties of arbitration or
regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine
for securing the maintenance of peace.

If an American, with the purpose in view of protecting
the Monroe doctrine, wrote this article, his affection for
it was tepid, and his allegiance feeble. If the purpose
of the man who wrote this so-called protection of the Mon-
roe doctrine was to place that doctrine specifically
within the jurisdiction of the league of nations, he suc-
ceeded admirably. The amendment, in fact, is "a fraud, a
delusion, and a snare." It does not protect the Monroe
doctrine. It could not have been written with any other
purpose than the destruction of the Monroe doctrine. It
is silly to contend that men who wanted to protect the
Monroe doctrine and preserve it could not have said so in
simple language. It was unnecessary to describe it, as
it is not, as a "treaty of arbitration" or a "regional
understanding." It was a misnomer, as any American knows,

and it is neither of these things "for securing 94
the maintenance of peace." The amendment was written
either by an American who had no sympathy with the Monroe
doctrine or by some one, not American, who was perfectly
competent to write ambiguous phrases which will place the
Monroe doctrine for all time under the league of nations.

What is meant by the language, "Nothing in this
covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of re-
gional understandings like the Monroe doctrine for secur-
ing the maintenance of peace?" The language certainly
does not mean what the Nation demanded--that the Monroe doc-
trine should be excepted from the league of nations, should
be preserved by the United States for America, and that it
should be administered by the United States and the United
States alone. The amendment simply says, "The validity of
regional understandings for securing the maintenance of
peace" shall not be affected. In other words, if the Mon-
roe doctrine is to be administered, it will be within the
jurisdiction of the league of nations to administer it.
The amendment of the Monroe doctrine is like nearly every-
thing that has come to us concerning the league of nations.
It is pretended that it does one thing when it is intended
it shall do another. It is not frank, nor fair, nor open,
nor honest. Where plain language might express, without
equivocation or ambiguity or evasion, the plain language
is not employed. If there had been a real desire upon the
part of the peace conference or the American delegates

there to safeguard the Monroe doctrine and to remove it from the league of nations, leaving it for administration by the United States alone, this would have been done. But, instead of doing this, ambiguous and inaccurate phraseology is employed, the very purpose of which, apparently, is to deliver finally this great American policy into the power of European nations. When the amendment was announced at Paris, the semiofficial announcement of the covenant stated:

Concerning the Monroe doctrine, article 21 makes it clear that the covenant is not intended to abrogate or weaken any other agreements so long as they are consistent with its own terms for the assurance of peace. And in so far as the Monroe doctrine tends to the same end, whatever validity it possesses can not be affected by the covenant.

It is obvious that the amendment, therefore, was intended to subject the doctrine to the interpretation of other powers, and the instant this is done the doctrine is destroyed. The amendment is not an amendment safeguarding the Monroe doctrine, but is an attempted amendment to the doctrine itself.

The construction of the Monroe doctrine amendment by the British has been given in the commentaries issued to their people by the British delegates. Unfortunately, the commentary of our only American delegate when he presented the amended covenant was, "Article 21 is new." In this, as in all matters affecting the vital interests of the Republic, Americans must content themselves with the absolute secrecy of their representative and his refusal to

enlighten them. The British, perhaps feeling a

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sense of some responsibility to their people, have in a series of commentaries endeavored to expound the various provisions of the league. Their interpretation of the Monroe doctrine amendment is thus stated:

Article 21 makes it clear that the covenant is not intended to abrogate or weaken any other agreements, so long as they are consistent with its own terms into which members of the league may have entered or may hereafter enter for the assurance of peace. Such agreements would include special treaties for compulsory arbitration and military conventions that are genuinely defensive.

The Monroe doctrine and similar understandings are put in the same category. They have shown themselves in history to be not instruments of national ambition, but guaranties of peace. The origin of the Monroe doctrine is well known. It was proclaimed in 1823 to prevent America from becoming a theater for intrigues of European absolutism. At first a principle of American foreign policy, it has become an international understanding, and it is not illegitimate for the people of the United States to say that the covenant should recognize that fact. In its essence it is consistent with the spirit of the covenant; and, indeed, the principles of the league, as expressed in article 10, represent the extension to the whole world of the principles of the doctrine; while should any dispute as to the meaning of the latter ever arise between the American and European powers, the league is there to settle it.

This declaration of the British is pregnant with meaning. It holds the treaties now existing, such as that between Japan and England, substantially an offensive and defensive alliance, and any which may hereafter be entered into, will continue in full force and effect, notwithstanding the league of nations; and, what is no less important, that should any dispute arise concerning the Monroe doctrine, the league will settle that dispute.

To Americans it has repeatedly been declared by 97
league advocates that the amendment fully protected the
Monroe doctrine and left the determination of its applica-
bility and its administration to the United States. To
the British public it is solemnly and officially an-
nounced that the amendment does no such thing, but brings
the Monroe doctrine in case of dispute to the league of
nations, where it will be submitted to the tender mercies
of England, Japan, France, and Italy. Of course, the Mon-
roe doctrine will never be mentioned unless a "dispute"
should arise between the United States and foreign
powers. To say that then, the only time when we need it,
it must be submitted to foreign powers for decision and
determination, is to deny the essence of the doctrine
and remove it from the very sphere from which it derives
its vitality--America.

The British interpretation of this amendment is
given added importance and controlling force by the voting
strength of the various members of the league. The
United States, the richest and most powerful Nation on
earth, has one vote. Great Britain has six. Not only has
Britain written the league, safeguarded her augmented
territories for all time, and with true British farsight-
edness commandeered our wealth and men for her protection
and preservation, but she has in the same spirit given
herself a preponderance of voting power to guard against

any future contingency. In this league, heralded 98
by its sponsors as a triumph of American idealism,
England has the following votes: 1, the British Empire;
2, Canada; 3, Australia; 4, South Africa; 5, New Zealand;
6, India. The moderation of the English statesmen in
not taking more votes--for, apparently, they could have
added, as they chose, votes for any part of the Empire,
great or small--ought to be fully appreciated by our
people. England had but to ask and the request was
granted; Japan but to demand, and we hastened to assent.¹
And so, with England six votes, the United States one,
we may be perfectly certain that the English interpreta-
tion of the amendment relating to the Monroe doctrine
will receive careful and courteous consideration.

Of late the advocates of the league have been ad-
vancing some curious reasons for our acceptance of it.
Many of them now suggest that the league is so fragile,
so weak, of so little compelling force that "it will do
no harm" to accept it, and then we can look for improve-
ment in the future. But if there are within it the
germs which will ripen into evils, it ought not to be
accepted upon any such theory. And this document has
within it not only the germs of world evil, but, what is
infinitely worse possibly, the germs of our own destruc-
tion. The great fundamental question which every father

¹"You have to take it, you can not escape it. Great Brit-
ain demands it, and Japan's friendship rests upon your
doing as Japan wants. So do not deny it..." 1930, p. 174.

and mother should answer is: Shall American boys 99
police the world? Shall American blood uphold, maintain, and preserve Old World governments and the territorial integrity of the nations which have immensely increased their boundaries? Once we adopt this league we are bound indefinitely to send American troops into Europe, Asia, and Africa, to sacrifice American blood in quarrels which never have concerned us and never can concern us, and to do all this at the behest and command of foreign nations. It is no answer to say that we may refuse, because no honest man will enter into an agreement with the mental reservation that he will break it, and no decent nation will solemnly sign a guarantee under the assumption it will violate its plighted word. I iterate and reiterate we pledge ourselves by this document to place our sons and our sons' sons under European or Asiatic command in European and Asiatic disputes, controversies, and wars. The advocate of the league of nations who denies this is either woefully ignorant or, what is worse, endeavors to deceive his people.

Another common expression at present is, "Half a loaf is better than none." But a half a loaf poisoned is worse than none at all, and this half loaf, as some of its protagonists describe it that has been given us, is poisoned in its very creation by wrong, injustice, duplicity, and broken faith. It was neither fair nor just nor humane, when the world wanted peace, to delay that peace until the

territorial acquisitions, like those of Japan, 100
should be for all time guaranteed. When the peoples of
every country, staggering under the terrible effects of
war, were longing and praying for its end by the treaty,
were begging and pleading that they might resume as best
they could their normal lives, it was the worst sort of
duplicity to intertwine and intermingle with the treaty
of peace a document for the maintenance of existing gov-
ernments and newly acquired boundaries. Some day some
one must answer to the soldiers who have been kept
abroad, to those who will be sent abroad, to the mothers
and fathers at home, for seven months of intermeddling
that an English document guaranteeing the British and the
Japanese Empires and the Kingdom of Italy might be
fastened upon the American people.

The sordid bargaining, selfish interest, and secret
diplomacy which produced the league of nations is best
illustrated in the decision of the peace conference re-
lating to China and Japan. At one time during the delib-
erations the President issued a statement concerning
Italy's demands, in substance denouncing secret treaties.
During all these wretched months of secret intrigue it
was the one clear note which struck a responsive chord
with many of us. Some of us immediately indorsed his
stand on secret treaties, assuming, of course, that when
he took that stand in the doubtful case of Italy he would
take it in the clear and unambiguous case of Japan. But,

hardly had the words ceased to ring in denunciation 101
of secret treaties when he accepted, without demur or
objection, the worst of all the secret treaties presented,
that between England, France, and Italy on the one hand
and Japan upon the other.

We were not a party to the secret treaties, it is
true, when they were made, but in the settlement of the
peace we have become a party to them. Of our own choice,
after the war is over, we join in the crime against China.
It is concerning the secret treaties in their relation to
the league that I speak. In disposing of Chinese terri-
tory we were dealing not with an enemy but with an ally.
We were despoiling not Germany, our enemy, but China, our
friend. And we who know something of the oriental char-
acter can understand the fate of China and how Japan bided
her time at the peace conference until the exact moment
for success came, and then demanded and successfully de-
manded. Just as Japan did with her secret treaties and
China, just so will she do with her secret treaties and
what she calls race discrimination. When the time seems
to her propitious--and it will not be long--she will
bring to the league of nations our yet unsettled dispute
over our alien land law and her pending controversy
respecting immigration and her assertion of race discrim-
ination by us. And when this is done the league will
take charge of these momentous questions and will decide

Glance for an instant at the jurisdiction of the league.

The preamble recites its purpose:

To promote international cooperation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another.

The council of the league may deal--

with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. (Art. 4)

The assembly may deal--

with any matter within the sphere of action of the league or affecting the peace of the world. (Art. 3)

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. (Art. 11)

It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the league to bring to the attention of the assembly or of the council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb either the peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. (Art. 12)

If there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture which is not submitted to arbitration as above the members of the league agree that they will submit the matter to the council. (Art. 15)

From the quotations made it is, of course, obvious that any question likely to lead to a rupture is a matter clearly within the jurisdiction of the league and may be

passed upon by it. With the Japanese question as

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it affects the Pacific coast I am reasonably familiar.

I recall in 1913, while I was governor of California, the law pending before our legislature for the protection of our agricultural lands. I remember vividly when we were doing that which was clearly our right to do, the matter became of such international importance that the President sent to California the Secretary of State, who, there for a week endeavored to convince our legislature that it should not pass its alien land law.¹ This law scrupulously observed existing treaties, was not discriminatory in character, and was designed solely as a measure of protection for the fairest lands in all this Nation, and the law was designed to do for California what Japanese law was already doing for Japan. My correspondence upon the subject was illuminating, not only upon the position which then was taken by the administration, but that which was assumed by the Japanese. It is sufficient for me to say that the controversy soon became of more than local importance and assumed international proportions. If the league of nations had been in existence then the question would have been taken from the people of California, who alone were entitled to deal with it, and would have been

¹This law prohibited ownership of land in California by persons not citizens of the United States, and was aimed directly at Japanese farmers in California.

decided not by those whose right it was to decide 104
and who were most interested, but by foreign nations.
Of course, under the provisions of the league which I
have cited, any such problem as our alien land law
would at once become a subject for the league's determin-
ation, and any such question as immigration would like-
wise be within the league's jurisdiction. It is
asserted, however, that the following amendment to
article fifteen of the league--

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by
one of them and is found by the council to arise
out of a matter which by international law is
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that
party, the council shall so report and shall
make no recommendation as to its settlement--

would make it impossible for the league to act upon immi-
gration and kindred problems. I deny that this is so. It
has never been determined by international law that immi-
gration problems are solely within the jurisdiction of one
party, nor has international law ever definitely decided
that what the Japanese term as "race discrimination" is
solely a problem of domestic jurisdiction. On the one
hand, it is asserted by the Japanese that alien land laws,
restriction of immigration, and the like, are discrimina-
tory in character, and hence international. On our part,
we might assert the reverse. In any event, the matter
would come before the council for decision, and we are
thus in the position of submitting to the council or the
league problems of the gravest moment to us.

offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Great Britain, and that when the question of Shantung recently was up Britain very frankly said this treaty alliance still existed. As a Californian, I am not ready to submit any race problems we may have to the jurisdiction of the council of the league of nations or to the league itself.

I am unwilling that either body should pass upon possibly the gravest question that confronts us. I will not leave to foreign powers whether it is a domestic or an international problem. That is for us, and for us alone, to decide. You gentlemen from the South would resent the suggestion that race problems of yours should be decided by nations bound to the race affected by secret treaties. You ought to be in full sympathy with me when I decline, so far as I am able, to submit to a determination of any sort, jurisdictional or otherwise, by foreign nations joined together by secret treaties, the great problem which confronts us.

Moreover, the peculiar phraseology employed leaves doubtful the intention of the particular reservation. The dispute must be found to arise "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of one of the parties. No domestic question has ever been determined by international law. If the matter

is one purely domestic, international law does not 106
and could not deal with it at all. The language employed
in the asserted exception of domestic questions is like
the language employed in so many instances in the coven-
ant, loose, inapt, and apparently intentionally uncertain
and ambiguous. And yet, if it be claimed that this par-
ticular amendment excludes the consideration of purely
domestic questions, what will be said of the very next
sentence in article fifteen? Immediately after the
amendment occurs:

The council may in any case under this article refer
the dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be
so referred at the request of either party to the
dispute provided such request be made within four-
teen days after the submission of the dispute to
the council.

Thus, even though you assert an exception of domestic
questions is embraced in article fifteen, yet, nevertheless,
the council may refer the very excepted case to the
assembly, and it is the right of either party to require
such reference to the assembly. When you recall that the
assembly at Paris voted eleven for the Japanese position
and six against, our California land law and immigration
question would, upon reference to the league assembly,
receive short shrift.¹

¹At this point Senator Reed of Missouri interrupted to ask
Johnson whether he knew how the respective nations voted.
Johnson replied that he knew only the totals and not the
individual votes of the various nations.

that questions like immigration, those arising from the alien land law of California and similar matters, will be within the jurisdiction of the league and will be determinable under the very language of the covenant. We have observed that any war or "threat of war" is a matter of concern to the league, and that if there should arise between members of the league any dispute likely to lead to a rupture the league will take cognizance of the dispute and jurisdiction of the matter. A question of immigration might in the first instance, where a single individual or a number sought admission to the nation, be held as purely a domestic concern; but if the country offended presented to the league that this question, originally of domestic concern, threatened peace and constituted "a dispute likely to lead to a rupture," the very purposes for which the league is formed, according to its advocates, would of necessity require the "threat of war" or the "dispute likely to lead to a rupture" to be brought before the league and there determined. The important question then becomes whether or not the matter constitutes a "threat of war" or "a dispute likely to lead to a rupture," and to say that the league, because the initial argument arose over a domestic question, would not take jurisdiction and cognizance of the impending threat of war and the possibility of rupture of friendly relations of nations would be to deny

to the league exactly what its advocates contend 108
it possesses and to take from it any possibility of
prevention of war. When a domestic question ripens
into a threat or war it comes within the league. Any
question, domestic or otherwise, under the covenant
which threatens war or constitutes a dispute likely to
lead to a rupture, of necessity, if the league is to
have the slightest vitality, must come within the league
and be decided by it. It seems, therefore, first, that
under the amendment domestic questions are not excepted;
and, secondly, that any question, domestic or otherwise,
which disturbs the peace or is likely to lead to a rup-
ture between friendly nations shall be decided by the
league. Californians, therefore, if they are interested
in Japanese immigration, if they believe in the Cali-
fornia alien land law; Americans, if they are jealous of
their right to determine who shall come to our shores
and under what circumstances, and who insist Americans
must alone decide their domestic problems dealing with
other nationals, can not support the present league of
nations.

Within the limits of argument here I can only show
briefly that the league of nations, a part of the peace
conference, is tainted and poisoned at its source with
exactly the same duplicity and wrong which have ever
characterized Old World diplomacy. Open covenants openly
arrived at are now a byword and a joke. Their mention

brings but a cynical smile. Utterances of the President concerning self-determination, the protection of the weak from the strong, against special covenants, understandings, or alliances were no less fervid than his statements regarding open covenants. I do not quote them humorously, I beg you to believe. I quote them in all seriousness, and then you may take them and set them side by side with what has transpired at Paris. They are too tragic, in my opinion, to be at all humorous.

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June 8, 1918, the President said:

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.

May 26, 1917, he cabled Russia:

No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payments for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

September 27, 1918, this:

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

July 4, 1918, was:

The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

September 27, 1918:

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all. Third, there can be no league or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the league of nations.

Instances of like utterances might be multiplied. I add just one more, of February 11, 1918:

Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We can not have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangement of a peace conference. It can not be pieced together out of the individual understandings of the powerful States.

Read these utterances in the light of the Shantung decision. Time permits me to discuss but one instance, perhaps the most glaring.

To the Japanese Empire, with only 60,000,000 of people, we turned over shamefully and unjustly and cruelly 40,000,000 of Chinese. To the autocracy of the

Orient we delivered 40,000,000 republicans of

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China. We made the Orient "safe for democracy" by dismembering its only democracy and handing the parts to the strongest autocracy on earth. The blackest page in all our history was written when our name was signed to the treaty delivering Shantung to Japan. It makes a mockery of our pretensions, and if the Senate permits it to stand it stamps us forever with its infamy. The delivery of China's fairest province unto Japan with its 40,000,000 people violated not only every word that had been spoken by us concerning the peace but it violated every principle of fairness, justice, and honor. Its justification by the thick and thin administration papers--and I presume as well by those very good people who advocate this league without knowing anything about it--is that the league of nations may ultimately right the wrong. But remember that with Shantung given to Japan, its people transferred to the Japanese Empire, under the league of nations, we--we, mind you, the ninety-six men sitting in the Senate--guarantee for all time by this league of nations, if we adopt it, Japan's territorial integrity and political independence. We have not only committed the crime, in the first instance, but we have guaranteed the crime for all time. We give by the peace treaty Shantung to Japan and by the league of nations, part of the same document, we guarantee Shantung to Japan, and guarantee it with our treasure and our blood.

We first rob China and enslave 40,000,000;

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and at the very time of the wrong we underwrite the robbery and guarantee by our arms and money it shall never be righted. This is the league of nations.

There is another experience that recently we have had with the peace conference.

In April dispatches came to this country that some sort of secret engagement had been entered into by the President with France and England. The story was repeatedly published. April 25 this statement was given out by Mr. Tumulty, the President's secretary, at the White House:

In view of the fact that certain newspapers of wide circulation throughout the country had intimated that the President had entered into secret alliance or treaty with some of the great powers, I conveyed this information to the President and am today in receipt of a cablegram from him giving a positive and unqualified denial to this story.

Within a very few days thereafter the French Government officially published that there had been an agreement between France and England and the United States for the protection of France. After this official publication by the French Government, and notwithstanding the original denial, the following telegram from the President was published by Secretary Tumulty on May 10:

Happily there is no mystery or privacy about what I have promised the Government--

the President cabled--

I have promised to propose to the Senate a supplement

in which we shall agree, subject to the approval¹¹³ of the council of the league of nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany, thus merely hastening the action to which we should be bound by the covenant of the league of nations.

"Happily there is neither mystery nor privacy"

about the document, except in the United States of America. Nobody here has seen it. Nobody knows what it contains. It is impossible to comment upon it, and it is a singular fact that an engagement of this sort has been entered into by the United States, apparently the first of its kind in our history. When you remember that England frankly says her treaties are yet in existence, her offensive and defensive alliance with Japan yet controlling, and then you observe the United States of America making some sort of engagement, the knowledge of which for the present we are denied, you may have, unless you willfully blind yourselves, some conception of what the league of nations is intended to do.

Do you realize the full meaning of the alliance with France? In his explanation the President has given us his first and only construction of the league. He says that an alliance now to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany is "merely hastening the action to which we should be bound by the covenant of the league of nations." By the league of nations, then, as understood by the

States must protect France in case of attack. By the league of nations, then, the armed force of the United States must protect any country a member of the league when attacked. If under the covenant we are thus committed to France, we are in like manner committed by it to Jugo-Slavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, Japan, England, and the Hejaz of Arabia.¹ The President by his own utterance in explanation of the covenant has made clear what the document itself plainly says, but what its advocates have occasionally denied, that under article 10 the United States is bound to send its troops and employ its power and treasure at the behest of every nation on earth. This is the definite obligation we assume; this is the so-called league of nations.

It is not a league of nations to prevent war. It is a league of armed nations in a gigantic war trust. In its very creation it has been stripped of every idealistic purpose it ever had. It contains within itself the germs of many wars, and worse than that it rivets, as in the Shantung decision, the chains of tyranny upon millions of people and cements for all time unjust and wicked annexations. It is a great world

¹This sentence is repeated almost verbatim in 1935, p. 206 f.

economic trust, wherein a few men sitting in 115
secret may control the economic destinies of peoples.
It is not a league of peoples, nor does it anywhere
concern itself with peoples whose past wrongs and future
rights were so eloquently portrayed by the President.
It is a trust of existing present power. It will
never prevent war; it will sanctify power in a new, a
terrible, and sinister sense.

If the professions which have been uttered respecting peoples were sincere, if self-determination were honestly intended, if war were sought to be prevented rather than territorial gains safeguarded, this covenant would at some point have touched and recognized peoples. Instead of coming closer to those most concerned, the men and women for whom governments should exist, the league goes a step further from them. The representatives of ruling powers sit far away in secret. Not even is the Congress a part, nor does it have the right of knowledge or any check except that which our fundamental law may interpose--a frail and uncertain barrier in these days of Constitution scoffers. The President will appoint as America's member at the league his personal representative, when he himself does not attend. The attitude of the gentlemen on the other side of this Chamber is that he may do with us as he wills, and presumably his representative may do likewise, and a gentle inquiry as to what is intended for our people

is treated as treasonable, but above all as partisan. There is control neither by Congress nor the people. Geneva in secret will render its decrees and the only province of our people will be their execution. There is to be a plebiscite or referendum in Schleswig, the Saar Valley, and other places in due time. If those who wrote this document really wanted to prevent war, they would have permitted the men and women who must bear the burdens of war to determine by their votes whether or not there should be war. Of course, unless all the nations of the world agree, this could not be done. It would manifestly be unjust for one nation to be compelled to resort to a referendum as to war while its antagonist without a vote, proceeded to aggression. But here in a league are, or ultimately will be, all the nations of the earth. If every nation agreed to a referendum to its people before a declaration of war, peoples instead of rulers, humanity instead of power, would decide whether wars should be fought, and only in the rarest instances would there ever be war, and then only in the clearest cases. Such wars would be people's wars. Upon what theory do the gentlemen at Paris prate of self-determination, the rights of peoples, recognize the referendum in matters of intimate concern to peoples in small and isolated communities and deny the right when the decision means the very life of human beings? The

answer is this is not a league to promote peace, 117
but to protect power. Those who advocate it dare not
amend it so that the issue of war shall be made by the
men and women who must fight and die for it.

In a word, Mr. President, this league means that
American boys shall police the world; that all the tot-
tering nations of the earth shall be upheld by our
blood and our bone; that Europe, Asia, and Africa may
draw upon us in their every dispute and quarrel; that
our Nation will be at the mercy of European and Japan-
ese diplomats who never had and never will have any
sympathy with our aspirations or our ideals; that we
with our glorious past shall guarantee the territorial
integrity of every country on earth and the bondage of
every suffering people in anguish begging for freedom;
that we destroy our Monroe doctrine and submit contro-
versies on the American Hemisphere to determination by
foreign powers. It means that I must abandon the les-
sons of my youth, which, until this moment have been
the creed of my manhood, of American ideals, American
principles, and American patriotism; that I must deny
the Americanism I taught my children, and that under
God's blessings I hope to teach my grandchildren. It
means the halting and betrayal of New World liberalism,
the triumph of cynical Old World diplomacy, the
humiliation and end of American idealism.

Certain partisan gentlemen, Mr. President, have of late been making the issue partisanly. For one, I make the issue with them. It is not one political party or the other. The issue is the Republic, the Republic that Washington gave us, that Lincoln saved for us, whose traditions and ideals have been so gloriously upheld by our valiant sons abroad. The issue is America. And I am an American. (Applause on the floor and in the galleries.)

I cannot express to you what is in my heart as I meet with you tonight. I cannot hope fittingly to tell you of my appreciation and gratitude. To find, after a prolonged absence, the friendships of the years yet enduring, their bonds strengthened, mellowed and moves me far beyond mere words. I am proud, I am happy--above all, I am thankful. And in speaking thus, I assume that tonight is not wholly a personal greeting, it has no political significance; but it represents possibly an idea uppermost in your minds and mine which you and I think needs expression, of the relations which our country should maintain toward the rest of the world.

For four-and-a-half months I've wandered through Europe. The opportunity has been mine to talk with many, high and low alike, to see--it is true, superficially--existing conditions; to witness some important developments and to hear at times expositions of national policies. I do not pretend an intimate knowledge of statesmen's minds, nor of peoples' purposes. I frankly concede to you I am utterly wanting in that omniscience which enables an American as he steps from the gangplank abroad, to tell the world what it should do, and then, with benevolence and generous intention, to confide to

¹New York Times, July 26, 1923, Sect I, p. 2, cols. 3-6

an eager and listening Europe, exactly what the United¹²⁰ States will do.

I regret that I am so lacking in discernment and intelligence that I cannot by an overnight residence in Europe, like some who spend a week abroad, advise Europe of her future course and America of her bounden duty with the absolute certainty that if the advice be heeded the world will prosper and all will be well. There is a growing feeling across the sea that too many Americans, under the persuasive and compelling influence of their environment there, speak what they think their auditors wish to hear; and who from the compelling influence of their own importance interpret our country not as it is, but as will best maintain the position they crave in Europe.

I was an "innocent abroad." I was content with my nationality, but tremendously curious to learn of others from among them. Without racial prejudices, with wholehearted religious toleration, with, if I may be permitted, a love of human beings, just ordinary people, I endeavored to sense the atmosphere in which I moved. Little more can be done in any brief visit abroad. And so, in the beginning let me say to you, I do not claim to have been a close investigator, nor do I presume to speak authoritatively. I give but the impressions of an innocent abroad. I went to Europe just an American. I return just an American.

In talking with you tonight, I speak in neither

personal nor political hostility to any man. I speak 121
in no partisan sense. I am one of those who believe
politics should be limited to the coast line of the
nation. Our international policy, our country's
relations to foreign countries, should be determined by
the policy itself, not by opportunism or by any spurious
cry of party regularity. I cannot forgive the man, who
decides this nation's future solely by the present
apparent necessity of partisan politics. Some of us
will neither be cajoled nor driven nor browbeaten into
advocacy of a foreign policy at variance with what we
deem our country's weal; what we condemned under a Demo-
cratic administration, we will not accept under a
Republican administration.

In our country, as in every other, there are today
pressing domestic problems, upon which there is wide
divergency of view. When the very struggle for existence
becomes more difficult, when the day's activities may
mean their continuance on the morrow, when possible want
stalks just beyond the fireside men have little time or
thought for international policies.

Tonight I am expected to speak sketchily of my im-
pressions of foreign relations, and I refrain therefore
from any extended discussion of domestic questions. Men,
however, are not unlike the world over. Human breasts
throb with the same emotions. Hopes and aspirations,
longings and yearnings, fears and love, come to the

peasant of Russia and the farmer of America alike. 122

The primitive problem of existence and subsistence for man and his dear ones is no different in one clime than another. Common humanity learned from dreaded war it must bear the burden, but it learned too it could wield the power. No people, least of all ours, will look again with equanimity or in silence upon the invasion or subversion of what they deem their inalienable rights--the right to happiness, to God's sunlight, the right to live. No court's decree denying fundamentals will they ever deem final.

Discontent abroad in our land, say our publicists? Of course, there's discontent. It arises, not from dissatisfaction with popular government, but with the lack of it. When we are so weak, our efforts so futile, that we cannot frame laws which will stand the test of courts to prohibit child labor and give women a minimum living wage, the common man looks at us, aye, he even dares to look at the courts, with some doubt and mistrust. When he finds his larder low, his crops poor, his prices poorer, and the appeal from statesmen and churches for him again to go to Europe; when his problems, which mean not only his happiness, but the happiness and very life of his loved ones, are shunned by those in power for the glamour of participation in European affairs, in no uncertain fashion he voices his discontent and distrust.

If one-fifth the effort now being made to take us

into Europe were devoted to taking their own out of 123 their distress and want, we'd have a happy, contented, and prosperous people. If a tithe of the time and money and labor spent in endeavoring to convince our citizens they should solve Europe's ills were spent in solving our own, the solution would be certain. Humanity is determined to have its own. It no longer begs; it demands. It asks its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It will have it in full measure. I suggest to my conservative brethren that recent events indicate they must choose whether progressive things shall be done in a conservative way or a radical way. You may have to take progressivism or radicalism will take you.

But upon these domestic questions our people will decide without pretense or cant, and they will be decided in the good old American fashion, in fair, stand-up fight. I have that confidence in the genius of the American people that they will ultimately be rightly decided; but the recurring periods of which the electorate may express their views make it certain they will finally express the will of our people. At any rate candor, frankness, directness will prevail in the determination of our domestic policies, and they may be changed just as often as the people, expressing their will at the ballot box, desire.

Unfortunately, another rule obtains with respect to our international problems. Unlike domestic policies, we may not with facility change a foreign policy once

adopted. When we have entered a particular 124
course the march onward may be irresistible. The future
is ever doubtful--never can it be accurately foretold.
Were we convinced of the unwisdom of a course adopted,
the arguments of expediency, of moral obligation and the
like, probably would carry us on. The overwhelming
force of these arguments need not be described to those
who remember the late war and the discussions then and
during the League contest.

Of transcendent importance is it, therefore, that we
reach our decision of foreign policy without haste or
passion, partisanship or prejudice. Once we enter upon
a new venture there will be no retreat. I'm well aware
of what may be said of Congressional action, and the power
of the representatives of the people, and I understand
thoroughly what that power is; but I understand, too, how
that power may be controlled.

It is a matter of deepest regret that in our dis-
cussions of foreign relations, sometimes candor is lacking,
frankness and directness forgotten, and too often we
neither see clearly nor think rationally of an inter-
national problem. Though you and I thought it had been
decided in 1920, the old question recurs. If it must be
decided again, I insist it shall be honestly and fear-
lessly decided. Let's have no pretense; let's make the
issue so plain that even some of our statesmen cannot
dodge it. I do not agree at all with the views of Mr.

associates. I do heartily agree with them on one thing--if our foreign policy is to come before our people, let it come frankly, fairly, honestly, and let the people decide whether they wish to participate in the European political mess or follow the policy that has thus far been ours; that has brought us our fame, our prosperity, our happiness and our glory.

I pause a moment to sound my feeble warning against the foreign propaganda now poisoning the national mind. It comes principally from the British Empire, although Britain is no worse, only more effective, than other countries in this respect. It taints the very sources of our news. It plays upon the most sacred of human emotions and often speaks in the holiest aspirations of mankind. It reaches into public bodies, civic and commercial associations, women's clubs, into press and pulpit alike. Its medium is sometimes in the guise of news, often in humanitarian and religious appeal, and sometimes it appears in titled personages from abroad.

When a Balfour or a Cecil comes among us, they preach their doctrine eloquently and tactfully, but it is always, however, carefully and sweetly phrased, the doctrine of and for their great nation, not of and for ours. And these titled gentlemen know, just as we have learned, that in the presence of a foreign title or a great alien personage some of our people are afflicted

with an inferiority complex, that makes them a 126
bit ashamed of being American, apologetic for the unfortunate circumstance of their birth and singularly susceptible to a foreign viewpoint. We cannot blame some of our English brethren if they are rather contemptuous in their estimate of American character. They see only two classes of Americans--fawning little brothers of the rich, who speak only in cringing aspects, and those who wish to bask in the sunlight of a titled presence and who jostle one another in a frantic effort for presentation at Court.

I'd like to label Americans of this sort who leave our shores, brand them with the contempt of real Americans, and sending them abroad plainly marked as the exemplars of but a small class, representing nothing but themselves, we would render an inestimable service to our people and perhaps an equal one to those beyond the sea.

Through this susceptible class and the ever-present foreign propaganda, the American people have absorbed the choicest and most amazing mass of misinformation; and the pity of it is, this misinformation is the basis of the opinions of so many good and well meaning people. The chords of human sympathy and brotherly love are played upon by masterly alien hands; the hatred of war and love of peace inborn in every man and woman have become the unconscious instruments of secret purpose and hidden

selfishness. And finally politics come into play, 127 and an international issue is eagerly seized upon as a political life preserver.

You may call the present effort what you will--a league, a conference, an association or a world court--the result, whether intended or not, will be exactly the same. Nobody in Europe cares a rap for the international court; many care very much whether we get into it. Nobody expects the World Court to solve any real provocative international problem; but many expect if the United States can be lured into it, the United States is on the way not only to the League of Nations, but to a full participation in European affairs.

War is awful, but there are other things almost as wicked.

War is terrible. Its horrors have so recently wrung our hearts that portrayal of its awfulness and its wickedness is unnecessary to enlist all right-thinking people in its prevention. But straight thinking people want really to prevent war, not to unite with war producers or inciters that their designs may be more readily accomplished and their wars made easier.

There are some things perhaps as wicked as war. A nation whose moral fibre has been destroyed by hypocrisy has no future. War may have people torn and bloody, but with character left; those people are not lost. Corrode a nation's character, destroy its moral fibre, and the

nation dies. We may fight and even lose and 128
yet again wax strong. We may suffer the untold agonies
of war, and rise supreme by the very force of a
national character untainted and moral strength un-
touched. I preach the doctrine of abhorrence of war.
I preach with the same emphasis abhorrence in our pub-
lic life, in our national and international policies,
of duplicity, cowardice, pretense, and hypocrisy.

However well intended, it is a dreadful thing to
tell our people that the International Court will stop
wars or that it will have the slightest effect upon
wars. However good the purpose, it is a shameful thing
to play upon the emotions of our women and our churches
with the pretense that a World Court exists which will
readily adjudicate international disputes and bring
peace and good will on earth to all men.

The court means nothing of that sort. It is an
utterly futile agency for peace--it cannot and it will
not prevent wars, and it does not pretend, either in its
organization or its operation to do so. It has juris-
diction of nothing except what countries choose to sub-
mit to it, and the four great member nations--Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan--have specifically
declined to submit to its compulsory jurisdiction.

It is an arbitrary tribunal to which disputes may
or may not be brought, as the great nations choose, and
passing events demonstrate conclusively great nations do

not choose to submit anything of consequence

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to it. Call it Court or what you will, its genesis is the League of Nations. It is part of the machinery of the League. It is the advisory body of the League; its opinions are based upon the prerogatives of the League; the law of the League is in reality the law of the court; and behind the League, controlling it and directing it are the chancelleries of Europe, with their secret diplomacy, their selfishness and cupidity and their hideous schemes of exploitation and conquest.

I have no purpose this evening in indulging in an infinity of detail concerning European conditions. Neither an intimate acquaintance nor a close investigation is required to determine the present situation. The policies of the major nations, whether cloaked in the guise of altruism or boldly announced, can be easily read by the most casual student. I characterize these policies neither in one fashion or another. Their justice or injustice, merits or demerits, I pass, leaving for another occasion perhaps their discussion.

England today pursues the policy that has marked her course for a century and a half; it is no different under a Baldwin than under a Palmerston. The commercial supremacy of England is at the bottom always of its political policy. No sentiment rules its foreign office, and none interferes with its political alliances. It stands against a powerful Germany when England's trade is

threatened. It stands against a powerful France 130
when France seems to dominate Continental Europe. Com-
radeship is forgotten when trade policies are threatened.

France victorious, remembering her past, and fear-
ful of the future, is determined to maintain her Contin-
ental position and her world power; she seeks by the
strong arm what she asserts is her just due.

Germany disarmed sees her fairest industrial
province seized and dreams of a future day of reckoning.

The strong man of Italy bluntly announces the
Italian policy, "Niente per Niente"---"Nothing for Noth-
ing"---Italy for Italians---and pursues his nationalistic
way, with no other thought than the advantage of his
own land.

The Balkan states, pawns of the great powers, retain
their unlimited capacity for involving their greater
neighbors, and with but one or two exceptions still cling
to the good old Balkan method of changing Ministers by
assassinating Ministers.

Peoples I found generally kindly, courteous, in-
dustrious, and lovable. Behind them are the centuries of
their history, and with them abide the traditions of many
generations. They have their way of living, their mode
of thought. They neither ask nor desire our advice.
Their habits of living and of thought have developed
through the ages and the suggestion of change in either
would be received with no less surprise than resentment.

A considerable number of our good people generally consider we are wiser and better than those living in Europe. Unfortunately the Europeans don't know it; and I fear notwithstanding the resolutions so generously and numerous and unanimously adopted by Friday morning clubs and Tuesday evening associations for "rescuing humanity" and "saving civilization," Europeans will continue living and thinking in the European way.

Britain today is at loggerheads with France. The legal staff of the British connected with the Reparations Commission hold the invasion of the Ruhr illegal. The legal staff of the French hold the contrary. In this there is a lesson for us, for it demonstrates how nationality enters into every decision and the facility with which reasons may be found by patriotism to make the law of the case. But the difference between France and England is far deeper than a mere difference of legal construction. It involves fundamental policies. England wants no dominant France. She seeks as ever a balance of power. France, rising invincible from a great war, wishes to discount the future and, aside from the collection of reparations, hopes to remove forever the menace of the past. I heard in Paris, for the first time in many years, the contemptuous words, "Perfidious Albion." I heard in London bitter reference to French militarism, Napoleonic conquest, and the like.

Germany, with her industries and workers in fair condition, has a middle class acutely suffering. She feels, it matters not whether her complaint be just or unjust, that we enunciated fourteen points of peace and then abandoned them. She accuses us therefore of bad faith. France and Britain say we fought the war with them and quit at its end when there was still work, we were in honor bound, to do. France and Britain while not openly accusing think we were guilty of bad faith. But France now sees England as a deserter, England sees France as an exploiter with designs of conquest. Italy looks askance at both and thinks of herself, and all are viewing us of course affectionately but rather cynically.

On every hand, in every land, are distrust, suspicion, hostility, and hatred; hostility and hatred of one another, distrust and suspicion of us. The moratorium required of Europe is a moratorium of distrust, suspicion, hostility, and hatred. Europe must put her political house in order before she invites guests to cross its threshold.

In this condition abroad, can any question what should be our attitude? We must not be persuaded to a false step in a little policy, however alluring it may seem, which ultimately may involve us in that which, thus far, we have shunned and avoided.

I will not take our country into this clash of

selfish ambitions and the yet existing racial 133
feuds which have written the bloody pages of centuries
of European history. If we become a part of what is hap-
pening abroad, we would be the dupe or the prey of the
one faction or the other. So earnestly and so firmly do
I believe that the future of the Republic depends upon
keeping out of the turmoil, the strife, and the contro-
versies, the schemes and machinations of Europe, that we
can have no higher resolve than to dedicate ourselves to
the patriotic duty in the days to come to maintaining the
distinctive American policy and keeping our country free
from any entanglement which would destroy that policy.
In my humble fashion, without limitations of politics or
candidacies, I dedicate myself to maintaining America
just as America has ever been.

It is nonsense to talk of turning our back upon the
world and maintaining aloofness from its daily activities.
We may have a foreign policy if we choose, and that
foreign policy may speak in tones which will cause all the
world to pause.

For one, I would have a definite foreign policy for
our nation, but a policy of our own. It is true that this
policy might change with succeeding administrations, but
this presents no obstacle to frank avowal of our present
purposes. If the Administration for a moment in power be-
lieves a foreign country jeopardizes peace, there is no
reason why we should not say so. I resent that our great

nation can only speak in concert with others
and that it cannot speak alone.

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Since when has America become so weak and so timid its foreign policy could be declared only in conjunction with other nations? I can recall the times when a Democratic President of the United States did not hesitate to express the views of our country in foreign affairs. And I remember when the greatest American of his generation spoke in clarion tones American foreign policy, and all the world listened. Hysterical sentimentalism has made us dumb, and our aimless drifting has brought us into international contempt. It is only the timid and the fearful who ask others to unite with them in order to exercise their moral weight. The strong, the self-reliant, the just, by the mere expression of a righteous view, give infinitely more effect to their moral weight than by waiting and watching and begging and pleading that others may join in the expression of what they believe to be fundamentally right.

Moral weight! Our internationalists constantly harp upon if we'd joined the League of Nations, our moral weight would have been sufficient to have prevented any subsequent wars. If we would only get into the European mess, our moral weight would sweep back the tide of centuries. Not so! The sure way in which we might dissipate our moral weight is to make it subject to the decision of those upon whom we wish to

exercise moral suasion, or to submit it for 135
ultimate expression to those who have no moral sense.
Free, independent, unfettered by league or association,
court or conference, America can speak and the world
will heed.

The latest effort to take us into the maelstrom
of Europe by an international court of the League is,
of course, indirect. We are told we are not to enter
the League by the back door, the front door, or the
cellar door, but the fact is we are asked to house our-
selves in a separate building upon the estate of the
League. Those who wish us to enter the League care
little for the moment whether we are in the original
structure. If we may be induced to enter that which is
a part, they know full well when retreat is no longer
possible, we can be driven into the main building.

I am well within the fact when I say that of all
those interested in the subject of Europe, none con-
sider the World Court except as a part of the League
of Nations, and the idea of the divorcement of the two
is merely a matter of jest.

I do not question the good faith of the President,
nor the fact that he believes he may accomplish the
seemingly impossible task, but aside from his few ad-
visers, I think there is quite a substantial disagree-
ment with him. Those who favor a League of Nations want
us in a World Court because they say it is a step in the

right direction, and as the franker among them 136
express it, it is but a preliminary move for entrance
into the League. The President says that under no cir-
cumstances will we have anything to do with the League.
The pro-leaguers believe that if we get into the Court
the President will be found to be mistaken, and they
are with him in his advocacy of the Court. On the other
hand, the opponents of the League oppose the Court be-
cause, among other things, they believe it means entrance
into the League; and the paradoxical situation is pre-
sented of the pro-leaguers favoring it because they think
the President is mistaken; and that it would take us into
the League; and the anti-leaguers opposing it for pre-
cisely the same reason.

Every utterance of three or four years ago concerning
the League is paraphrased in the arguments of today, and
singularly enough there are some who, while repudiating
their past utterances, again urge upon us a similar
course. I speak now in no invidious sense. I recall to
you what is but recent political history. I do it not in
personal vein, but as a legitimate warning concerning the
arguments made today for the Court.

You remember how, in 1920, a group of very dis-
tinguished gentlemen pledged their faith to the American
people that if the Republican candidate for President
was elected we would enter the League of Nations. Among
these who thus pledged themselves were two great

statesmen, Messrs. Hughes and Hoover, who are now 137
members of the President's Cabinet and whose utterances
in behalf of the League of Nations were among those most
eloquent and persuasive. They are now part of the Ad-
ministration which in very emphatic language at St. Louis
said that the verdict of the American people was rendered
against the League in 1920; that America would have
nothing to do with it, and that the issue of the League
was as dead as slavery.

These two distinguished members of the Cabinet have,
of course, recanted their views and are now just as the
President is, opposed to the entrance of the United
States into the League; for it is obvious if they had
not changed their views, with their pledge to the American
people so emphatically repudiated, they could not remain
members of the present Administration. I congratulate
them, and I congratulate the people of the United States
that they have seen the error of their way and that today
they would not take our great country into the League, and
I congratulate them upon their confession to the
American people.

They, however, are believed in Europe, and, I think,
in America too, to be the sponsors of the present endeavor
to have the United States join the World Court. I may be
pardoned, therefore, in suggesting the vehemence of their
views three years ago upon a most important international
policy, views which they now have changed; and we may be

pardoned too, in accepting, respectfully, but with 138
a bit of caution, their present view upon a less
important national policy.

Our internationalists iterate and reiterate that all
would be well in Europe and that everything there would
long ago have been solved and settled if only we Ameri-
cans had remained in Europe to give it the benefit of
our opinions in the League of Nations at Geneva and in
the Reparations Commission at Paris.

It is specifically denied that we would ever be ex-
pected to back our opinions with troops. Our inter-
nationalists would have us believe that it is not our
troops that are wanted. It is our views. It is our
troops.

No wonder that some Americans feel flattered at this
display of confidence in our mental powers.

It is admitted that Julius Caesar did not succeed in
solving Europe. It is admitted that Charlemagne left it
unsolved. It is conceded that Louis the Eleventh and
Charles the Fifth and Queen Elizabeth and Marlborough
and Napoleon and Disraeli and Cavour were baffled by it.
It is granted--and in fact claimed--that it is far too
puzzling for Mussolini, Poincare, Cuno, Baldwin.

It follows apparently that all it needs is two new
representatives of the American State Department, one at
Geneva and one at Paris, in addition to our present
numerous Ambassadors and Ministers.

These two new representatives would accomplish 139
a task that a thousand geniuses from Alexander the
Great to Lloyd George have attempted in vain.

How dazzling is this conception of our intellectual
gifts! We did not know before that we were such solvers
of problems. In the iridescent dream of the inter-
nationalists we now in many cases thankfully turn our
back upon problems of our own, which we know we cannot
solve, and address ourselves with enthusiasm to the
European problems we are told we can solve with ease.

I am frank to say I do not share this view either of
America's capacity to save Europe or of Europe's incapaci-
ty to save itself. Europe many times has been in a
situation as serious as the one from which it is now
striving to emerge. European intelligence solved those
previous situations--such as the ghastly one that fol-
lowed the Thirty Years War--without any help from the
United States, and often without even the comfort of
knowing that there was ever going to be a United States.

It is not American wisdom that France and Britain
want. They know that we have no special wisdom to offer.
They know that they could get better special wisdom
about the Ruhr, for example, from Denmark. But they do
not say that Denmark is essential to the League. They do
say that the United States is essential to it. What is
the difference? The difference is that while Denmark
is wiser about European affairs, the United States is the

world's largest reservoir of money and one of 140
the world's largest reservoirs of potential military
power.

Let us not permit our vanity and our egotism fool us. If we accept the invitation to help France and Britain enforce the Treaty of Versailles, let us at least realize that the importunity of the invitation is due to the size of our muscles and not the quality of our brains. When once, however, we have recovered from the hallucinations into which European flattery has thrown us, when we rift the dazzling veil of vanity and conceit in which we have enveloped ourselves, and when once we understand that our presence in Europe is desired simply and solely because of our sword and because of our purse, we will, I believe, reject the invitation to Geneva and reject the invitation to any and all judicial suburbs of Geneva with a unanimity which will close the matter forever.

I do not for an instant believe Europe will degenerate into chaos. Ministries may fall and governments may be overturned, but peoples will continue national life. I believe in peoples. They may indulge in excesses, even bloody terrors, but peoples finally want homes, and families, and children, years to live and love. The impetus of daily avocations, of hourly association, the spirit of gregarious men, will preclude in our day anarchical chaos. Wars there will be while antagonistic

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races with burning unabated hatreds face each other across imaginary boundary lines. I saw no evidence of chaos in Europe, but I saw plain evidences of future conflict. Another bloody war is in the making. I would prevent it, if I could; but if that bloody war is no concern of ours and comes from causes of which we are no part, I would not send a single American soldier across the seas.

In Europe are the feuds of centuries. God gave us the dividing oceans. There people must live in the days to come as in the centuries past with their hatreds and hostilities. Our forebears left behind them European feuds and began a new experiment in government in a savage and unknown land. They bequeathed us our immortal heritage untainted with hatreds. From the God-given vantage of 3000 miles of protecting waters, we do not view these hatreds with indifference; but by becoming a part of them, we cannot aid the participants, we can only become another belligerent.

And we have our racial problems, too. In France, in Italy, in Germany, and in England there is one race, homogeneously national. We are heterogeneous. Every race on earth is part of our citizenship. Human nature does not forget, though it may forswear, the land of its birth. A controversy in Europe of one of the races abundant with us at once arouses sympathy and advocacy here. If we become a part of a European pact, we are

not only in European imbroglios, we invite 142
controversies at home. By going into Europe, we have
little chance of settling Europe's racial hatreds, and
we may transfer them to our own land. There's just one
course to pursue, just one way to play our proud part,
just one method to render real service--speak our
voice, frankly and boldly be true to our own institu-
tions, hold to our own ideals, be fair and just to all
peoples, but standing upon our own shores, remain the
master of our own destiny, the captain of our own souls.

Mr. President, strange as it may seem, this is the first time during the debate on the London treaty that I have been able to address myself to any of the terms of that treaty. Such things as have heretofore emanated from this quarter have concerned procedure, and upon them some remarks I have indulged; but this is the first time, today, that I have been so guilty of lese majesty, as we realized this morning I am guilty of,² that I have attempted to address myself, or the opportunity has presented itself for me to address myself, to the treaty pending before the Senate.

I realize that no further debate is necessary with some of my brethren. I understand full well that the two treaty proponents who were plenipotentiaries in London, and now advocates upon this floor, have spoken, and inasmuch as they have spoken, debate forthwith should cease.

I recognize, of course, that no other man upon this floor ought to in any degree raise his voice or speak

¹United States Congress, Congressional Record, LXXIII, 222-230.

²Administration forces in the Senate, being assured of enough votes to ratify the treaty, had threatened to invoke the cloture rule to silence the futile extension of the debate by opponents of the treaty.

his mind upon this treaty now. They have spoken! 144

You have heard them here the last couple of days.

They have spoken, and the leader upon the Republican side, doubtless with the sympathy of that vast majority which he says this morning he controls, believes, the two plenipotentiaries at London and two advocates in the same individuals on this floor having spoken to the Senate, no other man ought to be permitted to speak or to argue upon this treaty.

So it was this morning, when the leader of the Republican Party here, the Republican Party of which I am a very humble member, but with which I can not go when it says it is presenting a treaty in a political campaign as a political asset for that party--when the Republican Party says to me upon this floor that it will stifle or gag me by cloture, I say to them, as I said this morning, go on and stifle, and gag, and invoke your cloture; we will present this case as best we can, whether there be one or two or three or four or five men upon this floor willing to commit lese majesty in this land of ours, and say what they believe in respect to their country and their country's defense.

What a wicked thing it is. If I stood here today and made a speech in behalf of Great Britain in regard to this treaty, half the newspapers of New York City would in great type tell of the wonderful feat and the marvelous speech, and how I had stood here upon the

floor of the Senate in behalf of a great moral 145
movement. Were I to stand here and speak in behalf of
Japan, were I to say what would be desired by some of
my brethren in behalf of that island, for which I have
a great respect, and no hatred, no matter what may be
said to the contrary, were I to stand here preaching
the doctrine of Japan, the same newspapers throughout
the land would rank me a great statesman.

But, sir, because I dare stand on this floor, born
where I was born in this great country; because, sir, I
dare stand here and speak from my heart and my whole soul
for the principle that is mine, for that I am a jingo,
and I am appealing to the baser passions of the American
people, I am doing something which ought to merit
opprobrium and denunciation from a large part of the
American press.

That is the situation which confronts us today in
respect to this treaty. Let any man prate in generalities
of the stuff with which we are familiar, and a great
statesman is he. Let any man stand here with his head
high and speak for his own, and for those who are to come
after him--ah, what a miserable, jingoistic individual he
is, and how little he should be heeded by the people of
this nation.

Mr. President, how seductive are the words "reduc-
tion in armament" and "limitation in navies." When to
these seductive phrases is added a tear-stained plea

for peace, in generalities, then to the ordinary 146
individual an argument has been presented which is well-
nigh irresistible. Do not examine the idea of reduction
of armament, do not demonstrate that it is sham and
fictitious, but just say, "reduction of armament," and
then what a welter of applause is yours.

When you speak of limitation of armaments and of
navies, do not go into the details, do not dare inquire,
where is the limitation in any such document as this? Do
not do that, or you will bring down upon your devoted
head the opprobrium and the denunciation of a very large
part of our people, and a much larger part of our press.

"Reduction of armaments." "Limitation of navies."
I say, sir, the reduction of armament by this treaty is
a sham, a delusion, a snare. I say, sir, that limitation
of armament under this treaty is sham and fictitious.
There is naught of either in this treaty which is pre-
sented to us. It is a treaty which had to be brought
home. It is a treaty which will plague you gentlemen on
the other side of this aisle.

No man ought to consider a subject of this sort from
any political standpoint. I regret that the Republican
National Committee has been so treating it, and has been
sending forth its publicity about this treaty as one of
the great Republican achievements. None should consider
the question of this country's defense as a political
question. None should for an instant indulge in any

argument, political in character, upon that which 147
may mean the future of his nation, and may affect in
the days to come that nation's welfare and that nation's
influences and interests.

Mr. President, it is a difficult thing to talk about
a treaty technical in character such as this is. It is
difficult to speak of it because you get into militar-
istic terms, and then when you discuss in militaristic
terms the details of the treaty at once you are accused
of being militaristic.

Nothing is further from me than to be militaristic
at all. Nothing is so far from my ideas as to desire war
with any people on the face of the earth. War, none
desires. Militarism, practically all abhor.

The question that is here presented, however, is a
treaty that is technical in character, which of necessity
deals with questions of war; and which at London, with
meticulous care, in the light of possible wars, the terms
of it were determined by the representatives of the five
nations assembled there.

Let me say in the beginning, some of you detest ad-
mirals, and so you take a minority of admirals to demon-
strate what a majority deny. As in this instance, where
the ratio is five and six to one concerning the experts
who testified, these gentlemen who favor this treaty
will take one-fifth of those who testified and say, "How
convincing is their testimony," and deny credence of any

sert to five and six times as many who may say 148
quite the reverse.

Let me impress upon you, admirals do not make wars. Generals do not make wars, unless generals have risen to political dictatorship, and have much more under their control than the mere military affairs of their nation.

Neither admirals nor generals make wars at all. Wars are caused by something different, and it is upon those different subjects that I first desire to speak, not particularly here, but to business in this Nation, something which this Nation's business interests ought to know and ought to understand, for wars have their roots in trade rivalry always.

Do not spend your time in abuse of one man with one kind of technical predilections or another. They do not cause armed conflicts. Armed conflicts are caused by nations becoming more and more and more prosperous, by nations beginning to assert their supremacy in trade, by nations finally obtaining predominance in trade. It is commerce which is the life blood of a nation, the jugular vein of a people; it is commerce, commerce and its rivalries, from which wars have sprung ever since wars have been fought.

It was commerce which gave to Britain her far-flung empire, commerce snatched with rapacity from those who were unable to defend it. Commerce it was which gave to her her very territories in every sea in all the

world. Commerce it is, sir, commerce--business, 149
if you choose to put it so--that is at the root of
every dispute which finally ends in the clash of arms
and the ultimate living or dying of nations.

Commerce it is, and today what nation has set out
to be the greatest commerce trader in all the world?
Where is it today that you see the predominance in
trade finally turning? It is here, sir, in this great
Nation of ours, and in the position we occupy today in
the commerce of the world, it behooves us by no pact, no
agreement, no treaty, by no act of ours however inspired
or inspiring, by no act of ours however we are driven to
it by the party lash upon the one side or the other, by
no act of ours however we may be kicked into it by a
power that is well-nigh irresistible, by no act of ours
to endanger that which our people, by their energy and
their efforts, have built up--a commerce leading all
the world.

I do not speak on this occasion, except in passing,
concerning some of the things which have been suggested
by the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Penn-
sylvania. I have listened to one or both of them say
that it is this treaty or nothing, it is this treaty or
chaos. Nonsense! It is nothing of the sort. Five
nations of the earth met here in 1922. Five nations of
the earth reached an agreement then. Five nations of
the earth, the same that this year met in London, by

contract then agreed that in 1931 again they 150
would meet in conclave and again they would act upon
naval limitation.

In the London treaty three nations participated in
the ultimate results. Two declined to agree. We have
now a contract existing, made in 1922 by those five
nations, that in 1931 they will meet in conference and
for determination of naval limitations, and we have
three of those nations entering into an agreement in
1930 in London, not agreeing except in part, and it is
said that if we do not ratify what the three have done
we will have chaos, ill will, hostility, and hatred
among the nations of the earth. Not so at all. Ill
will, hostility, hatred possibly, too, will arise if a
treaty such as this is ratified, because it contains
within itself the same illusory germs that the 1922
treaty included within itself.

After 1922, when all of us had believed that a
great accomplishment had been ours, when all of us
marched in here and voted with but one exception for a
treaty which we supposed to be of limitation, there came
the shattering of the illusion, and we began to under-
stand a few years thereafter that we had not had any
legitimate limitation in armament at all, but that we
had been, in the language of the street, "duncoed,"
fooled, deceived, put it as you will, by what happened
in the 1922 conference. What resulted? What resulted

from it is exactly what will result from 151
ratification of a treaty such as this, which a large
part of our people believe to be unfair to our country.
What will result from it will be ill will, jealousy,
almost hatred, certainly hostility, because of what has
been done at London and the belief we were out-
maneuvered there.

The Washington conference ought to be the guide for
all of our people respecting every other conference.
There are few people today who are so poor as to do it
reverence now, and yet the representatives of the United
States at that conference equaled, certainly in reputa-
tion, in attainment, in understanding, and in their de-
sire to do their duty by the country, those who were
sent to the London conference and who acted for us in
1930. Yet these gentlemen were so egregiously mistaken
in 1922 that it seems a bit of sarcasm and irony to read
their words now.

Never forget--let it be in your brain when you are
dealing with this treaty--just what our representatives
said to our people, to the Senate, and to those who were
interested in the matter, about what that Washington
conference did. They were perfectly certain about it.
We were, too, at the time. My recollection is that
there was just one man in the Senate who had the vision
and the courage at that time to say that that treaty
did not do what was claimed for it. My recollection is,

though it may be an error, that that one man was 152
the only man who recorded his vote against the treaty--
James A. Reed, of Missouri. I give to him my meed of
praise.¹

I think the Senator is right; but James A. Reed, of
Missouri, made a speech in respect to it, describing what
it was, and we all thought he was in error.

How does this sound now? Just remember who these
commissioners were. Ah, upon this side of the Chamber,
when I mention them, how we swell with pride: Mr.
Charles Evans Hughes. Mr. Elihu Root. Mr. Henry Cabot
Lodge. Mr. Oscar Underwood. It is not one man that
prophesies in this treaty, as one of the gentlemen said
the other day in a report on the treaty. It is not one
individual that asserts that something may happen in the
future. It is the four who then said:

It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately
an enormous saving of money and a lifting of heavy
and unnecessary burden. The treaty--

they said--

absolutely stops the race in competition in naval
armament.

It seems humorous to read that now because, as I
understand the Senator from Pennsylvania, he is stopping
the race in naval armament that started after the

¹Here Senator Reed, of Pennsylvania, Senate leader of
the treaty proponents, interrupted to correct Johnson--
it was Senator France, of Maryland, who voted against
the 1922 treaty.

Washington treaty, by having Japan and Great Britain permit us--ah, the boon of it, and let us thank God they are so kind and so generous to us--he is stopping the race in armament because he persuaded Japan and Great Britain to permit us to build up to what Japan and Great Britain had done in the race for armament after the 1922 treaty. 153

Somebody was mistaken when the lines were penned which I have just read. Somebody erred in the story of the Washington conference. Somebody in the best of faith was utterly in error as to what the Washington conference did. Indeed, all four of the delegates from the United States of America were not only egregiously in error, but were outrageously fooled by what they imagined had occurred at Washington in 1922. I do not know whether the Senator from Pennsylvania was a Member of this body at that time or not. I see he shakes his head, and he was not. I was. I had the same emotional reaction that is today the emotional reaction throughout this Chamber, perhaps--emotional reaction in 1922 and I believed that what was stated to us in high-sounding phrases had been accomplished. I know now that it was not.

But, sir, having gone through 1922, having seen four great Americans, those of the greatest reputation that this Nation had at that time, report in writing--they did not fear to report in writing--the results of

that Washington conference and realizing now 154
how egregiously wrong they were, I, sir, am walking
warily concerning the London conference and its assumed
virtues, virtues which no man yet has dared to put in
writing before this body or to the United States of
America.

Here, sir, I hold in my hand the volume containing
the report upon the Washington conference. It was not
beneath the dignity of Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes,
Henry Cabot Lodge, and Oscar Underwood to write their
report of what transpired at Washington in 1922. But
where is the report of what transpired at London in 1930?
Although the Senator from Pennsylvania said that he
offered the Foreign Relations Committee on one occasion
to answer any question they desired to propound, where
has he been heard in respect to this treaty save in a
radio address printed by the State Department of the
United States and sent all over this land by the State
Department? Where has he ever been heard upon this
treaty save in that radio address and save in the speech
which he made upon the floor of the Senate day before
yesterday, and at the conclusion of which we are asked
to close debate and put cloture upon every other Senator?

Here, sir, is the report of the 1922 conference.
Here in the beginning of it is the message delivered in
person by the then President of the United States ex-
plaining his views and his position, asking the activity

of the United States Senate in behalf of the treaty that had been negotiated.

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Until a week ago, when the message was sent down here with figures that would not stand the test of scrutiny at all, where have been the words of the President of the United States in respect to the London treaty which, according to the floor leader on this side of the Chamber and the Republican National Committee, is to constitute his great asset in the coming primaries and in the coming election, politically? Where, sir, I ask are the reports of that conference; echo answers, "Where?" They do not appear.

Sir, I repeat, a conference can be called in 1931 under that pact. That conference can do whatever may be essential in the premises. If this treaty should be rejected, there is no reason on the face of the earth why, under proper instructions from the Government of the United States, another conference may not be called and that conference do whatever may be essential in the premises.

Again, sir, what is the favorite argument of the gentlemen on the other side of this question and favorite argument of the State Department printed as a public document and sent broadcast throughout this land at public expense? I do not mind that. I do not complain that the State Department with its power and its wealth and its influence can mail throughout this land hundreds of

thousands of copies of a speech by one of the 156

proponents of the treaty made upon the floor of the Senate and a speech by the Secretary of State himself.

I mailed some copies of the very brief speech that I made, but, Mr. President, in printing the few thousands that I had printed and sent abroad this land I paid for them myself. No United States Government with its Treasury stood behind those who opposed the treaty. They have paid from their poverty the little that was necessary in order to endeavor in some small way to disseminate their views.

It makes rather an unequal contest, unequal, too, upon this floor, because every element politically is here arranged for in order that there may be no difficulties in the ultimate result--an unequal contest, but what a glorious one, Mr. President! What a glorious thing it is in an unequal contest to stand your ground, knowing you are right; to fight the fight as God gives one the ability to fight that fight; to fight it for your country and its future.

It will not be many long years before others will take the places of some of us in this Chamber. I sit, sir, three thousand miles away from here upon a hillside, in a very modest cottage, in the city of San Francisco. I look down into the most beautiful bay there is in all this world. Sitting upon my porch upon that hillside I see there, coming into that bay, ships from every corner of the globe. I am proud as I look at them, and I think

of the marvelous growth of the State in which I 157
was born and of its possibilities in the future.

There, Mr. President, is an empire that never has been rivaled upon this earth; there are possibilities that none conceive of. My mind runs riot as I dream of the future, as I sit upon that little perch. I dream of that State from which I come, and that coast which I love, as the great theater of world activity in the years to come. I know it will be so; I understand full well it will be so; and I would be recreant to the duty that is mine if, understanding the possibilities of that marvelous empire there, I did not stand here, and, no matter what the consequences, fight as well as I am able for its protection and the preservation of that which has made it so great, and will make it so much greater in the days to come.

I make this contest partly because of that vision of mine. It is because I think I understand and I see the possibilities better than do some of my brethren here. It is because I am past the time when ambition in any way affects the individual's attitude upon any question. It may be it is because I have gone by that period where political preferment or political coercion can in any degree alter any course of mine, but I see in the not so distant future this great territory from which I come, the empire of all the world, with its ships going to the four corners of the earth, carrying this commerce of ours that has been continuously expanding and which makes of

our country the greatest and most prosperous
on earth.

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So it is, sir, in the desire to protect that commerce, in the endeavor to aid that territory which I love and from which I come, wherein I was born, because I see within this treaty the germs of the destruction of that which is essential to the well-being of the United States that I am struggling here, struggling notwithstanding cloture, notwithstanding what may be done to a few of us, and notwithstanding the jibes and slurs of the lackeys of the press who may come from the White House preaching in the press what they are told to preach. It is because I believe the Nation demands that somebody speak in its behalf, and in behalf of its future defense, that this contest is being made upon this floor, and will be made just so long as those who form this little band here who oppose this treaty are able to make it, either under the rules or under the physical strain that may be put upon them.

Mr. President, let me turn a bit to the commerce of this Nation, for, while there are many of minor consequence, there are two great fundamental errors in the presentation that has been made by the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Arkansas.

The Senator from Pennsylvania says that, of course, when a nation goes into a conference such as that of London the status quo must control. He repeated that again

and again--the status quo must control when a nation goes into a conference such as this.¹ 159

The Senator said that it was so important that the American delegates could not do otherwise than they did; it was so important that the Senator from Pennsylvania, in the most lugubrious fashion, said that he was "simply horrified"--"just horrified"--to find out how far behind we had lagged, and the status quo, therefore, was all to our disadvantage. It was at the status quo we looked in 1922, and the status quo then was measured by our superiority in battleships. The status quo in 1930, however, was measured by our inferiority in cruisers. So we caught it both coming and going. To coin a verb from the phrase, we were "status-quoted" in 1922 because we possessed the greater superiority in battleships, and so our battleships were taken away; and then in 1930 we were again "status-quoted" not upon what we had been "status-quoted" in 1922, when we had a greater number of battleships, although the one conference was a continuance of the other, but we were "status-quoted" with our inferiority in cruisers. So we caught it in both fashions, and in both ways we had the worst of it.

Why is it, Mr. President, that if in a matter of

¹Senator Reed interrupted here to point out that Johnson was misquoting him; he claimed that he actually had said the status quo "must be considered."

this sort there is a doubt to be resolved, 160
it is resolved against the United States of America?
Why is it if there is a construction to be put upon a
provision of a treaty, it should be construed,
according to some gentlemen upon this floor, against
our own country? Why is it essential whenever any-
thing arises here respecting what may be determined
in one fashion or another that we always have to take
the end of the other nation rather than our own? I
am now too old to do that, sir; I decline to follow
that sort of precedent which has been set for us.

First, our friends on the other side erred in
taking the status quo. They could have taken it as of
1922 instead of as in 1920 if they had so desired.
There is another error concerning this treaty that is
major in character. I will come hereafter to many that
are of minor character, but another that was major in
character has to do with Admiral Pratt, concerning whom
something more will be said before this debate shall
have been concluded, not in uncomplimentary terms but
in demonstration of the inaccuracy of what he says. As
the testimony shows conclusively, the principal idea in
the mind of Admiral Pratt was to obtain a fleet adequate
for fleet combat. He and the one or two associates that
he has--twenty-odd being the other way--say that with
the fleet provided we are perfectly safe in our home
waters; that Britain is perfectly safe in her home

waters; and that Japan is perfectly safe in 161
her home waters. Conceded, Mr. President; they are all
perfectly safe in their home waters, but that begs the
whole question of what a fleet is for. The first
utilization of a fleet by the United States, the first
design of a fleet under England's method of determina-
tion, is that the fleet shall be utilized for commerce
protection, and if the fleet is designed wholly for
mere battle combat in home waters it will be unable to
do the job in the matter of commerce protection. Two
major errors were committed, therefore, in the making
of this treaty by our friends on the other side and
their admiral adviser.

Now, Mr. President, let us look for a moment at the
situation that confronts us concerning our ships and our
commerce and then, if we can, determine what ought to be
done in relation to our Navy. Ours, sir, is a producing
Nation. The cycle of development through which we have
just passed has been principally internal, but our huge
resources have given us a productive capacity almost be-
yond belief and far in excess of our own power to con-
sume. The surplus must be marketed abroad if our gener-
al prosperity and our standards of living are to be
maintained, and only thus disposing of our production
can we avoid privation and hardships to great masses of
our people. The desideratum can be accomplished in one
fashion; that is, with a due measure of sea power. By

sea power I mean a sufficient merchant marine 162
and an adequate Navy. Neither can exist separately;
they are mutually dependent; they are the two elements which, when combined, are the sea power which every producing nation must have in order to be prosperous and stable. We must have first a merchant marine to carry our goods abroad and we must next have a navy to conserve, preserve, and protect that merchant marine. The merchant marine is as essential a part of our transportation system as are our railroads. To stop the ships would be equivalent to interrupting railroad traffic. To depend absolutely upon our trade competitors for the carriage of our goods would be like a merchant intrusting to his commercial rival and competitor the distribution of his wares. We need a merchant marine for the thousands of miles of internal sea travel now utilized between the various sections of our country. We need it because our unrivaled resources have, with an unparalleled genius and capacity for production, gone far beyond our ability to consume. We need it because exporting our surplus products is essential to maintain our standards of living and prosperity. We need it because we must of necessity import large quantities of essential products from overseas. We need it because the United States is at the center of the maritime world, with a position unequalled for the carrying trade to the great continents

of Europe, Asia, and Africa. We need a merchant 163
marine, lastly, because American commerce requires it
and American national defense demands it. It does not
make any difference whether one believes in a pri-
vately owned merchant marine or a Government-owned
merchant marine; either is preferable to none. If we
have not or can not have a privately owned merchant
marine then the Government of the United States must pro-
vide one.

And the corollary then is undoubted. We must have a
navy suited to our needs, sufficient for our requirements,
and absolutely able adequately to protect our sea-borne
commerce.

Since the Great War the United States has become the
keenest international trade competitor in all the world.
This has its compensations in the extended commerce of
the Nation, the greater prosperity of our people, and in
enhancing the general welfare. It has its dangers, be-
cause success is ever the target for envy and successful
national commerce has always aroused hatred. In speak-
ing thus I do not imply that either the rivalry, the
envy, or the hatred of other nations because of our com-
mercial success would lead to war. Indeed, America's
intentions are so pacific, our policies are so utterly
lacking in aggression, that it seems inconceivable that
the pursuit of legitimate commercial paths, even to the
exclusion of trade rivals, could ever give such offense

as would lead to armed conflict. But if our present preeminent position in trade and commerce is worth having it is worth safeguarding and protecting, and it is a lamentable historical fact, written red in the annals of time, that one of the greatest contributing causes of war has been trade rivalry.

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Only recently have we reached our high position in the world's commerce. Until the World War Great Britain exceeded us by fifty per cent.

In our day we have seen, in 1922 at the Washington Disarmament Conference and in 1927 at the fiasco at Geneva, British statesmen with an eye single to supremacy upon the sea. The long story of Great Britain's struggle and rise and final success, her proud boast that Britannia rules the waves, thrill us with admiration for the patriotism, the statesmanship, and the vision of our English brethren. They understood as no other race has so thoroughly understood, and what we in our newness and with our multifarious diversions must learn, that sea power and the rise and fall of nations are closely linked. Progressively through the centuries they have gone together. In turn Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome ruled the Mediterranean. Venice, Florence, and Genoa went farther afield and into the Baltic and Atlantic. The Hanseatic States with unparalleled industry struggled for commercial supremacy in the far north,

and finally in world trade the cities of the 165
Mediterranean were compelled to yield to London,
Amsterdam, and Hamburg.

Trade rivalry brought on great wars of nations, and in nearly every instance supremacy of the sea was the deciding factor. When the Dutch through their natural instinct acquired maritime dominance, the challenge came from England, and England's navy took from the Dutch the commercial supremacy they had with such difficulty won. Spain rose to her great power, and for a brief period the Spanish Main, and her galleons carried the commerce of both the New and the Old Worlds. But England's fleets in bloody battle swept Spain from the sea, and naval defeats marked the decadence of Spain as a dominant factor on the oceans. The commercial history of the eighteenth century is written in the long-drawn struggle for supremacy between England and France. Commercial rivalry was the basis for the many and protracted wars of that period, and at their close England's sea power had relegated France to a secondary position.

So, dominance upon the sea has ever led to victory for the nation that held that supremacy. It was not really at Zama that Hannibal was defeated. Hannibal was defeated when Rome's dominance upon the sea forced him to make that long and perilous march through Gaul that wasted his strength and destroyed a large

We are accustomed to think that Napoleon was vanquished at Waterloo. He was vanquished not at Waterloo. The downfall of Napoleon came at Trafalgar, and it came because England was supreme upon the sea. History teaches us what, under circumstances such as confront this Nation today, it is the duty of the United States to do. Here we have, for the first time in the story of this land, trade supremacy. Here we have today, sir, upon the sea a maritime dominance that the United States has never before possessed. We have wrested it from the tight little isle which for three centuries past has boasted of her supremacy upon the oceans that covered the earth, and today, with this supremacy that is ours, comes to us the warning that is written in the history of all time that we must protect, preserve, conserve, and maintain our sea power, or woe be unto this Nation in the days to come.

If we have to any advantage studied history, if we have followed the rise of nations and their fall, the oft-repeated tale holds its lesson and its warning. Wilfully deaf to every dictate of prudence is the American who prizes our present proud commercial position and will not understand that it can only be maintained by an American merchant marine and an American Navy sufficient for its protection.

While our maritime trade has increased, and is

passing that of every other nation, our ability 167
to carry it is progressively decreasing, and the time
may come when we can not safely, without full naval
protection, rely upon other nations to carry our goods
and expand our trade. Of course, such a time will come.
No man can foresee it, none can tell the number of years
that will elapse until it does arrive; but that it will
arrive, history demonstrates conclusively. When that
time arrives, if in our ineptitude and sloth we have
idly accepted the present precarious situation, disaster,
hardship, and suffering will be our portion.

The argument for a merchant marine of no greater
importance than an adequate navy generally rests upon two
premises: first, its necessity as a complement to the
Navy and for ultimate national defense; and, secondly,
the dependence of the Nation's economic welfare upon
foreign commerce. Those are ample and incontrovertible
reasons, but there is another equally cogent and of like
importance. Few realize the extent of our so-called
coastwise traffic, its essential ocean-going character,
and dependence upon it of many major industries. This
coastwise traffic, is, in fact, internal domestic trade,
yet it follows external overseas routes and is necessar-
ily carried in ocean-going vessels. There is nothing
comparable in all the world to this coastwise traffic
of the United States of America, except the overseas
trade between the various parts of the British Empire.

Upon this overseas trade, as Senators who 168
followed the Geneva Conference will realize, the British
ground their argument for naval supremacy; but the dis-
tances of British sea lanes are not greater than the
distances of our coastwise sea trade, and the value of
this coastwise trade of ours is more than half the value
of Britain's total foreign trade.

Senators who are familiar at all with statistics of
the past, who understand that for centuries and more
Britain has been the great carrying nation upon the
ocean, and that in all that time there has been no
challenge of her supremacy, will realize what the value
of the coastwise traffic of the United States is when
they understand that it is six-tenths of the value of
the entire vaunted maritime trade of the British Empire.
That is one of the reasons and one of the necessities
for an American merchant marine and an adequate navy to
protect it.

When they recall, too, that our extensive pipe
lines generally lead to the coast; that our great oil
industry depends upon ocean transport, and that this
dependence will become greater as domestic sources are
reduced, they will have a greater and a better under-
standing of this coastwise traffic of ours.

We know the sea route via Panama as the cheap
transportation link, without which our lumber, coal,
and other industries would suffer and languish. Few

Americans have any true appreciation of the extra- 169
ordinary value of our domestic seaboard commerce or
its potent influence upon many of our great industries.
Blocking this commerce would dislocate the country's
entire business and bring hard times beyond anything
in the Nation's experience.

So much for the predicate, sir, to the necessity for
a navy which would be of adequate size to protect our
ocean-borne commerce. We shall see as we proceed, sir,
that under this treaty no such navy is accorded to us;
and that while Britain and Japan, because of their pe-
culiar geographical situation and their naval bases, may
protect fully their commerce save in one direction, we
might quite possibly, in the event of difficulty, be
wholly blockaded and our commerce be practically
destroyed.

Before proceeding with this theme, however, let me
speak just a moment about something that has been said
by the Senators on the other side concerning cruisers.

Horried--do you remember the language?--was the
Senator from Pennsylvania to find what a dreadful
condition we were in at London. Horried was he--so
horried that whenever the opportunity has been
accorded him to say so, he has told of the marvelous
favor that was done us by Japan and Great Britain in
permitting us to build up to their strength.

Now let us see just what that situation was.

repeatedly assert it--"we had just one cruiser; just one! Japan had twelve; Great Britain had"--the Lord knows how many; let us say thirty-nine or fifty-four, as the case may be; I do not care. We had just one--just one!--and think of the victory that our delegates won at the London conference. Marvel of marvels; mirabile dictu! Let us take off our hats and cheer! They won such a victory that from having one, they are permitted by Mr. MacDonald to build eighteen, and they are permitted by the Japanese to build fifteen. Wonderful victory; marvelous victory!

Now let us see just what the situation was.

This year, sir--it may be that some of them came in after the conference--we have five cruisers in the water now. If I am in error, the old gentleman of the sea there, the "Admiral from Virginia," can correct me, I am sure; and if I blunder in any of my figures I beg him to do so, because I want to state them wholly with accuracy.

We have five cruisers in the water now--the PENNSYLVANIA, the SALT LAKE CITY, the HOUSTON, the CHESTER, and the NORTHAMPTON. That is a pretty good start.

There are three more which will be completed in 1931, the AUGUSTA, the CHICAGO, and the LOUISVILLE. That means eight--eight cruisers that we will have in 1931. We had only one to bargain with, you know!

But there was something more that is not mentioned

by our friends on the other side. We had, 171
sir, a law that was passed by the Congress of the United
States, which is in full force and effect now.

We had the ten OMAHAS. I was going to refer to them
subsequently. These I have been talking about were in
the 8-inch class. We had the OMAHAS, with smaller guns,
aggregating 70,000 tons. But we had something more,
something for which the "Admiral from Virginia" had
striven and striven well. We had the cruiser bill, which
was passed by the Congress of the United States, whereby
we provided for the construction of fifteen cruisers and
one aircraft carrier. Five of these cruisers were to be
laid down during 1929, five during 1930, and five during
1931.

It is true that by a presidential order some have
been held up, perhaps, but that makes no difference.
There is the law, fifteen more 8-inch-gun cruisers which
the law has authorized, making in all twenty-three 8-inch-
gun cruisers we have either authorized, or were built or
building when these gentlemen were in London.

Talk to me about "one cruiser, and we had to lie
down and take it and do whatever we were directed to do."
Eight substantially built or building, five actually in
the water now, three to be within a year, fifteen
authorized by law, twenty-three in all--twenty-three
which constituted the program of the United States in
8-inch-gun cruiser building. In addition to that we

had the ten OMAHS, aggregating 70,000 tons. 172

Take these, now, twenty-three which were in the program of the United States. Why can we not ever consider a program of the United States in one of these conferences? Why is it essential on every occasion, and under all circumstances, to take the program of Great Britain or of Japan? What sort of necromancy is there in it? What kind of talismanic words do these people from Great Britain and Japan use that they cause ever our negotiators to take their programs and forget ours? Why is it?

There we had a program of the United States of America calling for twenty-three 8-inch-gun cruisers. We had in the water as well seven OMAHS, aggregating 70,000 tons, and the total aggregate amount of tonnage of those twenty-three and our ten OMAHS, of course, was 300,000 tons. Why is it necessary to have Mr. MacDonald insist that we should take some other kind of ship? Why, I ask, and echo answers, "Why?"

The first communication from MacDonald to this country, July 9, 1929, said that we could have eighteen cruisers, and the last communication of MacDonald to this country over in London at the conference said that we could have eighteen cruisers, and that is all we got.

We had the 300,000 tons of cruisers provided for by law. The treaty gives us, according to their interpretation of it, eighteen 8-inch-gun cruisers, a

total of 180,000 tons, and smaller-gun cruisers 173
aggregating 143,500 tons, a total of 325,500 tons.

Now, you gentlemen who believe in arms limitation, we had a program under the law which was our program. Of course, we decry it now because Great Britain and Japan decried it; but it was our program. It was, of course, I admit, tainted and tinctured with the fact that the United States adopted it, but it was our program, a program for twenty-three 8-inch-gun ships, and we had our seven OMAHAS, 300,000 tons in all.

Under the treaty they assert that they give us eighteen 8-inch-gun ships, 180,000 tons, and smaller cruisers aggregating 143,500 tons, a total of 323,500 tons.

Talk to me of limitation of armament by this treaty! Tell me that you have reduction of naval force! There is the story of it. Do not be misled by a tale regarding great battleships. For months before there ever was a conference, every one of the nations wrote--wrote, I say; they dare not give us the correspondence, but I charge it--they wrote saying they wanted a holiday in battleship building, and they were perfectly willing to have a battleship holiday for a considerable period of time, many years in the future. So dismiss battleships in the matter of arms limitation.

Here was what was dealt with over there. Talk of naval reduction and arms limitation! I said in the

beginning of my remarks it was sham and

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fictitious. It is. This kind of naval reduction and this sort of arms limitation is sham and fictitious. It does not exist. That is all there is to it, and the figures demonstrate it.

All that has been done is this: They have made us take, not what we agreed upon and what we passed by act of Congress. They have made us accept, not what this Congress solemnly decreed by its act, signed by the President, and which became a law. They have made us take what they wanted us to take, and they have sugar-coated the pill by giving us a few more thousand tons than we would have had under our own building program. But you have to take it, you can not escape it. Great Britain demands it, and Japan's friendship rests upon your doing as Japan wants. So do not deny it, accept it, of course.

Great Britain insists, and Great Britain has never changed her tune in respect to it from July 9, 1929, when the first dispatch was sent over here, to the last moment of the last part of the particular conference in London on naval limitation, Great Britain has insisted from the beginning to the end we are to have eighteen cruisers.

Do you know what we did last year? Oh, what a terrible thing! I charge that the record shows--I am ready to demonstrate the fact--that in the beginning of the negotiations last year, after July, we demanded

twenty-three cruisers, in accordance with the 175
General Board of our Navy. We demanded it, and Mr.
MacDonald said we could not have it. Mr. MacDonald did
not care, in my opinion, because I believe MacDonald's
socialistic government really wishes disarmament and
really wishes limitation, but he is controlled over there
absolutely by the British Admiralty, and he can do just
exactly what the British Admiralty permits, and nothing
else. So while I give to MacDonald full credit, and to
his socialistic government full credit, for the desire for
reduction of armaments and for limitation of armaments,
the British Admiralty said to him, "You can not permit
the United States to have the kind of cruisers she wants
or the twenty-three they have asked for," and MacDonald
had to refuse.

This is the sequence of events. After that, pressure
was brought to bear on the General Board to come down and
to ask for less, and the General Board, as they testified
in the hearings before the committees, did come down, did,
indeed, say that as an irreducible minimum they would
accept twenty-one. When Mr. MacDonald got to London, to
the British Admiralty, the British Admiralty said, "Not
much. You can not permit twenty-one to be given to the
United States," and MacDonald had to say no.

So it was that MacDonald said from the beginning
to the end, eighteen, because the British Admiralty
demands that you be permitted but eighteen, and eighteen

is what it is assumed we got, but when you read 177*
the terms of the treaty, as ultimately I shall do---not
in this particular address of mine---I will demonstrate
that that is not the fact. We do not get even eighteen
under the treaty.

Talk of limitation and reduction, limitation and
reduction! There is no such thing in the cruiser cate-
gory, and no limitation or reduction of any kind or
any character. The only thing we did was to scrap the
American program and in lieu of that accept the British
program, and in accepting the British program they threw
to us as good measure 23,500 tons that we would have
lacked if we had carried out the American program and
the law which had been passed by both Houses of Congress.
So much for the cruiser situation.

Now let me call attention to one or two rather re-
markable things here. I don't want to argue this par-
ticular part of the matter at this time, but I am at a
disadvantage. The other day I asked the Senator from
Pennsylvania to deliver the proposal or statement made
by the Japanese April 3, 1930. He advised me last
evening that he was unable to do that because it was
received in confidence and he could not deliver it. I
think I state correctly what he said. I have no desire
to state more than the mere fact at the moment.

Here is how we stand: We obtained from him the
proposal of the United States delegates respecting the

*Page 176 omitted in numbering.

American Navy. That was put in the Record.

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It was put in the Record and for the first time it was published in full. Two or three gentlemen ran around here, superserviceable gentlemen, who said that it had all been published in the newspapers before. I have been unable to find it. They may have found it. Anyway, this is the first time this proposal concerning our Navy has been published in full, and it was published in the Record day before yesterday, or thereabouts, when I demanded it from the Senator from Pennsylvania.

I demanded from him then the Japanese proposal in response. He tells me he can not deliver it because he received it in confidence. I respect his views of confidence in that regard, but what sort of body is this, this body of ours, the United States Senate, which can not have the document which thus has been presented in answer to our own proposition concerning our own Navy? Is it not a marvelous thing? I venture the assertion that there never before in the history of this body has been such a situation presented, and I venture to say that this situation will return to haunt the Senate in the days to come. We have said by our action, as well as can be said at all, that whenever the Executive desires, that whenever the Secretary of State desires, to refuse to send any papers to us respecting a treaty that that is conclusive, and we do naught in respect to it of any kind or character.

I have to turn therefore to the press and I have to turn therefore to the foreign press. What an outrage it is. Ah, it is an outrage, nothing less, that we here, whose duty it is under the Constitution to pass upon a treaty, are denied the particular documents upon which we may intelligently act. But, sir, I turn now to a favorite newspaper of some of our brethren, the London Times, and I find there certain things in relation to Japan and Japan's activities in regard to the treaty. I read from a Tokyo dispatch to the London Times of March 16:

The United States retains the right to build 180,000 tons of heavy cruisers--that is, eighteen 10,000-ton vessels--against Japan's existing 108,400 tons--in eight 10,000 ships and four vessels of the FURUTAKA class, of 7,100 tons each--but the United States undertakes to build only fifteen of those vessels by 1935...The general effect of the proposal is that Japan obtains about seventy per cent in auxiliary tonnage as a whole, while in the 10,000-ton class, which is her special bugbear, she obtains a practical seventy per cent until the next conference.

In order that we may see what the situation is I read again, because there is first a proposition by the United States whereby the United States has taken the figures of MacDonald, although up to that time we had insisted upon more, of 180,000 tons of 8-inch-gun cruisers. There is first a proposition by MacDonald of that sort with no qualifications at all. Remember that. Then there is a proposition by Japan, which I must dig out in this devious fashion from newspaper articles,

which limits the 180,000 tons to 150,000 tons 180
through 1935, and in 1935 there is to be a new conference when Japan may do as she sees fit. That is the situation. Talk about getting anything! We did not even get MacDonald's eighteen cruisers. We got Japan's permission to build fifteen up to the time of the next conference. I read from an article in the London Times of April 2:

The compromise is accepted in all essentials, with reservations, or, more properly, explanations of the Japanese attitude, on four points, namely--(1) the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers, after 1935; (2) earlier replacement of submarines; (3) duration of the agreement, which, the Japanese government understands, will run till the end of 1936; (4) capital ships.

The construction of 10,000-ton cruisers after 1935:

No new proposals are advanced in regard to the fourth point, but the Government desires the arrangements concerning battleships to be bound up with the auxiliary tonnage agreement. The delegates in London are left to arrange the exact wording by which these points are secured, and the procedure, by an exchange of notes or other methods to be adopted.

That is the procedure by which we limit our construction of 10,000-ton cruisers. We recognize that our brethren say there is not any secret agreement or any understanding, but there is not the slightest doubt about what Japan understands, and the terms of the treaty bear out that understanding, because, under the terms of the treaty, until after the next conference we are to have fifteen cruisers only. So it is not a question of two cruisers or of one cruiser or of three cruisers.

It is a question, in reality, of eight cruisers, 181
and when we apply that to our commerce protection it
means practically one-third of our commerce protection
upon the seas.

I have read a few excerpts, though I have many more
which ultimately I shall read upon this subject, because
it was upon that theory that I presented a reservation
this morning, a reservation which I expect to argue at
length, and which ought to be adopted. There ought not
to be the slightest question about it, because, if
Senators will recall, from Secretary Stimson down every
single individual who talked upon the treaty has insisted
that the United States get eighteen cruisers, and not one
of them has ever mentioned, until the query was asked,
not one until questioned ever suggested that Japan had
insisted that there should be but fifteen cruisers until
the next meeting should be held and the next conference
should take place.

Mr. President, we had a great Secretary of State
once named John Hay. He announced a program so far as
the Far East was concerned that has become a definite
policy of this Nation. It was called "the open door."
I do not know whether you, sir, care for the open-door
policy or whether any one in this body cares for the
open-door policy. The fact of the matter is that it
has been the policy of this Nation for a long time in
the past and as the policy of this Nation it has

proved, we felt, beneficial to our commerce, 182
and proving beneficial to our commerce it has enabled
us to go forward with our trade in the fashion that we
desire we should go forward.¹

Mr. President, just prior to the quorum call I had
touched very briefly upon the "open-door" policy, which
found its fruition during the tenure of Secretary of
State John Hay. For very many years it had been a
matter of grave consequence to our people, but it was
not until Mr. Hay's time that in concrete form the
policy was put and that then it was carried out. I want
to return to that policy in a moment. However, because
just prior to referring to it I had been speaking of the
Japanese and of their view regarding the number of
cruisers which we were to have not only during the life
of the treaty but up to 1935, I want again to call
attention to the official book of the British Empire,
which I introduced into the Record one day last week,
in order that we may understand how our British brethren
approach this problem.

I sometimes think, Mr. President, that we are
probably the most emotional people on the face of the
earth. Sometimes I attribute it to the fact that in
reality we represent in our admixture of blood so very
many different races. So it is that in this country
we love phrases. I think we love them much more than

¹Johnson was interrupted here for a roll call.

the people of any country on the face of the earth. Even the Latins, even those who are mercurial and fickle as we believe some to be, have not the same sort of worship for phrases and words that we have. In this country in the last ten years since the World War we have been sitting at the shrine of what we did not know, but what we loved to think, some sort of mode by which peace would be brought to all the nations of the earth; and we have been ready in our peculiar fashion to do whatever lay in our power that we might forward the great cause of peace among the peoples of the earth. In doing this we have coined certain phrases, and we have become more or less slaves to them, so that now if a man wants to become a great statesman he needs to do little else than stand before his fellows or talk through the microphone about peace; and if he can shed tears, My God! his reputation is so enhanced that there is no question in the minds of the Tuesday Evening Club of Kankakee, or the Friday Morning Club of Kokomo, or the Ladies' Auxiliary of Kalamazoo that the greatest statesman of the world has come among them, and, talking peace in generalities, peace in the fashion that he does, that he is not only entitled to their suffrages but to their enthusiastic support for anything that he may desire.

I remember eleven years ago when we were contesting the League of Nations it was not unusual for very good people, people in whom I had the greatest confidence and

for whom I had a real affection, to rush up to 184
me with their eyes starting out of their heads and say,
"Do you not believe in peace?" and when I would say,
"Yes, of course, I believe in peace," the reply would
come, "Then, you must be for the League of Nations;" and
that was the end of the argument. So it is with a treaty
like this. A treaty that is made in the sacred name of
peace is brought over here in order that we may have a
treaty--not because of its terms, but because we have
got to have a treaty.

The treaty is brought over here and we are asked,
"Are you not in favor of peace? Do you not believe in
naval limitation and naval reduction?" When the reply
is made, "Yes; of course we do," we are told, "Then you
have got to be for the treaty; and if you are not for the
treaty, we will see that not only are you ostracized but
that you are treated in a fashion by the great inter-
national newspapers of this land"--that always respond
to any propaganda from abroad--"we will see that you are
treated in a fashion from which you never can recover."
That is the story of what is at present happening.

I grant that I fell for it in 1922. With the
emotion of the war filling me at that time, with the
anxiety that I have always had to do anything, no matter
what it was, that might be an accomplishment of the road
to peace, I fell in 1922 with my fellows and voted for the
treaty that now there are none so poor to do reverence to,

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and we all admit was an injustice to our country, 185
by which we were egregiously and outrageously deceived.
I am not going to fall, Mr. President, in 1930 for a
document of that sort, and perhaps the experience I
have had in the past is what protects me in the present.

Our British brethren can do just as much talking
as we can do. We heard it in the very charming and de-
lightful way in which the Premier of England came among
us. I had some strange thoughts that day when he stood
at the desk of the Vice-President and talked to us. I
looked around to my brethren from Pennsylvania, and the
Republican leader from Indiana, and the distinguished
Senator who now sits in the chair, and to others here,
and I thought to myself what a marvelous thing that
they stood here wildly applauding a socialist, the leader
of the Socialist Party, and all of them, with the ex-
ception, of course, of the Presiding Officer now in the
chair, so gladly hanging on to his coat tails during
the time he was here--this socialist, when in this
country they would not sit next to a man who was called
a socialist under any circumstances.

I had also some very strange thoughts about Mr.
MacDonald when he was talking. His is a political ro-
mance that is not equaled by any other in all this
world save that of the present President of the United
States; and when I listened to Mr. MacDonald on the day
he was here, and saw gentlemen who are so conservative

metaphorically throwing their hats in the air 186
and striving with one another to greet him and shake
his hand, I thought, "What a marvelous thing power is."
That is what it is--power. How we change overnight when
the power comes about. And here is this treaty, and be-
hind it is power. That is what is behind it--power.
There is the Democratic side responding; here is the
Republican side responding, and here are even my in-
surgent brethren responding. Power is behind it--power
of one sort or power of another. It may be of one kind
or it may be of another, but it is power that is behind
it; and because of the power it is thought by many to be
a terrible thing to stand here fighting a treaty of this
kind.

Mr. President, let us look at what our British
brethren say concerning this sort of thing. Here is
their policy officially declared:

EXHIBIT A

(Miscellaneous No. 2 (1930), Great Britain Foreign Office)

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITION AT THE LONDON NAVAL CONFER-
ENCE, 1930, OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM, LONDON, FEBRUARY 4, 1930

(Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to Parliament by command of His Majesty)

PART I

(1) The policy of His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom is to keep the highway of the seas open
for trade and communication and, in relation to the
political state of the world, to take what steps are
necessary to secure this.

They do not indulge over there in the expressions 187
that we are so familiar with here; they make very plain
what their position is.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom is to keep the highway of the seas open
for trade and communication and, in relation to the
political state of the world, to take what steps are
necessary to secure this.

That is the first thing. Then, when finally this par-
ticular treaty was presented to the Parliament they made
very plain their understanding concerning it.

The United States has the option to rest on this
figure and to make a corresponding increase in its 6-inch-
gun cruisers from 143,500 to 189,000, in which case the
total tonnage for the United States and the British
Commonwealth of Nations will amount to 541,700. If it
does not choose to exercise this option, it undertakes
that its sixteenth 8-inch-gun cruiser will laid down in
1932, its seventeenth in 1934, and its eighteenth in
1935. In that event Japan will be free to advance a
claim at the conference in 1935 for an increase in its
8-inch tonnage.

This section of the treaty, which will apply to
the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States,
and Japan, will contain a clause safeguarding our
position in relation to the building programs of other
powers.

There is the story. Treaty limitation? Limitation
of arms? Not a bit of it. Reduction of naval forces?
Not a bit of it.

Returning now to the question which I had suggested
a few moments ago--the question of the open-door policy
which John Hay established--I desire to read an article
appearing in last Sunday's Star, written by Frank H.
Simonds.

by Frank H. Simonds

The postponement of discussion of the naval treaty until the extra session insures that there would be another chance for the public to consider the merits of the London accomplishment with no such complicating detail as tariff and pension legislation. Moreover, it is unmistakable that so far the treaty has excited only languid interest, and ratification has been regarded with resignation rather than with any real enthusiasm.

It is patent, however, that the only real criticism--that coming from the naval authorities of all ranks--has on the whole failed to enlist public support. On the whole, the opposition of the naval men has been the single real contribution to the forwarding of the treaty.

Yet there is an obvious paradox in all this. We are living under an administration which more than any other places value upon experts and commissions. From prohibition to panics, the inevitable resort has been to the so-called "best minds," to the specialists and the experts. That is precisely what makes the official attitude toward the naval experts rather impressive. For with exceptions which are too inconsiderable to make any real differences, the admirals, the captains, and the commanders--the best minds in the Navy--are in accord in opposing the treaty.

The great difficulty with the case of the admirals against the treaty lies in the fact that it is presented to the civilian mind, which is not in the least trained to consider technical or strategic aspects and has an instinctive distrust of the uniform and of the soldier or sailor. Nevertheless, there is one phase of the protest of the sailor men which deserves an attention it has not yet had.

All the naval experts who have testified have agreed that the so-called treaty Navy is adequate to defend the shores of the American continent, to maintain control of the Caribbean; in a word, to conduct a passive defensive within the vital areas of the United States. They are as one in testifying that neither the British fleet in the Atlantic nor the Japanese in the Pacific can constitute a menace to our home territory.

To the untrained civilian mind this seems not only much but enough. Why should the United States desire to

send a fleet to invade British areas in Europe or Japanese in Asia? The difficulty with the situation lies in the fact that there is a complete failure on the part of the layman to perceive the fact which is uppermost in the expert mind, namely, that the fleet of the United States which is adequate to defend home shores is not equal to the task of maintaining the actual policies of the Nation. 189

For it is a truism that the size of the fleet of any nation must be based upon the character of its policies.

Mr. President, that is a truism. The size of your fleet must be based upon your policies. If you have no policies, and if you have no merchant marine, and if you have no commerce, you need not worry greatly about your fleet, because the rest of your country will be of little consequence anyway; but if you do have policies, and if you do have a merchant marine, and if you do have an ocean-borne commerce, then, of course, you must have a fleet that will be commensurate with the importance of your policies and your commerce.

The first step in the reduction or even the limitation of armed strength must be the modification of national policies, to carry out which is the sole purpose of the Army and Navy. The real case of the admirals against the treaty is that it reduces the means to carry out policies which may produce collision without in the smallest degree cutting down the policies.

Broadly speaking, the United States has three policies which could carry it into collision, one with Britain and two with Japan. These policies may be described as neutrality in European conflicts, the retention and defense of the Philippines, and the maintenance of the open door in the Far East. As long as our Government and people adhere to these policies they are bound to maintain the military and naval forces adequate to support them.

As to the policy of neutrality the situation is simple. The great powers and the small of Europe, bound by the covenant of the League of Nations, have adopted a

policy of enforced peace. They have bound themselves to common action against any country which resorts to war in defiance of the rules and regulations of the League. In theory they would be bound to use economic, financial, military, and naval resources against the aggressor. 190

And in the calculations of all the League states the first and most important weapon is naval, and is primarily the British fleet. If Germany should one day seek to recover the Polish corridor by force in violation of existing treaties, if Italy should apply Mussolini's recent and familiar words to any one of many questions, the League powers would be bound to unite in common action, and the first step would be the employment of the British fleet for purposes of blockade, along with economic and financial pressure.

But the United States is not a member of the League; it is not considered either with German or Italian aspirations. It would have no part in the discussions and consultations which preceded the application of force. On the other hand, it would immediately be affected by any blockade which in the nature of things would go beyond any existing warrant in international law, as was the case during the World War.

The effect of such a blockade upon American trade-- upon the farmer even more quickly than the manufacturer-- would be disastrous. All the circumstances of 1915-16 would inevitably be reproduced. Moreover, if we accepted the blockade, as we did substantially that of the Allies in the World War, then we should be, in fact, an ally of the League. But just as obviously we should be the enemy of the nation or nations at war in defiance of the League mandate.

It may be easily be argued that this is the course that we should follow; that we are at the least in duty bound not to feed, munition, or finance such an aggressor. But the trouble is that we have adopted no such policy, and on the whole stand firmly against it. To assist in disciplining Italy or Germany, to help Europe make war, to preserve peace, is not at the present hour any part of American intention.

But since our present policy is clearly, as Mr. Wilson once phrased it, "to wage neutrality," to maintain not alone our aloofness from actual conflict but to avoid vast losses incident to an illegal blockade, it becomes necessary to have a fleet equal to that of the greatest of the League powers, namely, Great Britain. For it is manifest that Britain will not engage in a

League of Nations enterprise to preserve 191
peace on the Continent of Europe if such enlistment
insures actual collision with an American fleet of equal
strength. The existence of such a fleet in itself pro-
vides the certain barrier to such British action and is
thus the guaranty of American neutral rights.

If the Government and people of the United States
are ready to join the League, if they are prepared to
agree in advance to waive their neutral rights when the
council of the League shall pronounce some nation guilty
of aggression and liable to sanction, then the whole case
of the admirals falls to the ground. We have no need of
parity with Britain, because there is then no conceivable
cause of conflict.

But if we refuse to join the League, if we adhere to
our traditional views as to neutral rights, then the ad-
mirals, as the ultimate executors of our policy, are
entitled to be heard upon the question of the means which
are required. It is not only their province but their
duty to inform the country in advance if, in their
judgment, the existing Navy or the treaty Navy falls so
short of parity as to be incapable of performing its
mission.

A European war is today at the very least a patent
possibility. Such a war would at once compel the League
to take action, and such action would inevitably involve
us. If President Hoover and Secretary Stimson could in-
form the admirals that they would not be called into
question, that we were prepared to remain neutral, but
along with nominal neutrality to act as the benevolent
associate of the League powers, then they would have no
case and no temptation to go beyond their immediate duty.

But if we are to wage neutrality we must have a Navy
adequate to the task, so completely the equal of the
British as to preclude any British action which might
bring a collision. And, of course, the same is true in
both the Asiatic issues. If we are determined to defend
the Philippines, the London treaty deprives us of adequate
naval resources. The increase of the Japanese ratio auto-
matically gives Japan strategic superiority in the area in
which we must defend our island possessions. And the
same is even more the case in the matter of the open door.

If we are prepared to retire behind the Hawaiian
Islands, if we are on the one hand ready to resign our
purpose to defend the Philippines and on the other to re-
nounce our policy of equal opportunity commercially in
China, then the admirals' case against the London treaty
falls to the ground. But, on the other hand, if we are

not prepared to renounce either policy, it is 192
clearly the business of the admirals to tell us that we
are pursuing policies with inadequate resources.

The real basis for the limitation or reduction of armaments is the adjustment of national policies which may lead to collision. To reduce the size of navies, for example, while maintaining in full vigor policies which may necessitate the use of navies is like reducing the carrying capacity of a new bridge without making any prior reduction in the size of the load it must carry.

At London the single conceivable cause of Anglo-American dispute, neutral rights, was rigorously excluded. Collision was thus made no less likely, but vastly more risky for the United States. And that is the case of the admirals.

Reducing the number of ships and the size of guns to be employed in war and maintaining in full vigor the policies which may produce war is not a step toward peace. With the making of these policies admirals have no proper concern. But they are entitled to ask for the naval means to carry out the political policies which the Government has adopted and to testify if the means are lacking. What the admirals have said in substance is that the treaty fleet is not adequate to sustain the national policy. That is the situation to date.

That is the exact situation. If you believe in the open-door policy in China, if you believe, indeed, in a neutral policy such as has been defined upon this floor, it is absolutely essential that you have the strength with which you can enforce that policy. If you believe the Philippines should be defended, it is necessary that there should be sufficient force to defend the Philippines.

I recognize that by what we did in 1922 we have probably put beyond our power the defense of the Philippine Islands; but we did that, sir, upon a distinct agreement, as our delegates say, and it is perfect nonsense either to minimize what was said at that time or to

pretend that it is not the fact. We refused to 193
strengthen our fortifications in the Far East upon the
distinct agreement that Japan would accept the ratio
with us of five and three.

The ratio of five and three that was then deemed,
not only by our naval people but by our civilian officials
as well, necessary for our protection, was scrapped at
London by the London treaty; and there is no gainsaying
that. The few excerpts that I read a few moments ago
show that conclusively. The figures that are in the
Record here, the report that was presented by the minority
from the Foreign Relations Committee, demonstrate it be-
yond the peradventure of a doubt; and in my opinion, the
worst thing that was done by the London treaty was
scrapping the Washington treaty ratio, and raising the
ratio of Japan that we dearly bought from Japan by re-
fusing to fortify our own possessions in the Far East--re-
fusing to fortify what belonged to us, and doing it as the
price that should be paid to Japan for giving us a five-
three ratio. They have retained the price and they have
raised the ratio; and, by raising the ratio, they make it
utterly impossible for this country to protect its poli-
cies in the Far East. No longer can we protect a policy
of the open door in the Far East--and, so far as that is
concerned, already it seems to be surrendered by the
State Department; for I read in the New York Times of
Saturday, July 5, a remark attributed to Ambassador

Castle over abroad, in which he said, in so many words:

Japan must be guardian of the peace in the Pacific.

And then he added, in the article:

It seems to be another echo of the policy of the Monroe doctrine for Asia. It is again recalled that Mr. Castle came here from Washington after meeting Mr. Wakatsuki and the members of the Japanese delegation.

I read the speech which was delivered by Mr. Castle in Shanghai not long ago concerning trade in the Orient. I can read his remarks in no other fashion than that he is giving a sphere of influence in the Far East to Japan and is providing, as the article in the New York Times says, for a Monroe doctrine which will be in the keeping of Japan in the Orient.

I was a Member of the body at the time when the Lansing-Ishii agreement was given to the press. I recall that the men upon this side best versed in foreign affairs were very loud in their denunciation of that agreement. I remember the debate that was held then upon spheres of influence and I recall the bitter protestations of the Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee concerning that endeavor upon the part of the Secretary of State at that time.

Today an Undersecretary of State proceeds to Japan, he makes, as the press reports apparently indicate, a new doctrine there, a doctrine which, so far as I am able to see, would abrogate the open-door policy of John Hay, which we followed for so long in the past, and would

establish a new Monroe doctrine in the Orient.

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The policies thus dependent upon navies are policies which, after all, I presume, must be determined by those in power and those representing a particular administration; but if there are such definite policies of a nation like that which we have just been discussing, when we have certain definite things to be done upon the sea, we have to have a measure of protection which will enable us to do the job upon the sea.

Mr. President, it was my intention this afternoon to discuss somewhat at length the effect of the reduction of the cruisers upon our sea-borne commerce and the possibility of protection of our commerce there. I feel, however, that I have taken sufficiently long upon the subject now, and I am leaving to a later date the opportunity to present my views upon that subject.

I feel that in a matter of this sort too much time can not be consumed in legitimate debate. I feel, sir, that with a treaty of this kind, which may mean the very future of the Republic, it is worse than idle, it is worse than wrong and wicked to say that time shall not be occupied in legitimate discussion and legitimate debate.

What difference does it make if some few men upon this floor are convinced of one thing or another? What difference does it make that some one upon this floor may believe that he must vote a certain way because of

certain things? Nevertheless a discussion that is 196
germane to the subject and relative to the particular
matter is one which ought to be heard at least with
patience by the few who are present, the making of which
should not call for the sign of any displeasure upon the
part of any individual under any circumstances. Whether
it be a matter of displeasure for some or not, neverthe-
less we will pursue the even tenor of our way in presenting
this thing as best we can. There is another day, another
day far beyond that in which we are speaking. There is
another time coming when it may be that some one will look
at that which has been transpiring today. There will be
another time in the history of this Republic when there
will be other conferences, and other conferences wherein
people may be heard upon various subjects and various
categories. If preceding 1922 we had had a conference
wherein we had learned something of that which might be-
fall us during one of those peculiar assemblages, if then
we had had knowledge of what might happen to us, perhaps
we would never have sacrificed all that we sacrificed in
1922.

Then, as I said this morning, there was but one vote
against the treaty. There will be more than that, at any
rate, today; and the experience this body may have had
from the discussion of this treaty may save some future
Senate from some future conference and from some future
giving away of the Navy of the United States. If we do

no more than point the way, if we do no more 197
than have them pause and heed and listen and think in
the days to come, we will have done enough.

Talk about a conference limiting armament and reducing naval force! Until it came from the Senator from Pennsylvania the other day there had not been a single, solitary word mentioned by anybody, except when I cross-examined the Secretary of State before the Foreign Relations Committee about the demand for another dreadnaught over at London. Talk to me about parity, and of the fact that we had parity with Great Britain in battleships. Here is the provision that was in the proposition made by the American delegation, submitted by the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania; submitted, as I am told, with the statement that its terms could not be altered, only its phraseology could be rewritten. In submitting it, here is what he said:

In order to realize now the parity in battleship tonnage which was ultimately contemplated by the Washington treaty by balancing the RODNEY and NELSON the United States may lay down one 35,000-ton battleship in 1933, and on completion scrap the WYOMING.

Just think of it! The American delegation in writing says, "Why, we have got parity with Great Britain now. It makes no difference that the RODNEY and the NELSON are powerful ships, and that those powerful ships are better than ours; we have parity, and we are able to do everything that is essential of a navy equal to that of Great

And in their official communication they say to the other parties to this contract, to those with whom they are dealing, "In order to realize now the parity in battleship tonnage, we demand the right to build another battleship."

I do not need to argue any more about parity in battleships. There is the argument presented by our brethren, the delegates to London.

When Secretary Stimson was asked about that, he paused a moment and said, "That was a bargaining point." Bargaining for what? We never got a thing. Bargaining for what? Bargaining, finally he said, as I recall it, for the right to modernize our ships! We were already doing it, and had spent nearly forty million dollars doing it. So he was bargaining with a mythical battleship in order that he might obtain parity in order that he might modernize ships which he was already modernizing, and which he could not stop modernizing if he wanted to. That was the situation presented by the testimony, and these gentlemen never have mentioned anything about this battleship they asked for over in London. The London Times says--I don't know how accurate the statement is--that when they gave out their statement over in London of their demands, or their desires, they omitted that portion of it relating to the battleship. I do not know how accurate that is, but the London Times states it,

and it was not until two days afterwards, when it 199
was learned from the Japanese delegation, that the press
knew America was demanding another battleship. At any
rate, we were demanding it. That is where we got. We
were demanding it. We did not get it, of course. The
British Admiralty saw to that, but we demanded it, and
we demanded it in order that we should get parity. So
much for that.

Mr. President, now I leave the subject temporarily.
It is an embarrassing situation, this, with me. I speak
in frankness here. With the Secretary of State I was on
terms of fair amity. I wished him well. I wish him well
now. When he went abroad on this excursion I hoped that
he would succeed. I dislike exceedingly to be in dis-
agreement with him. It is embarrassing for me to be in
disagreement with two of my fellows upon this floor. I
like to be on terms not only of intimacy with all the men
upon this floor, but on terms of affectionate friendship
with all of them here. It is embarrassing to disagree
with them. But there is something far beyond their feel-
ings or mine, something far beyond our personalities in
this discussion.

This treaty is a treaty which ought not to be rati-
fied by the United States of America. It is a treaty
which, in the days to come, will plague us. It is a
treaty which, sitting where I do, three thousand miles
away, I know can not do what ought to be done in behalf

of our country. It is a treaty which, after all-- 200
and you can not gainsay it--denies us the sort of ships
to which we are entitled for our protection, and in one
kind of ships Britain makes the specifications for our
Navy. It is a treaty which we should not, if we believe
in American defense and the protection of American com-
merce, for one instant tolerate. It would do no harm to
defeat it, not a bit. Remember, there are two nations at
loggerheads which are outside of the contract relations
now, just as they have been for a long time in the past.
They are parties to the original contract to have another
conference in 1931. That could be held. No one could be
harmed. No country yet has ratified this treaty. Why is
it necessary, with the invitation coming to us originally
and to the other countries from Great Britain--why is it
necessary for us to be forced to ratify this treaty, to
be forced no matter whether we want to debate it, or no
matter what we wish to say concerning it? Why is it
necessary that we should be the first to act upon this
treaty?

It emanated from abroad, and, emanating from abroad,
there first it should be ratified. It will be ratified
in England if the Labor government lasts, I concede. It
will be ratified in Japan, I admit. But if there should
be a change in the government across the Atlantic and
that change should come before ratification, no man could
say what might be the result. Why, I ask, is it

necessary for us to act in such haste? Echo
answers, "Why?"

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There has not been time for these gentlemen who attended the conference ever to make a report upon this treaty. There has not been even a report from the Foreign Relations Committee. There has not been a written line officially, save the message which came to us lately from the President, concerning this treaty. Never before in the history of this land was such a procedure followed. Why is it necessary now, in the heat of a political campaign and in the dog days in the city of Washington, to ratify this treaty and to ratify it without delay?

Today the Chief Executive has in his hands, I am informed, various appointments to various offices which constitute the most important positions internally and domestically this country has. He will not send them even to the Senate for fear we might be delayed an hour, two hours, or a day in the ratification of this treaty.

The whole country may go hang, every policy may be avoided, offices which have been created by the Congress with the President's assent may go unfilled, in order that this treaty may and must be ratified. There is no earthly reason for the haste and for the mode in which its proponents have gone forward with this document. Sir, upon every standard it ought to be denied ratification and ought to be sent hence without the approval and the sanction of the Senate.

Mr. President, this day has been of singular significance to the distinguished Senator from Texas.² It is of singular consequence to me, sir, too. This day is the twenty-first birthday of my older grandson, and, Mr. President, I cannot do better by him in whom my affections center nor for those situated as he is throughout this land than on this day to dedicate my poor efforts and my limited talents to the endeavor to preserve the traditional policy of the American Republic and to keep this country free and independent in its every action in regard to other nations.

I speak, Mr. President, not as a citizen of the world; I speak as a citizen of the United States. With that I am quite content, and speaking thus, sir, I speak with the philosophy that has ever been mine during my political life, the philosophy so well expressed in the

¹United States Congress, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 479-490.

²The day was the fifteenth anniversary of the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution; Senator Sheppard of Texas had previously delivered an address describing the evils of the liquor traffic.

I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true;
I am not bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up
to what light I have. I must stand with anybody that
stands right, stand with him while he is right and
part with him when he goes wrong.

So, Mr. President, today I stand where I have stood
during the entire political life that has been mine. I
stand where I stood in 1918, in 1919, and in 1920, and
where I have stood every minute since that time. I stand
here, sir, quarreling with no man for his views as to our
international relations. I stand here critical of none in
this body. I stand here, though, sir, even though I be a
little lonely now--I stand here representing the same
spirit that I endeavored to represent many years ago and
that in all the succeeding time I have represented as
best I could here and in this Nation.

Mr. President, a matter of transcendent importance
today comes before us. It will not do, sir, either by
pronouncement or otherwise to belittle what is now before
us. It is nonsense to say to me that what we do is of
little moment and small consequence, because the implica-
tions that arise from this action of ours today are impli-
cations which may bode ill for the future of the American
Republic. Believing thus in every fiber of my body and
believing it, sir, with every throb of my heart, I cannot
do otherwise than present as best I may, within my very
marked limitations to this body and, although it may not
carry far, to the people of this Nation what today is

being sought and what, if accomplished,
it may mean to the American people.

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Mr. President, we are asked now to join the League of Nations Court. We are told that we have delayed action for so long that the Senate has been engaged in some reprehensible practices and is open to the caustic criticism of every internationalist there is upon the face of the earth. I deny it, sir. The Senate needs no defense at my hands at all. The Senate, indeed, ought to be unto itself sufficient for its defense under any and under all circumstances. I recognize the faults that may exist here; I recognize that there are times when all of us, if disposed, may indulge in all sorts of criticism concerning our action as a body, and all sorts of criticism, perhaps concerning some individual activities; but, Mr. President, after all, this is the last free forum there is upon this earth; after all, speak of it as you will, denounce it as you wish, refer to it, if you please, in such language as the internationalists refer to us throughout this land, term it what you may, sir, this Senate of ours stands the bulwark of American principles, and it is the last place where people may look for the protection of their rights and the security of their liberties.

This Senate is just that; and so, Mr. President, I resent the criticism that has been leveled at the Senate by those who are citizens of the world, and who are no

longer content with being merely Americans.

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When they tell us that we are responsible for the delay in regard to entry into this nefarious contraption abroad, I answer they are responsible, and their allies abroad, and not ourselves.

It was in 1926 when erroneously the Senate gave adhesion to the protocols of the League of Nations Court. It adhered to them with reservations which were the irreducible minimum of protection that should be accorded our country in entering that tribunal. Ever since 1926 all that was necessary to be done for taking us into this Court would have been the acceptance of the protective reservations that were made by the United States of America. Finally it remained, when those protective reservations were discussed, for a distinguished American to return here with something else and some substitute that altered the original reservations which had been adopted by this body, and it is they who have caused the delay and not the Senate of the United States. If our conservationists and Europe's scheming diplomats had been willing to accept the irreducible minimum of American protection, there would have been no delay. If Mr. Root had not at the instance of Sir Cecil Hurst manufactured something destroying our irreducible minimum of protection, there would have been no delay. At any moment, much as I would have regretted it, we would have been in this adjunct of the League of Nations. And that the Senate was

right and they were endeavoring to do

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something else while assuming they were doing only what had been done is demonstrated by the resolution of ratification with its addenda, the celebrated fifth reservation, now presented to the Senate.

Mr. President, the World Court, the League of Nations tribunal, the sacrosanct tribunal for the preservation of peace throughout the world--we are to enter for what? For the determination of any American question? Not so, not so. Are we to enter it for the purpose of deciding any controversy that exists between our country and any other country? Not so, not so. Are we to enter it, sir, in order that we may preserve peace between European nations that now disregard and snap their fingers at that court? Not so, not so.

Why do we enter it? Not for America, not for our beloved Republic; we enter it to meddle and muddle, under an hysterical internationalism in those controversies that Europe has and that Europe never will be rid of. We enter it to do something that is foreign to our soil, foreign to our people, foreign to the genesis of our institutions, foreign to their very characteristics and to our Republic. We enter it for that and that alone, and you may be just as certain of that in the beginning as at the end. We are going into the World Court, sir, not for America, not for the United States. We are going in, sir, for the benefit of the Hejaz of Arabia,

and for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 207
for Italy, for France, for England, and for all those
States that constitute at present the League of Nations
in foreign lands. That is why we go into it. We go into
it in the sacred name of peace, when there is no peace!
We go into it because in stentorian tones gentlemen,
weeping great salt tears, tell us that we must go in in
order to preserve the world's peace. We preserve the
world's peace! It is a beautiful thought; it is a
marvelously naive expression that we, with all the nations
of Europe save one, feeling toward us like a recalcitrant
debtor ever feels toward a creditor, are to go among them
to preserve peace among them, which they cannot preserve
for themselves.

Where do they go if they want to preserve peace? Not
to their League or their Court. Italy meets with France
in secrecy for the determination of African boundaries
and for the settlement of differences that may exist. If
this Court is such a body as is represented to us, if it
has the capacity for peace that is attributed to it,
attributed only by Americans and by no one else, if it
can solve the problems that now exist in European nations
and throughout the world, why do not these people with
their problems go to that Court for solution? Yet not
one of them in the matter of peace or the preservation
of peace has ever used the Court or ever will. They
will unite among themselves and do just exactly as they

ever seek to do, and, doing that, they

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take us into their particular organizations; that if trouble arises we may bear the brunt, go forward and lead the way in matters which do not concern us and then pay the meddler's price.

For peace go into the League! What peace do you mean? Do you mean that we are going to take up the question of France bombarding Syria? Oh, no; we will stand aside and wink and blink and have naught to do with such a dreadful thing by such a great power. Will we deal with the Egyptian question, with the Egyptians knocking at the door for many, many months in the effort to take up their matters of difference with Britain? Oh, no; Britain is too powerful and too great for us for a single instant to touch such a subject unless Britain desires. Are we going to deal with Mussolini, who blowing up Corfu only a few years ago, laughed at the Court and laughed at the League? Are we going to stop him now in matters concerning Abyssinia, where he is to be given a free hand by France? No; we will do nothing of the sort, and none of them, although the League and the Court are theirs, will brook the slightest interference from their own creations.

Are we going to take up the question of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and her rape of China? Are we going to attempt to deal with what Japan has done in tearing up the Nine-Power Treaty of peace into which she has entered? Oh, no; our Secretary of State prior to

the present one tried that. He tried 209
it when he was told by some of these great nations abroad
to take a lead. He buckled on the sword and marched
ahead, and when he had marched a short time he looked
around to see those who had induced him to march, but they
had vanished, and he had nothing to do but to turn and re-
trace his steps and unbuckle his sword, and the matter
rests today just exactly in the sweet will of Japan.

Peace, sir! With what peace are we going to deal?
Two little nations down in South America today are at
grips. They are at grips in a dreadful and awful war,
Bolivia and Paraguay. They are both members of the League
of Nations, Mr. President. They are both members of the
peculiarly sacred and noble institution abroad. They
have been fighting for three years now. They have
decimated their very populations by warfare. What peace
are we going to bring? To what peace do we contribute
by going into the League or into a part of the League?
Who says we will have peace, peace? Only the blind
American internationalists who in their anxiety to forget
their Americanism in fawning upon other nations, would
blithely lead us into any peril.

I want peace, and I yield to no man upon this floor
in the desire for peace. I yield to none upon this
floor in praying that there shall be no strife among
nations or among human beings in the days to come. But

where is peace today, and what peace do we 210
gain by going into this Court or by going into the League
of Nations? As I shall show, going into the Court will
ultimately mean going into the League of Nations just as
surely as that night follows day.

"Peace, peace, peace," they cry, when there is no
peace. "Peace, peace, peace," they cry, when those for
whom they strive do not desire to keep the peace and do
not keep the peace and will not keep the peace. To say
that our entry into this Court will bring peace to the
world is to me the most silly thing that ever was advanced
by sensible human beings. If the proponents rest their
adhesion to it upon this mystic formula, and apparently
they do, there is not a man in this body who understands
the English language and follows current events who ought
not in contempt to send them out of this Chamber and
refuse to accede to their hypocritical cry.

Peace, Mr. President! We have maintained the peace
for years and years in this Nation. We have done it with
arbitral courts and arbitration treaties. One hundred
years of record of our arbitrations will not be met by
this particular instrumentality of the League of Nations
in ten thousand years. We have never refused to arbitrate
a question or a controversy; never! We have arbitrated
some that were of extraordinary consequence and that were
of transcendent importance to our land and to the world.

that has been made. Never have we violated in any fashion or in any way any award that has been made by our arbitral tribunals. We have accepted all that have been made, and we have preserved our peace, and we have settled our controversies in that way. To say to us now that we can preserve peace and we can be influential in world affairs only by entering a part of the League of Nations, a League of Nations Court, is to deny the truth of the past hundred years in this Nation and in the world, and is to set at naught the remarkable record which has been made by the United States of America in its arbitral relations with other countries.

I am interested in peoples, Mr. President. I care not for those who consider themselves rulers of people. What commends the gentlemen in the White House to me is that in his philosophy I take it he believes in peoples. Peoples I should like to protect. Peoples' interests I should like to conserve. But I cannot conserve the interests of the people of the United States by sending them into a league or a court where the controlling individuals represent dictatorships, absolutism, tyranny. The state of the world today is that that is exactly what is the fact.

This, sir, is the most unpropitious time to ask this country to betray its long-standing traditional policy.

Of all the times that have come to us

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during the lifetime of the oldest of us, this, sir, is the worst moment in which to ask the United States of America to join this peculiar foreign relationship of the League of Nations.

All Europe is seething now. We do need to be told that. All Europe sits over a volcano. No one knows when the explosion will occur, and when difficulties will happen. If Europeans do know, Mr. President, they are looking forward to the day when with their propaganda they will do what they did with their propaganda in 1917--take this glorious country of ours into a war which with our treasure and blood we will win, and then afterwards hate us for the very aid that we rendered them and never forgive us for saving them.

We have had our lesson, Mr. President. How often must we be kicked in order to understand exactly what is transpiring? Mirabeau once said of the distinguished statesman Talleyrand that he could be kicked on one side seventeen times and retain his facial composure. That might be. I am wondering if the expectation is with our foreign brethren that they cannot kick us once, twice, or thrice, but that they can kick us seventeen times and we, with the inferiority complex which seems to be a part of some men's character in America, kicked thus we will retain our facial composure and go right ahead to do

exactly as they went.

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Mr. President, what is transpiring abroad today all of us understand. Why go abroad to be a part of them in one fashion or in another? Why, now of all times that the Lord ever gave to us, should we depart from the policy which has been ours ever since we have been a nation, and become a part of the mess that exists over there and put ourselves in a position not where dire results with certainty will happen, but where possibly dire results may happen? Why should America take the chance?

I am interested, sir, in eleven million unemployed Americans. I am interested in the swelling relief rolls all over this land. Do you not think there is room here for the exercise of the highest degree of statesmanship we possess in dealing with our eleven million unemployed Americans and the relief rolls which are swollen out of all bounds now? Do you not think that we can deal with our own for a brief period and forget Europe's controversies, Europe's difficulties, and Europe's wars, into which again they would take us if it were possible for them to do so?

Do you not think, Mr. President, there is work enough here for all of us? Do you not think it tries us to the uttermost to deal with the subjects now before us? Why not deal with them? I detest the idea of standing upon this floor and taking even a brief period

upon a subject matter such as is now

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before us. I resent that I have to turn my mind, little as it is, from those things which seem so important to me in our own domestic economy and deal with some subject which is across the sea and which amounts, it is said, to little, but into which, with all the driving force that there is politically in this country and by powerful and costly propaganda, they are shoving us at the earliest possible moment.

Why, sir, must we turn aside? Delay in the Court, you say, Mr. President? Yes; delay there has been, delay because those abroad would not accept what the Senate wrote into the Senate's acceptance of the protocol of accession. Delay? What delay is there that will occur in the near future that need affect us in the slightest degree? Why turn aside now from ourselves to go abroad for others? I would rather take care of the trials of American citizens here than indulge in the trials of a foreign court abroad.

This Court, Mr. President, comes, as we know, from the League of Nations. It will not do in the heat of this discussion to say that we are undertaking no obligation concerning that League. If there is anything that the American people have definitely decided and upon which they have rendered their verdict, it is that our country should not enter the League of Nations with or without

If there is anything that ought to have been definitely in the limbo of the past it is the League of Nations so far as the United States of America is concerned. And yet, sir, it is proposed now to take us in, not only to a part but to an integral part of the League of Nations, and the hope is that we will be taken into the League itself, and when in the League itself, then it will not be difficult for Europe to wreck us.

Authority for this Court, Mr. President, is contained in article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, constituting Part I of the Treaty of Versailles. Let me digress to suggest, What is the trouble abroad? What is it that causes the unrest, the unrest which seems to be in every nation over there, and which has been growing constantly and more menacingly with the passage of time? What is it that has caused it? It is the Treaty of Versailles that is maintained there in all its rigors and with all its injustices. What is maintaining it and what is it today that maintains the status quo under the treaty which now nearly every publicist in all the world denounces as a wrong and injustice?

What is it that retains the status quo of that treaty? It is the League of Nations--a part of it the World Court--and it is because that treaty has been continued in inflexibility, with all its harshness, that

the difficulties have arisen abroad and that 216
today war is in the air everywhere. It is the Treaty
of Versailles; but do Senators think that we would go
into this sacred Court and rectify the Treaty of Ver-
sailles? Rectify the treaty? Why, those who profited
by it would not for an instant tolerate its rectifica-
tion.

And so these great institutions that we are to be
driven into, either with the party whip or to be driven
in by propaganda of internationalists or by those
pseudo-intellectuals who have been driving, driving,
driving during the year--these contraptions abroad, for-
eign in character, are maintaining the status quo of the
Versailles Treaty; and they, and they alone, are
responsible for the unrest and the inflammable condition
that exists abroad now.

The Treaty of Versailles came into force January 10,
1920. It contained provisions that the jurisdiction in-
stituted by the League of Nations is authorized to ad-
judicate certain disputes. At the second meeting of the
Council of the League in February, 1920, M. Bourgeois
proposed that a committee of League experts be appointed
to prepare a draft scheme for the organization of the
Court.

I read this because this is the historic statement
of how the Court was organized.

In making his report, M. Bourgeois, 217
among other things, pointed out that in order to give
full effect to the stipulations contained in the treaty,
it was essential that consideration be given without de-
lay to the formation of a court.

The Council appointed an advisory committee of
jurists to prepare plans. In the communication inviting
the members to serve the Secretary General of the League
pointed out that they were to prepare plans for a court,
"a most essential part of the organization of the League
of Nations." In accepting the invitation the committee
assumed the obligation of creating a court in accordance
with these instructions.

At the first meeting of the committee at The Hague,
June 16, 1920, the solidarity between the League of
Nations and the proposed court was emphasized. M.
Bourgeois described the two institutions as complementary
to each other. M. de Labradell said, "The new Court,
being the judicial organization of the League of Nations,
can only be created within this League." Mr. Root acted
in accordance with these views.

On June 22, 1920, Mr. Root said, "We must first
consider that this new Court must be provided as a part
of the system of which the League of Nations is part.
We cannot accept the invitation of the Council and
recommend a plan for a Court which is not going to form

a part of that system."

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The plan of the committee was referred to the Council. Modifications were made by the Council of the League. The Assembly of the League made other modifications and alterations; and finally a draft statute was presented to the plenary Assembly of the League of Nations and adopted December 13, 1920. The stature of the Court came into being through a resolution passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations providing for a protocol of signature. The signature to the protocol was limited by the League to members of the League and to states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant of the League.

One of the officials of the League, Mr. Hagerup, of Norway, reported the Court's constitution to the Assembly of the League away back in 1920 and used this language:

You know that a representative of the United States of America, a man of the highest authority, Mr. Elihu Root, took part in the preparation of this constitution. The political party to which he belongs in the United States will soon come into power--

Of course, you realize that this is an old prophecy.

The political party to which he belongs in the United States will soon come into power; and though this party has not yet decided to go into the League of Nations, it has proclaimed in a resolution that it is quite prepared to accept the Court. I think I shall be voicing the general sentiments of the Assembly when I say this resolution has within it important results. It is a first step leading to the entrance of the United States into the League.

There is an unbiased and an unprejudiced opinion

concerning the Court by one of the

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gentlemen who was a part of the League of Nations at that time.

Not only that, Mr. President, but there is other evidence as well that makes it perfectly certain what the situation will be after we adopt this resolution.

It will not do to say that nothing will happen, because the propaganda that has been in evidence in the past year or two concerning the Court will be emphasized a hundredfold to go into the League after we shall have gone into the Court, and we shall be pilloried day in and day out by the highly paid propagandists and all their dupes.

Just after the matter concerning the World Court was presented in 1923, a gentleman who was then a friend of mine wrote me concerning it. He is a member of this great organization presided over by Mr. Manley Hudson, that has some title like "The League for the Preservation of Peace" or "The League for the Obtaining of Peace,"¹ or something of that sort. It is a big national organization. My correspondent is its regional director in the West and this he wrote me. I asked him at the time if he was willing that I should publish it. He said that he was,

¹Actually, "The League to Enforce Peace." Was Johnson's distortion intentional?

and I read it then in a speech that was

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made in 1926. I say that so that the Senate may know that I violate none of the amenities in reading it.

He wrote me:

My dear Johnson: How small the world is, now that electricity has put us all into one room! Anyhow, I read in the paper this morning your sarcastic quotation from an alleged "great writer" who could perhaps be identified--"all of which is partly true."

You are quite right....

Your strictures on the Hughes-Root-Taft plan to sneak in the back door of the League of Nations are "partly true." The whole scheme is illogical, impractical, insincere, and cowardly. And I am for it. But not for those reasons. You, from your standpoint, will be quite right in being against it. There is no present practical situation calling for action. It is a purely academic, theoretical proposal. There are theoretical arguments for it which are "partly true." You can make others as good against it. I am for it because, as an opportunist, if the Government has not the courage to walk into the League by the front door, I am willing not to approve but to submit to the alternative policy of sneaking in the back door. It will ultimately get us in. This is the final reason why you should be against it and I for it. But in your immediate strictures on the manner of it I agree with you, and am glad if you found my phrase one which you could use, even derisively, as a weapon in the criticism.¹

Oh, yes--Chester H. Rowell. He is a publicist of California, and is now one of the editors of the San Francisco Chronicle; and Senators will find, if they look in Mr. Manley's last book, that he is on the committee that is conducting the campaign.

¹ When Johnson had finished reading the letter, Senator Robinson of Arkansas asked for the name of the writer.

It may be that Mr. Rowell since then has 221
changed his views. I do not know; I do not care; but
I am not of the same opinion that he is. I am not ready
to walk into the League by the back door, or the front
door, or in any other fashion. I recognize, and of
course you do, the danger inherent in what we are doing
today, and the possibilities that may transpire.

Away back in 1926 the New York Times printed a dis-
patch from Europe in which it quoted an incident that
occurred when the news came to Geneva or to Paris--I do
not know which--concerning our subscribing to the World
Court at that time. The dispatch was by Edwin L. James:

When Premier Briand was asked today to express an
opinion on the Senate's favorable vote on the ad-
hesion of the United States to the World Court,
he said, "It is a beau geste. I hope it is the
first step."

"I hope it is the first step." Of course, he knew,
just as we knew, that it is the first step. But here the
clever English statesman, Austen Chamberlain, British For-
eign Secretary, who was present, interrupted quickly, "It
is better not to say that."

"It is better not to say that!"

And so we have M. Briand saying with great glee, "It
is the first step," and Mr. Chamberlain saying, "Hush! It
is better not to say that," but we can know and we can
understand just exactly what this means, and what will be
done.

Senator from Idaho, openly avows in the press that he is going to endeavor to take us into the League, and that the State Department already has written for him the resolutions that are essential. That, I take it, is the fact, because it was repeated to him in the committee meeting, and he substantially agreed that it was so. So there we are. We are going into this Court with the knowledge upon the part of those who are the influential members of it and of the League that it is the first false step.

Senators, remember Virgil, "Ficilis, descensus Averno." "Easy is the descent to hell." This is the first step that we are taking in going into the League of Nations, and the propaganda will be well-nigh irresistible once we have taken that step.

There is another reason--and I shall not deal with it at any great length--why it should be impossible for us to enter this so-called "Court." This is no court as we understand courts. This is no institution where merely justice is done judicially between the litigants. This is a court not only with its judicial attributes but with its political attributes, and the latter the more important of the two. This Court, political in character, has demonstrated its political proclivities, and demonstrated them so clearly that nearly the entire press of this Nation,

in disillusionment, on the rendition of the decision in the German-Austrian tariff case, spoke of the political character of the Court.

The political character arises, of course, out of advisory opinions. I am not going into them at any length today, because they will be presented upon this floor by another and far abler man, who, having made a study of the subject, can present it so that none can misunderstand. But what are these advisory opinions? Purely political. Judge Cardozo, in a case in New York State, long ago defined what an advisory opinion is. In Two Hundred and Twenty-fourth New York he says, concerning advisory opinions, "The giving of such opinions is not the exercise of a judicial function." Then he goes on to explain how in England they are given, and winds up with the fact that they are merely advisory; they are not judicial in character.

So we have decisions that are rendered by this Court political in character; and I am sorry to say that the reservation which protects us from any political activity with nations abroad--the reservation which has been carried on every single solitary resolution of accession to this Court in the past--was defeated before the Foreign Relations Committee, but will come upon this floor again for action by the Senate.

When the decision was rendered in the Austro-German

customs union case, various newspapers

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throughout the land commented on it. I have gathered some of those comments together from those papers which are not unfriendly to the entrance of the United States in the Court. I have taken but a few of the many, but these few I want to read so the Senate will understand that it is dealing here not with a judicial tribunal but with a political tribunal, and it ought not to require any evidence on the part of any man with a head upon his shoulders to understand that fact.

How long do Senators think a man from Italy would sit upon that Court and render a decision against Italy and Mussolini? If Germany had continued to be a member of the League and Germany had a representative upon that Court, how long do Senators think that representative would last with Mr. Hitler if that representative rendered a decision against him?

Take it with every one of those governments where dictatorship exists that have representatives upon the Court--why, of course, human nature will convince us, unless we have forgotten all we know about it, that the men who sit there, representatives of dictators, representatives of those people where angry passions nationally have arisen--those representatives will decide not according to the law, not according to the judicial concepts that we may have; they will decide upon the politics of the

situation and upon the politics that affects
their particular territory.

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Here are some of the views that were expressed by
newspapers upon this subject when the German-Austrian
decision was made.

From the Chicago Daily News, September 9, 1931:

THAT WORLD COURT ADVISORY OPINION

Many advocates of entry by this Nation into the
International Court of Justice, one must think, are
deeply disturbed by the inescapable implications
growing out of the advisory opinion given by that
tribunal in the Austro-German customs union case.
It is painfully manifest that the majority in the
8-7 result reached its adverse conclusion by a
process of reasoning that is decidedly more
political than judicial...The United States Senate
has yet to decide whether or not it will accept
the World Court protocols approved by the
National Executive. And most assuredly neither
the Senate nor enlightened public opinion will
entertain the idea of adhering to a quasi-judicial
tribunal that sacrifices principles of law to
political considerations or the fancied interests
of a particular power or alliance of powers. Such
a court...belies its solemn pretensions and betrays
instead of upholding the cause of international
law and justice.

From the New York Herald Tribune:

THE TROUBLE WITH THE WORLD COURT

The reaction in this country to the World Court's
advisory opinion on the Austro-German customs
union has inevitably been unfavorable. Some of the
strongest friends of the Court have expressed the
greatest disappointment. It could hardly be other-
wise, for the line-up of the Court exhibited a de-
pressingly strong political bias, and its decision
by an 8-7 vote robbed its findings of all weight or
pretense to finality. Faced by a major issue,
affecting the fundamentals of European organization,

the Court failed to function either judicially or effectively.

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From the Chicago Evening Post:

By the vote of 8 to 7, the pact was ruled illegal. Unfortunately for the prestige of the Court, the cleavage was wholly on partisan lines, with France and her continental allies swinging the majority vote. Former Secretary of State Kellogg, the American member of the Court, voted with the minority, which held that "It cannot find reasons explaining how the regime would endanger her (Austria's) independence."

World Court skeptics can claim, with some show of justice, that wherever there is a shadow of doubt, politics rather than law dominates the Court's post-war decisions.

From the New York Times, probably the strongest internationalist paper there is in the United States:

A fear that the behavior of the World Court in the matter of the German-Austria customs alliance would be seized upon by American enemies of the Court was justified last week. Washington dispatches related that Senators who have steadily opposed American adhesion to the Court, with or without the Root formula, are prepared to fight the proposal again, and believe that they at last have definite evidence to support their hitherto theoretical argument. This evidence the Senators hold to has been supplied by these circumstances of the World Court's opinion--its political cast; the advance intimation, so that the abandonment of the plan at Geneva by Germany and Austria before the decision was made public could be charged to foreknowledge, and inferences to be gathered from the division among the judges.

Realistic friends of the World Court are agreed that its prestige has been deeply injured. There can be little doubt that the chances of American adhesion have been badly damaged. In the Senate there has been no particular enthusiasm for the Court. The protocols have been kicked about committee rooms. Presidents, while urging them upon the Senate in grave and lofty terms, have been inclined to let

things go at that. No real administration effort to press the issue has been made.

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Meanwhile the enemies of American adhesion have attacked the advisory-opinion function of the Court from two angles. They have expressed resentment at the prospect that the United States should be given European advice on its sovereign rights, thrusting aside the answer that, by formula, this prospect is excluded. They have contended that in its decision the Court is certain to decide from the political viewpoint when great nations are involved. The recent line-up of the Court has given strength to the latter contention and color to the former. When the World Court divides 8 to 7 on an advisory opinion sought by the League Council, it is obvious that this opinion is of no value. And when the detail of the division shouts "politics" it is obvious that the charge must lie.

And then in addition to that, the other equally strong internationalist paper, the Baltimore Sun, has this terse expression. It says of the opinion, "The product of partisan judges who voted like ordinary politicians for the boys back home."

And this is the sacrosanct Court that we are to go into in order that we may save the world, bring peace to a war-torn Europe, and ever afterward have happiness among all the peoples of the earth.

The propaganda that has been used in this regard is such that it ought, indeed, to make every man here stand straighter in determining the fact and rendering his decision.

There is one thing that is of extraordinary importance in this Court as well, and that is what the implications are from membership. Before the Committee

appeared Mr. Clark, and he presented a brief in relation to this subject matter that I think is unequalled in all the briefs we have had and all the evidence that has been put before us since this controversy began.

Mr. Clark holds distinctly that behind the Court are the sanctions of the League, and that we may find ourselves, if we sit upon this Court, in the very singular situation finally of being a party to sanctions being imposed upon recalcitrant nations. We understand, of course, what sanctions are. Sanctions, under the League formula, mean any sort of thing that may be done to enforce its conclusions and its decisions. But they mean something else. Oh, you peace-loving gentlemen! Oh, weep your eyes red in telling us about the peace that will come to us from the League of Nations and the Court--you, you are standing here in behalf of the League of Nations in thus doing--sanctions are the cruelest, the harshest, the most terrible thing in all the horrors of warfare. I would rather see men shot by shell or even killed by poison gas than to have women and children and noncombatants, the weak, sick, and the infirm starved to death, as is the plan of the League of Nations when its decisions may not be carried out.

Sanctions! If there are sanctions behind any decision that this Government may render, then this Government has

departed so widely from its old traditional

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policy that every American ought to hang his head in shame.

Sanctions! Sanctions mean simply starvation, want, hunger, killing the weak, the infirm, the small, the aged, and the young--those who cannot fight. They mean the cruellest thing that there is in all warfare.

Not only does Mr. Clark say that sanctions are behind the decisions of this Court, but Mr. Manley Hudson himself, the great bellwether in all the propaganda in behalf of the League and the Court, says exactly the same thing. Mr. Hudson says, in his work:

The statute fails to make any provision for the enforcement of either interim or final judgments, and the only sanctions behind the Court are those contained in the covenant; and if any State shall fail to abide by a decision it will be for the council of the League to propose what steps shall be taken to give effect thereto.

And the council of the League may determine that sanctions be employed.

Why, there was talk of sanctions only a little while ago when Japan tore up her treaties and broke her solemn agreements--there was talk of sanctions then. But do you know what they asked and what was wanted? They wanted the United States of America to stand in the van and to be the one first to apply the sanctions to Japan because of Japan's actions in Manchuria and in China. And be it said to the good sense of our people, we declined to be the

cats-paw, although our Secretary of State

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apparently marched ahead for the purpose of going the route. And, of course, he was immediately deserted by the great members of the League.

I do not want any son of mine or any grandson sent over to China in a war between China and Japan. And I have very strong feelings concerning the attitude of the Japanese in relation to treaties and in relation to what they have recently done, but God deliver us from the day when by joining a league, or joining a court, this country of ours will be party to levying sanctions upon a harmless part of a particular nation or bring starvation to those who are least able to bear it. I want none of mine in it. Why take the risk? How ironical to join for the sake of peace--the peace of sanctions...¹

One of the arguments which was advanced by my distinguished friend from Arkansas the other day--an argument with which I was not unsympathetic--was that we should not stand aside, accept something from the Court, and then refuse to pay our proportion of expenses or to do that which we ought to do. He called it a "sponger" argument, and as

¹At this point Senator Huey Long of Louisiana interrupted to ask, "Mr. President, how does the Senator mean to spell that word, 'peace?' They have an eleven billion dollar piece over there now belonging to this country." Johnson replied, "I was going to speak of that in just a moment."

sponger argument he held it up to

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ridicule and to obloquy. I would not say that he was

not right concerning that sponger argument, but just look for a moment at the other side of the picture. You want to take our own revered Uncle Sam where? Where spongers upon him sit in judgment upon him, and not only the

spongers upon him but those who made and solemnly signed treaties. Every one of the spongers got out money as they begged it. Every one of them wept in gratitude.

Every one promised in treaties to repay. Every nation

owing us save Finland violated their solemn written

promises and repudiated their plighted faith. Now we are to sit with spongers, with welchers, and with repudiators of treaties in the sacred name of peace. What a scene!

Talk to me of a sponger argument! Take our country into a gathering of that sort, and where are we? I have heard in my time of a debtor submitting himself to the judgment of his creditors, but I have never yet heard of a creditor submitting himself to the judgment of his

debtors,¹ and this is what we might wander into in the

¹Johnson had used this line before. He wrote in a magazine article in 1919, "I have heard of men who placed themselves in the hands of their creditors, but the United States is asked to place itself in the hands of its debtors." "What of the Nation," August, XIII, 108 (October, 1919).

this internationalist bypath. In their gyroscopic somnambulism, these gentlemen, pseudo-intellectuals, who think they are beyond ken and that no man is able to comprehend them, talk in this lordly fashion. They tell us, "Just take your country into the leadership of the world," never for an instant thinking of the older nations that have lived all their lives with their glorious history behind them and are proud of their traditions. What do they think when they hear us prating about leading the world and leading them? They must smile with their tongues in their cheeks as they devise the methods for utilizing our didocy.

Some of our people have an inferiority complex in dealing with foreign nations; that is something remarked upon all over the world, and we cannot avoid remarking upon it here. There seems to be a segment of the American population that spends its time in its anxiety to obtain a foreign decoration. I recall when I was in Paris one distinguished American waiting there for two long months to get a decoration from France.

I feel friendly toward every nation; I have no prejudices, no hatreds--none whatever--or bias at all concerning a single one; I recognize their right to do just as they please; but I demand my right to have my country do just as it pleases. I do not want my country

shoved across the water, so that it

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may be--not will be, but that it may be--under the power of those who are abroad. Senators all know how those abroad think and feel toward us; there is no use amplifying that subject; but now is the most unpropitious time that was ever suggested for us to join the League Court; now is the worst of all the periods when this question has been before us to do what is asked of us.

I wish that I could prevail upon the Members of the Senate to secure the statement of Mr. Reuben Clark which will be found in the Foreign Relations Committee, part II thereof, and read what he says, and also read his brief. It is a remarkable document prepared by a very able man. He has the advantage of not only being a very great lawyer but he has also been a diplomat, and he has been connected with the State Department in days gone by. If Senators will read that brief, if they will follow at all his argument, they will be in a better frame of mind to do the thing that ought to be done this day.

Now, in order to ease us into the World Court, we are repeatedly told that we need not submit any questions unless we want to and that we can go in and be a part of the Court and submit questions or not, just as we choose. Like my friend from Arkansas, in the case of the sponger argument, I cannot fathom entirely that kind of argument. It is neither appealing nor persuasive with me. It was

phrased a little differently by one of

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our Presidents when he said that it--the Court--is a convenient instrumentality to which you may go but to which you cannot be brought.

I do not care for instrumentalities of that sort. If this country is going to join any organization abroad, let us go in not with the idea that it is an instrumentality to which we may go but to which we cannot be brought; let us go in with our heads high, though we hate it; let us go in as Americans manfully to play our part. To say to me that we are going into an organization as to which we may go in if we want or stay out if we desire is an argument that has neither force nor weight nor logic nor persuasiveness behind it. If we are going to act in the fashion that we should, if we are going to stay out altogether, the argument may be more or less effective with certain individuals. But that is not the purpose of this particular organization, and very shortly after we get in we would find the purposes presented by the organization vastly different from what we assumed them to be under an argument of that kind.

Mr. President, the resolution of accession presents a rather strange situation. I am not going to present it at any length particularly today, but I should like to commend it to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas and

to the Members who are here. I am not clear as to what was done with the reservations that were supposed to be attached to the resolution of accession to the Court. Let me recall to you the historical situation. We have a protocol dated 1920; that is the original protocol of admission to the Court. We have then a protocol, or call it such, concerning amendments to the Court; and then we have the protocol presented at the time the Root formula was submitted here. I am unable to determine for myself, I am not clear in respect to the matter whether or not the first four reservations are preserved by the protocols that are thus accepted by us. It is true that we accepted on one occasion the protocol with our reservations; it is true that thereafter there was a gathering of the clans at Geneva out of which came the Root protocol, but the Root protocol does not traverse the first four reservations, only one of which, in my opinion, is of very great importance. I may be entirely in error in this, and we will take it up as we proceed with the argument hereafter, but there is no place that I am able to discover where there has been an acceptance of the reservations which were adopted by the Senate which will be authentically official in the days to come. As I say, I express that thought in interrogative form to the Senator from Arkansas and we may take it up subsequently

during the debate.¹

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Mr. President, to resume briefly, I want to say that I am very glad to have these discussions. The fact of the matter is that all of us have been engrossed in our daily tasks. They are no small tasks, too. All of the Senators, I am sure, feel just as I do in that regard. Naturally, it has been a difficult thing to twist our minds back over the period of twelve years in a contest that was of great moment, but that lasted for a long time, and had many, many details; and I think the more we can thrash this thing out upon the floor in the fashion that we have done today, the better it is for the Senate and the more information will be derived, because, sir, I believe there are men in the Senate who want information upon the subject and are very glad to have it.

As the President said this morning, this is not a political question. It is not a political question with me. This is one of the questions where men may disagree,

¹Here Senator Steiwer of Oregon interrupted to ask to what reservations Johnson was referring. There followed a discussion, in which Senators Borah, Norris, Thomas, Robinson, and Vandenberg participated, which served essentially to establish the parliamentary status of the resolution of advice and consent of 1926 and the Senate reservations thereto, and the various protocols of adherence and accession to the World Court considered by the Senate since 1926 up to and including those under consideration at the time of this speech.

it is true; but it is one of the

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questions where a man may do all in his power under all circumstances, and go forward, no matter what the consequences may be, in behalf of an honest opinion. I am ready to do that, and I have done it for sixteen years in the past.

In 1919, when we began the contest on the League of Nations, there were few to do us honor, and few to listen to our arguments. We went from State to State then presenting our cause; and although the great newspapers of the country supported the League, and every paid propagandist in the country was on his feet and on the rostrum in behalf of the League, when the common people--who, thank God! are in the majority yet in this Nation--understood the issue, there was no question about the results.

It is just people in whom I am interested. I can not, of course, convince a metropolitan daily or a professor from a particular college. Of course, I can not convince a gentleman who receives a salary of considerable extent per week or per month for propagandizing concerning this matter. But I should like again in the strength that I had in 1919 and 1920--I should like again to present this question and the question of our going into Europe--I should like to present it to just the common people of America, and I would do it with an absolute confidence that they would again agree that

we should never join with a European

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organization that might take us across the water and again embroil us in Europe's wars.

Mr. President, this is not the first time that this country of ours has had to consider what would be done under certain circumstances in regard to its foreign policy. It is a little more than a hundred years ago when with sanctified utterance the endeavor was made by the Czar Alexander to bring to the world his great Holy Alliance. His language was not different from that we heard during the fight upon the League of Nations or that we hear now about this World Court--a court so futile in its operations that it is really unable to decide anything except a political question.

The Czar Alexander, one of the great monarchs of the time, and one of those who was conqueror of the great Frenchman--the Czar Alexander in language as florid as any that has been dripped on us, told of the aims of his Holy Alliance, and I desire to read a word or two that you may see how history repeats itself, and so that you may see how even in the young days of the Republic men then stood their ground and fought their fight, fought it for their country, and announced their doctrine, which has been the doctrine from that time to this.

The Czar and his fellow sovereigns forming the Holy Alliance sent forth their pronunciamiento to the world as

Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity. Considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all places render each other aid and assistance; toward their subjects and armies, they will extend a fatherly care and protection, leading them (in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are themselves animated) to protect religion, peace, and justice.

I will not read the rest of the pronunciamiento, but it is composed in the same diction and follows along the same high plane with the same high purpose. Then forming, as they did, the Holy Alliance, the victorious monarchs started in the holy name of peace to make plain to the people of the world how never again should war trouble, how men should ever walk upright, and all should be brothers. Unctuous in their liberality, they promised subjects happiness and prosperity. They went on with the Holy Alliance until finally England, carnny England, began to understand, and England ultimately withdrew.

That is what we are doing today, you know, bringing peace and happiness to all our people by joining a war-like aggregation across the Atlantic Ocean! The Holy Alliance continued its activities until Metternich, wily politician and clever statesman, finally wrought his will within that alliance and its cornerstone became legitimacy. Then when people had revolted in Spain and

the wretch who had been put upon

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the throne had fled, the Holy Alliance, in the name of "religion, peace, and justice," sent its troops to Spain, destroyed freedom, and put him back upon the throne, and thereafter the Holy Alliance became simply the engine of tyranny and an object of contempt and ridicule.

During the period of time when the Holy Alliance was embracing the world and telling the world just exactly how it should act, and how it would carry on and keep its peoples free and happy and contented and prosperous, its advocates came to America for the purpose of engaging our Monroe and our Adams, and getting our accession to their particular tribunal. Oh, ye people of Massachusetts! let me read what Mr. Emerson said in that day. Let me state to you that during that period when the Holy Alliance was asking the accession of the United States of America, the Massachusetts Peace Society passed its resolutions, demanding that we join this particular tribunal for the sake of maintaining peace throughout the world. Emerson then indulged in just a brief remark;

Aloof from contagion during the long progress of their decline, America hath ample interval to lay deep and solid foundations for the greatness of the New World.

Let the young American withdraw his eyes from all but his own country, and try, if he can, to find employment here...In this age the despots of Europe are engaged in the common cause of tightening the bonds of monarchy about the thriving liberties and the laws of men; and the unprivileged orders, the bulk of human society, gasping for breath beneath their chains, and darting

impatient glances toward the free institutions of other countries. To America, therefore, monarchs look with apprehension, and people with hope. 241

Today what have you in Europe? What is there there? Monarchies? Worse. You have the absolutism in Italy; you have the peculiar sort of government in Germany; you have the strange crew now cheerfully engaged in executions in Russia. All along the line Europe has its separate affairs to solve. It has its kind of people--- better than we, perhaps, but not like us. There they are governing in their own fashion. They have in the sacred name of peace their League and their Court. Let them have them; but do not make us become a part.

Think of the things that have passed in the long days gone by in the history of our country when it was young, and when it was weak. During that period is when here we gave birth to the Monroe Doctrine. You will realize, I have no doubt, the difficulties that confronted the small Government during that period, and why it was that we endeavored to keep ourselves free and keep ourselves clear of foreign entanglements. I can never forget the language of your Massachusetts man, Mr. Adams, during that period of time. Mr. Adams instructed Middleton, July, 1820:

The political system of the United States is... essentially extra-European. To stand in firm and cautious independence in all entanglements in the European system has been a cardinal point of

their policy from the peace of 1783
to this day...

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Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes of others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply...

And that is what troubles us. The temptations increase and multiply during these days with us to depart from that which has been our only safe anchorage during all the days of our existence.

Our intellectuals, you know--these pseudo-intellectuals who are so perfectly certain they are right, and who feel very assured of their mentality with the cherished views that they hold, who are impervious to any knowledge of anything that smacks of reality--they go about all over the land trying to muddle us in theories that are theirs, to have us change the Government under which we have lived so long. Mr. Adams, clear-headed and American said the possibilities:

Should renewed overtures on this subject be made--
Said Mr. Adams to Mr. Middleton--

Russia would be answered that the organization of our Government is such as not to admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added that the President, while approving of its final principles and thoroughly convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the conception and presided at the formation of this system, by the Emperor Alexander, believes that the United States will more effectually contribute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded by abstaining from formal participation in it. As a general declaration of principles,

the United States not only give
their hearty assent to the articles of the
Holy Alliance, but they will be among the most
earnest and conscientious in observing them. 243

As a general principle I will give my hearty assent to the doctrines of the League of Nations and the World Court so long as they are practiced and so long as they are developed in Europe for European ills, but we are different from those people abroad--can you not understand that? We have not only national prejudices in this country of ours, but we have difficulties which arise within us from those who come from abroad. The other day we saw accounts of a number of American citizens going over to the Saar to vote. I resent the idea that American citizens should do that. But it illustrates better than any words of mine could how difficulties with us multiply, and are different from those difficulties that exist abroad.

Here we are supposed to have a melting pot. It has not melted as yet, and we are obliged to concede it. Here we have men and women from every clime on the face of the earth--men and women who perfectly naturally have their hot passions for the territory from which they come. You may take an oath and say abjure it all, but it is in the very nature of man that he should love the spot in which he was born, and you cannot eradicate it from his mind or from his soul. And in this country,

with these various elements, we have

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the troubles not that they have alone, but we have the added troubles of having every one of these racial groups interested, passionately interested, in what goes on in the country from which they came. We are different from these people abroad. We are told every day, Oh, distance has been annihilated and means of communication are such that we are all brought closer together, and therefore we ought all to form one great world nation and one great world community. A distinguished gentleman in the State Department, Mr. Wallace McClure, has been issuing some releases of late. Senators may get them if they desire. I understand he is a most excellent gentleman and is the assistant to Mr. Sayre, who has been here among us. Mr. McClure has been releasing some speeches that he has made which are so grandiose in character that I sometimes fear he is afflicted with delusions of grandeur. It is said that all distance is annihilated and all communications bring us right together, and therefore it is time for us to go abroad.

God gave us two great oceans that put us here upon this hemisphere. Distance has been annihilated abroad, it is true. There is only the shadowy boundary line between France and Germany, but that shadowy boundary line, across which these two Nations are brought face to face constantly, in a generation--aye, in a century--cannot

because of proximity remove and cannot

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obliterate the national passions that exist or remove the enmities of centuries.

We are different over here. Why go abroad? What reason is there that we should alter our system in the slightest degree and go abroad to enter a Court or a League of Nations or any other organization of any other kind or character there where political questions may be decided and political questions determined?¹

Yes; it is a very interesting thing. I do not want to get into a discussion of the debts at the moment. I do not know whether or not Senators remember the arguments on the League of Nations. They were founded all upon a moral obligation that we had--a moral obligation. We were so great and so beneficent, so beautiful and so good that we had the moral obligation to lead all the rest of the world, and we were going to do it by virtue of going into the League of Nations and putting our resources and our men at the disposal of that particular aggregation. Today it is the same thing. A moral obligation rests upon us to go into this Court. Do you not realize, Mr. President,

¹At this point Senator Huey Long again interrupted to point out that although England had balanced her budget and was preparing to reduce her taxes, she had at the same time sent a note to the United States declaring that she was unable to pay the interest on her debt.

when they say to us now, to minimize what 246
we are doing, that we will not need to do anything once
we get in because we do not need to submit to a decision
unless we want to and we do not need to have a decision
acted upon at all unless we wish--do you not realize that
once we get in we have gone in and the moral obligation
will be preached to us day in and day out until we will
be called a "welcher" if we do not do the job in the
fashion in which the internationalists wish us to do it?
Once we get in we are gone. That is all there is to it.
So if there be any danger at all, out we should keep and
out we should remain.

Mr. President, let us look, too, at another thing
which is important in this case. If there were anything
like a Republican Party in this body, I would address my-
self to it in that regard, but I address myself to every-
body here in that respect. To the Root protocol is
annexed practically the latter part of the fifth reserva-
tion which was adopted by the Senate. What it provided
is that if the United States has or claims an interest,
over the objection of the United States a case cannot be
heard. That is, in substance, what is provided; I do not
quote it with accuracy but I quote the substance of it.
Who is to determine whether or not a case shall be heard?
Who is to decide it? The cry is rampant throughout the
land today to destroy the Senate as a part of the

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treaty-making power. All the good people who want to take us abroad and who want to make us citizens of the world instead of citizens of this country, all of them in unison cry, "Take from the Senate of the United States its power in making treaties; strip it of the right and leave them naught to say respecting treaties." By this reservation the Senate is deprived practically of the right to say aught concerning what is a treaty. It is a delegation of power that is quite as dangerous as delegations against which there has been some outcry of late. A portion of the reservation that is attached to the Root formula therefore may be effective under certain conditions, or it may not be effective at all. Where do you suppose we will land if the State Department, with the international views of our present State Department--and I speak in terms of high commendation in some respects of the present Secretary of State--where do you think we will land if the State Department has the determination of whether or not an objection shall be made to the hearing of a case by people abroad? Once we have advisory opinions relating to the United States of America, political as they are, and as we know they are, and as has been admitted today--once we have advisory opinions rendered in matters in which the United States is interested, the whole fabric that has been built up since we were

a nation goes crumbling to the ground, 248
and so it is that we ought not to take the initial step.

I read a little while ago the instructions of Adams to Middleton. By the way, Mr. Canning, who was running the affairs of England at the time, made some remarks about the Holy Alliance when finally he quit it. He said;

What was the influence which we had had in the counsels of the alliance? We protested at Laybach; we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste paper; our remonstrances mingled with the air.

If they get us over there at Geneva into the Court, our protests will be treated as so much waste paper and our remonstrances will be mingled with the air.

On November 19, 1823, during an interview with Addington, Mr. Adams, while suggesting the difficulties that Great Britain might find in breaking her former close relations with her allies, declared that the United States would decline to attend any conference on South America, unless the new republics were also invited to be present. No Congress, he maintained, could give Europe a right "to stretch the arm of power across the Atlantic." In the strongest terms, he reflected upon the pretensions of the congressional system.

That was the Czar Alexander system under the Holy Alliance. Mr. Adams said;

The very atmosphere of such an assembly must be

considered by this Government as infected--and unfit for their plenipotentiary to breathe in. The ground I wish to take--

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Wrote Adams in his diary--

is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force in South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe. As the Holy Alliance has come to edify and instruct us with their principles--

He wrote in reference to Poletica's Mission of Exhortation--

it is due in candor to them and in justice to ourselves to return the compliment.

Oh, of course, that was a long time ago. The man who uttered those words long since passed away. Naturally his words and the words of those who were his contemporaries are regarded now by our internationalists not only with contempt but with some degree of contumely. We have been teaching some of our people that patriotism is a sin and that no man should speak his love of country and none should engage in any eulogium upon his Nation.

There is a grand old man who wrote the fifth reservation, John Bassett Moore, undoubtedly the most astute international lawyer who lives and the most learned. He has filled many roles, always with credit to himself and always with honor to his country. He it was, in conjunction with the late Senator Walsh and former Senator Swanson, who prepared the fifth reservation,

but, you will remember, Mr. President,

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how the difficulties mounted and multiplied over that reservation in the days that followed. Just think for a moment and then see if you cannot doubt some of the intellectuals who believe now with such certainty that they can direct world affairs.

When the reservation was presented, it was overwhelmingly adopted by this body. It went abroad, where it met with some objection in some particulars; and then the most astute lawyer that probably has existed in this generation was sent abroad by one of our Presidents in order to write a new fifth reservation and bring back something that was just as good but a little different, and he did it. He brought it back, and then all the intellectuals accepted the Root formula.

I was belabored, as every other man who was opposed to the Root formula was belabored all over this land, bludgeoned by the newspapers who believed in internationalism and wanted to take us abroad. Oh, it was claimed, the Root formula answered every question, every single, solitary objection; it had to be accepted in fifteen seconds by the recalcitrant Senators; it ought to be adopted without a single solitary moment of hesitation. All over the land the cry went up; and those individuals who had not approved of Mr. Root's substitution for the work of the Senate of the United States were abused in a

fashion that has seldom been met with.

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Yet what has happened? Finally we are justified in the opposition we made to the Root reservation, for today the proponents of the World Court annex to the Root formula the fifth reservation which the Senate had adopted and which the Root formula sought to destroy.

So I say to you, Mr. President, if we do with too much confidence in what our internationalists and our pseudo-intellectuals insist upon as the appropriate method of procedure, remember what has transpired in regard to this single reservation and look at least a little skeptically and a little doubtfully upon what they say.

Mr. President, I know what the situation is, and I know it full well. I am very glad that the Lord gave me the ability to stand upon my feet and to fight my fight, no matter what was in store. I am very glad that today, on an occasion such as this, I can present my views, even inadequately and in sketchy fashion, as I have, concerning a matter in which I think my country is involved.

I wish I had the power and the eloquence--oh, I long for that which some men have been given in such profusion, I long for that facility of expression and that power which could arouse in the Members of the Senate the same thoughts that I have regarding our

country and regarding its future.

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We are all alike in our designs, none of us would do aught that would injure our Republic; none of us desires to do that which in the days to come we may repent; the only question is, How can they see this thing; and the only appeal that I can make to Senators is to see it with your own eyes, to probe it with your minds and your own heads; decide it according to the God-given mentality you have, and decide it as you believe to be the right. If you believe in that right, stand up to it no matter what the consequences may be, for it is your country that calls to you today. This is no little matter with which we deal; this is no trivial policy upon which we are asked to act; this is the American policy which comes to us today. It is the American policy that means either that which we love in the future or that which we may fear in the future. We can be, and we ought to be, Americans. The only appeal that I make is, for the love of God, without fear, let us be just Americans.

Mr. President, a little over twenty-four years ago, I sat in the House Chamber in a joint meeting of the Houses of Congress, listening to a President tell us why it was necessary for us to enter the war. I listened then, first, because I was new to the Congress, secondly, because of the words of the President. I recall his first line. He said, "It is terrible to take this great, peaceful country of ours into the war."²

Then he spoke his reasons for wishing that to be done. His words had upon me an effect which I have never forgotten. I spent that night almost sleepless, thinking of war and what war meant. I feel somewhat in that condition today, especially after the Senator from Maryland³

¹United States Congress, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8670-8671. The proposed amendments would have permitted U. S. ships to (1) carry defensive armament, (2) sail into combat areas, (3) carry goods and passengers to belligerent nations.

²Johnson's memory was not entirely accurate. The sentence to which he alludes came in Wilson's last paragraph. "There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace..." United States Congress, Congressional Record, LV, 321 (April 7, 1917).

³Senator Millard M. Tydings, who had previously denounced Administration support of Britain against Germany.

delivered his peculiarly apt speech

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respecting the situation which we face. I felt twenty-four years ago that it was a terrible thing to take this country into war. I feel tonight, sir, upon the eve of that perhaps being accomplished, that it is a terrible thing to take this country into war.

I speak tonight under some handicaps, but I have the feeling, sir, that no man can do more when the time comes than to speak as he thinks he should speak in behalf of his country.

And how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods?

Tonight I have a feeling, sir, that scarce lets me speak concerning what we are about to do. I have the feeling that we are committing a grave mistake, that we are placing our country in a peril which I cannot adequately describe.

I think, sir, that I have heretofore referred very briefly to the fact that this is a question, after all, of peace and war. Other Senators have the right to have any opinion they see fit to have in regard to war. I have the right to have my poor opinion in regard to peace.

I am at an age now, sir, when war is to me, as President Wilson described it, a terrible thing. I am at an age now, sir, when I firmly believe that any man who would take this country into war, when his judgment is against it or his conscience tells him otherwise, would

be doing the greatest disservice he could do unto this country.

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Tonight we speak the last word. It is the last word which deals with this subject of war. If Senators upon this side of the Chamber--I am in a place where I ought not to be perhaps--can be cajoled or can be threatened or in any other way induced to vote for war against their better instincts and their better manhood, then I say they will do something unto their country that they can never undo, and I say that at seventy-five years of age I do not want upon my soul the infamy of taking this country into war when I believe fully it ought not be taken into war.

Mr. President, we have heard the question of what war means and what peace means so often broached on both sides of the controversy that it would be a work of supererogation for me to discuss it further; it would be idle for me to tell the Senate what war means or what peace means. It would be useless for me to say to any of my colleagues that they are ruining their country. They do not want to ruin it any more than I do. Their motives are just as pure as mine, I take it. They ought to be. If they are not, they ought to be ashamed of themselves. But I believe their motives are just as pure as mine, and they ought not to take their country into any path at the end of which is ruin, and ruin is at the end of this vote which is about to be cast tonight.

Russia one billion dollars. We gave to her the greatest loan ever given to any nation, I think, within the memory of man. We gave Russia a billion dollars to do with just as she saw fit. Then can Senators say that there is no danger in what they can do?

I shall not now argue the right or wrong of the sinking of any particular vessel. The chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee has the records. They show no wrong, perhaps, upon one side of this controversy. They speak for themselves. Senators can see them if they wish to. If they do not wish to, they can close their eyes and say nothing concerning them.

I speak now of money, and I speak of it in the secondary aspect alone. The money we have expended in our preparation for war and the money we have loaned to other countries is an amount large enough to ruin any country on the face of the earth. I do not see how our country is ever going to repay the money to those from whom it has been borrowed or get back that which we have loaned to others. Money has been loaned to almost every country that can be thought of. The administration fights in every sea of the world. The administration permits our ships to pass through every ocean and every bay, and then expects to get off scot free.

But, Senators, it is war, war, it is war that you

cannot afford, that none of us as

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Americans can afford. I am simply an American. I care not for Great Britain or "Bundles for Britain," I care not for Germany and Hitler's crimes. I care not for Russia and Russia's greed. I care not for any of those countries. I am only an American, claiming the right to speak as an American in an American Congress. There have been too few words spoken in the American fashion.

Take these things by themselves; put down in a column of figures exactly what the liabilities of this country are today. Write them down and tell them off, and then say to the people of this land, "There is no danger of war; there is no danger of any kind or character." Write them down in any fashion you choose; write them with all the peculiar ambiguities which are established by the White House; and when you are through, there is a staggering amount of money due this people, which we never again can pay.

What do you say to it? You say, "We have freedom of the seas." Do you not realize that Wilson surrendered the freedom of the seas in his last campaign? Do you not realize that when he, the greatest man in the world at that time, acclaimed by the common people in every country on earth, and whose meetings were greater than those ever held by man before, asked for the freedom of the seas, he was told instantaneously by Great Britain, "You cannot have freedom of the seas?" I do not know why we are talking

the seas will always be denied by Great Britain, I do not care whether she squinted at it in the papers which were drawn up between the Prime Minister and the President. She will never surrender freedom of the seas. Control of the seas is the cornerstone of her prosperity and her empire. She once refused to grant freedom of the seas; we acquiesced, and that was the end of it. When the time comes, she will again refuse, we will acquiesce, and that will be the end of it.

It is hard for me to talk. I am an emotional old man. I feel very keenly the great things of life. I feel more keenly than I can say what befalls us in our daily walks. Declare war tonight, and, under the Providence of God, every man who votes to do so will live to regret it to the last day of his life.

Recall again the whole system of war. War is not a plaything. It is not something for you or me or somebody else to play with. War is a brutal actuality. We cannot afford war. I cannot afford it. None of us can afford it. In the name of God, in the name of all the mothers of this land, and in the name of all those who have been asking our assistance and intervention in this controversy, I appeal to the better part of the nature of all Senators. Do not declare war. Do not plunge this country into that sort of holocaust.